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COLD WAR PROPAGANDIST FOR
DEMOCRACY AND GLOBALISM

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PREFACE

Since starting the first draft of this manuscript in 2003, U.S. strategic goals have undergone a radical transformation from a Cold War Era policy of “Containment” to the present day policy of “Preemption.” What began after World War II as a quest for global economic security—some would say hegemony—through diplomatic initiatives which stressed broad-based trade incentives, has devolved into Roman-style, garrison-state, expansionist overreach. Madison Avenue expertise has given way to perpetual conflict and has resulted in blunder after adventurous military blunder.

The Office of Strategic Influence (OSI), designed by the Pentagon as the propaganda arm of the nation’s military (and purportedly scrapped by its architects), has seemingly morphed into the Office of Special Plans (OSP). According to Pulitzer Prize winning investigative journalist, Seymour Hersh, “A small cluster of policy advisers and analysts ... call(ing) themselves, self-mockingly, The Cabal ... which was conceived by Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, has brought about a crucial change of direction in the American Intelligence Community.”¹ Preempting other more recent exposés on this “White House Intelligence Group” (WHIG), Hersh noted that “These advisers and analysts, who began their work in the days after September 11 2001, have produced a skein of intelligence reviews that have helped to shape public opinion and American policy toward Iraq.”²

The immediate goal of the WHIG, post-9/11, was to “find evidence” that tied Saddam Hussein to Osama bin Laden, and thus to the destruction of the World Trade Center. Polling conducted in the months following the attack on the WTC and the Pentagon, and the downing of the civilian jetliner in Pennsylvania, points to the success of the propaganda that emanated from the OSP: ^Aseventy-two percent of Americans believed it was likely that Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the September 11th attacks, although no definitive evidence of such connection has been presented.”³

While it may be evident that the influence of the OSP was crucial in swaying President Bush toward a preemptive war on Iraq, what is less obvious to the public are the roots of the “neoconservative” ideology that shapes current U. S. foreign policy. Former University of Chicago political philosopher, Leo Strauss, spawned such members of the “cabal” as Abraham Shulsky and Paul Wolfowitz. Strauss’s philosophy is that, ^Aphilosophers need

to tell noble lies not only to the people at large but also to powerful politicians.”⁴ The utility of this philosophy can be seen in the evolution of a bipartisan American foreign policy after World War II. But its far-reaching corrosiveness to a liberal democracy is evinced in debacles like the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and both the Vietnam and Iraq Wars, to name but a few.

THE MEN WHO NOW SELL WAR

Where once American propaganda was utilized to present democratic capitalism in the best possible light, it is now employed by its present purveyors to sell war. So says journalist James Bamford, author of such groundbreaking works on American Intelligence as *The Puzzle Palace* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982) and *Body of Secrets* (Anchor Books, 2002), who notes that the civilian sector of the Pentagon, along with like-minded cohorts in the CIA, set up a “clandestine operation—part espionage, part PR campaign—for the express purpose of selling the world a war.”⁵ Again, according to Bamford, the man in charge of the operation was “a secretive and mysterious creature of the Washington establishment named John Rendon.”⁶

Rendon and his firm, The Rendon Group, are in the business of “perception management, manipulating information ... and, by extension, the new media ... to achieve the desired result.”⁷ In this case, the Rendon Group “created” the Iraqi National Congress (INC) out of wholecloth; a Potemkin Village, as it were, of anti-Saddam militants. Ahmad Chalabi, handpicked by Rendon to lead the INC, contacted Judith Miller of the *New York Times* who openly courted neo-cons in the Bush Administration, to disseminate “reliable and significant” information, which purported to expose Saddam Hussein’s renewed program to develop “weapons of mass destruction.” The information, which turned out to be spurious, was then woven into a larger web of deceit and disinformation; a pattern that has characterized much of U. S. foreign intervention since at least the infamous Gulf of Tonkin Incident. As it pertains to the current Iraq conflict, Bamford likens it to “President Kennedy ... outsourc(ing) the Bay of Pigs Operation to the advertising and public-relations firm of J. Walter Thompson.”⁸

Bamford claims that Iraq may be the “first war based almost entirely on a covert propaganda campaign targeting the media.”⁹ More ominously, U. S. geopolitical strategy has shifted away from its reliance during the Cold War

on the superiority of American values and know-how, to “communications networks and technologies that control access to, and directly manipulate, information. As a result, information itself is now both a tool and a target of warfare.”¹⁰

Today, American democratic propaganda has come full circle from its basic tenet that the best this nation had to offer could successfully be sold to the rest of the world, albeit by less than noble—and transparent—means. What we are now witnessing is the fully-realized ambition of every erstwhile dictatorship: control over a vast communications network—the likes of which the world has never seen—which can be used to manipulate public opinion to the extent that the public would accept, even welcome, the loss of its own liberties. Perhaps, then, what former practitioners of the art of propaganda failed to recognize more than fifty years ago was that, like the atom, once the genie is let out of the bottle, its spread and usage is impossible to control.

This book is a study of U.S. propaganda strategy and some of its major proponents during the Cold War in the 1950s, including President Dwight Eisenhower, and, most notably, his chief adviser for psychological warfare, C. D. Jackson. My aim is to present a comprehensive analysis of so-called “democratic propaganda” as a tool in confronting post-war communist expansion. I focus on how it was employed as a method of celebrating the virtues of what we call, the “American way of life.” In addition, what unfolds is a story of how one individual, C. D. Jackson, evolved different modes of traditional advertising to construct an effective counterbalance to Soviet propaganda in Europe, and around the world. Finally, I will assay the efforts of these American “psywarriors” in ultimately stemming the Soviet quest for world domination, and ending the Cold War.

ENDNOTES

1. Hersh, Seymour, "*The New Yorker*," 12 May 2003.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Bamford, James, "*Rolling Stone Magazine*," 2 February 2005.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The rigorous task of preparing a manuscript is made possible, and enjoyable, by the contributions of those people who support your work. I take great pleasure, then, in singling out for appreciation the mentors, colleagues, teachers, librarians, archivists, technicians, institutions, historical witnesses, and family, who aided this undertaking with their guidance, their knowledge, and most of all, with their encouragement.

First, I would like to extend a special debt of gratitude to mentor, colleague, and, most important, my treasured friend, Blanche Wiesen Cook. The subject itself was motivated by the important and invaluable scholarship of Professor Cook. A Distinguished Professor at the CUNY Graduate Center and at John Jay College, Blanche opened up a vast field of study to me and generously shared her wealth of historical resources. When first I met Blanche Cook as one of her Diplomatic History students in 1996, she recommended psychological warfare during the Eisenhower Administration as a topic for my doctoral thesis. I agreed, and it has been a rewarding choice, for it afforded me the opportunity to work with one of the preeminent historians in the nation. Her ground-breaking biographies of former First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, and former President, Dwight Eisenhower, are cornerstones in the field of modern political history. Moreover, Blanche has remained a constant inspiration to my work, and her expert editorial suggestions contributed greatly to whatever excellence is reflected in this manuscript.

At the State University of New York at Stony Brook, I had the great fortune to be mentored by David Burner, whose intellectual guidance over the years has been indispensable to the completion of this project. Professor Burner painstakingly read several drafts of my original manuscript, and provided insights and suggestions for improving the narrative. His own expertise in the field of political history added immeasurably to my understanding of the Cold War and the atmosphere that spawned it. His friendship over these last sixteen years has been greatly appreciated and his recent passing leaves a void in all he touched.

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An integral part of my research, were the personal reflections of those whose careers were dedicated to fighting communism while keeping the United States at peace. The hours spent interviewing former CIA official, Tom Braden (recently deceased) at his home in Virginia, were both eye-opening and pleasurable. Likewise, the late Abbott Washburn, former United States Information Agency Deputy, and his lovely wife Wanda, were gracious hosts at their Washington D.C, home, and they had a treasure trove of first hand experiences to contribute. Noted historian, the late Arthur Schlesinger Jr., also took the time to impart through correspondences his views on the subject of psychological warfare.

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my beloved Maine Coon cat.

INTRODUCTION

Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free.

John 8:32

When President Dwight D. Eisenhower entered office in January 1953, among his first tasks was to develop a new dialogue with the Soviet Union in order to lessen global tensions, and to diminish the risk of the unthinkable: nuclear war. In April of that year, the President reached out to the communist world in a speech entitled “Chance for Peace,” crafted by one of his top political advisers, C.D. Jackson. In his address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Eisenhower lashed out at the current state of affairs between East and West which was fraught with danger and, in the President’s words, “was not a way of life at all ... It is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.” Ike was not, in fact, abandoning America’s commitment to stopping the spread of communism throughout the world. The distinction, however, between the Eisenhower White House and that of his predecessor, Harry Truman, would be in the methods employed in fighting the Cold War.

Dwight Eisenhower met his soon-to-be chief of psychological warfare, C. D. Jackson, during World War II when Jackson was flown into North Africa to take charge of the Office of War Information. On loan from Time-Life Inc where he served as vice-president, Jackson was one of Time founder Henry Luce’s leading apostles of the “American Century,” Luce’s defining description of the twentieth-century. It was the effectiveness of the psychological warfare program directed at the Axis Powers during the war that led both Eisenhower and Jackson to conclude that the key to the successful prosecution of the Cold War lay in propaganda — democratic propaganda.

Jackson and Eisenhower understood the power of propaganda, and they were convinced that psychological warfare was “just about the only way to win World War III without having to fight it.” C. D. Jackson, businessman and public relations guru, was a master of using Madison Ave-style advertising to project for the United States a positive image to a post-war world that was confronted with a choice between communism and capitalism as a way of economic life. With Eisenhower in the White House, CDJ was to become the preeminent US image-maker and he would sell his most important idea to the world: that the United States possessed the best way of

life, and that democratic capitalism delivered more to the largest number of people. Jackson created the concepts and Eisenhower was the salesman. During the 1950s, Jackson and Eisenhower worked together to construct a strategy of psychological warfare that would remain for decades a driving force in the development of modern United States diplomatic relations.

1947-THE ALLIANCE SHATTERED: MEETING THE SOVIET CHALLENGE

On 14 August 1945, World War II ended when Japan surrendered five days after two of its largest cities were obliterated by nuclear bombs. Following seven long years of carnage, compromise, and genocidal horror, the world looked fearfully but optimistically to the future for a lasting peace. Keeping the peace in the postwar period would require an enduring bond between two improbable partners in the defeat of fascist tyranny: America, which had emerged from World War II with vast military strength and increased economic standing, and communist Russia, which was ideologically alien to America's geopolitical interests. Not surprisingly, the Grand Alliance soon gave way "to a global antagonism between two hostile coalitions, one led by the United States and the other by the Soviet Union."¹

A series of portentous postwar events, including the division of Germany, the unleashing of the atom by the Russians, the Soviets Union's ever-tightening grip on Eastern Europe, the Greek Civil War, Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, and the Truman Doctrine, diminished Franklin Roosevelt's design for postwar political and economic ties between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. What began as a collaboration between two widely disparate societies in a noble quest to rid the world of one of its more hideous tyrants, Adolph Hitler, had devolved into a clash of egos and self-interest.² By 1991, the superpower conflict had economically exhausted Russia and rent the Soviet Union, while leaving the United States a seemingly omnipotent but greatly despised and embattled power, crusading for "globalization" in the curious language of freedom and democracy, especially for the newly "liberated" former Soviet satellites.

At the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, the Americans charged the Soviet Union with violating the Yalta Agreements concerning Eastern Europe. Soon after the war ended, the Russians began growing increasingly uneasy over the American reluctance to support what they

thought to be equitable war reparations and, they believed, that the United States was backing away from its commitment to de-Nazification. More ominously, the fires of war were being stoked by some Republican reactionaries who charged the Roosevelt Administration with capitulation for abandoning Eastern Europe to communist dictatorships. When the U.S.S.R. displayed its own nuclear capabilities in September of 1949, there were calls for new and more powerful weaponry to be added to the American arsenal. Inevitably, the apparent ability of the Soviet Union to match the destructive power of the United States led in some quarters to discussion of the unthinkable: a preemptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union and China. William Knowland, the Republican majority leader of the Senate, warned his colleagues that, “atomic stalemate” worked to the advantage of the Soviet Union. “Time,” he said, was “running out.”³

But not everyone during this seminal period in the Cold War thought that a return to bloody battlefields was the only realistic option. Significantly, Eisenhower himself thought that the Cold War could be fought bloodlessly. Covert warfare, observed Ike at the time, was “just about the only way to win World War III without having to fight it.”⁴ Moreover, Presidential Adviser C.D. Jackson claimed “it is possible, by operating on men’s minds, so to condition them at home and abroad, that a nation may achieve victory—bloodless victory.”⁵

C. D. Jackson, Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for International Affairs and Cold War Planning, had long been a footnote to United States’ Cold War history. Now, thanks to the diligent work of Eisenhower researchers, most prominent among them historian and journalist, Blanche Wiesen Cook, Distinguished Professor of History at John Jay College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, Jackson has emerged from the historical shadows to assume his rightful place among the central figures of the 1950s struggle against communism. Thousands of hitherto unseen Cold War documents relating to Jackson’s work in the field of psychological warfare are now declassified under the Freedom of Information Act, owing in large part to the Watergate Scandal of the 1970s.

A key aide in President Eisenhower’s first Administration, Jackson was also a vice-president of Time-Life Inc and, according to Professor Cook, “one of Henry Luce’s leading apostles”⁶ of the gospel of the “American Century.” During the 1950s, he played a major role in developing “America’s political warfare strategies.” Cook, in her illuminating work, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, claimed unequivocally that, “if there was a hierarchy of

American Centurions, C.D. Jackson would surely be in the first rank.”⁷

As President, Eisenhower worked with CDJ to export democratic capitalism in a program that combined economic development with American ideology. According to observers, “Eisenhower wanted to wage the Cold War not only on the diplomatic and covert fronts, but also for world opinion.”⁸ Jackson’s position as one of the Administration’s top speech writers placed him in a perfect spot to assist Ike in his crusade for a bloodless Cold War victory, and afforded him the opportunity to spread ideas that as a businessman he embraced. Through Eisenhower, Jackson could deliver the message that it was “peace” we were waging, not war. In one of Eisenhower’s most memorable speeches he declared that, “Our aim in the Cold War is not conquest of territory or subjugation by force. Our aim is more subtle, more pervasive, more complete. We are trying to get the world, by peaceful means, to believe the truth. That truth is that Americans want a world at peace, a world in which all peoples shall have opportunity for maximum individual development.”⁹

C.D. Jackson and President Eisenhower would answer the bellicose cries of the saber-rattlers with a clarion call of their own. Jackson outlined his “Strategy for Survival” in a rapidly changing and dangerous world: What would win the day; he promised in sermon-like prose to a wide and diverse audience, was propaganda: “we had better get used to it, because goodness knows we need it, and just because Dr. Goebbels and the Kremlin have debased it, that is no reason why we cannot elevate it.” He made palatable the idea of “an official propaganda organization”—which, he confessed, many citizens found “dishonest” and “un-American”—by comparing it to teaching “a word of wonderful meaning.” In addition, CDJ emphasized that “We must tell our side of the story to the world; trumpet our good deeds; combat the poison that the communists are spreading about us throughout Europe. Propaganda does not have to mean Nazi, (F)ascist, or (C)ommunist techniques. Propaganda can mean, and for us it must mean, the wide dissemination of those truths about our country which are of value to our country to have disseminated.”¹⁰

Jackson realized that the game the Soviet Union and the United States would be forced to engage in after the Great War was “Power Politics, we are in (it) up to our necks, and our real problem is how to keep from going over our necks.” The dilemma, he observed, “which faces us is both economic and political ... (and) if the economic and political problems can be solved, then it won’t be necessary to resort to the third member of the trio—the military.”¹¹

After Eisenhower delivered to the United Nations his CDJ-inspired, landmark “Atoms for Peace” speech, Jackson pushed the President “to follow up ... with proposals for complete atomic disarmament.”¹² This was something that the Russians, already at a great disadvantage in modern military technology, were unlikely to agree to. But Jackson’s plan called for maximum deployment of psychological warfare to gain the upper hand in the current “war of words.”¹³

C.D. Jackson understood that the first lesson of public relations is the ability to communicate ideas. In order to win the day for his more liberal and enlightened policies, he knew that “not only must the people of the U.S. understand and approve,” our actions, “but equally the people in these other countries must know and understand.”¹⁴ Jackson was uniquely qualified to make the public understand. A close colleague, Abbott Washburn, described him as a “person of enormous persuasiveness. He had a tremendous effect on others ... a lot of drama, a lot of flair ... an enormous zest about everything he did.”¹⁵ Who better, then, to spread the gospel about the superiority of the “American way of life”? And what better vehicle than Jackson’s Time-Life International, which he described as a “simple and normal way of getting the truth about this country and real news about the rest of the world spread practically all over.”¹⁶

The devastation and despair that encompassed Europe after the war had created great social and political upheaval. Hunger, poverty, and unemployment led to alliances disturbing to the United States. The spectre of communism hung over the capitalist West like some great bird of prey that was preparing to swoop down on its helpless target. Tom Braden, former Office of Strategic Services officer and soon to be Central Intelligence Agency senior operations official, remembered wandering around Europe after the war with Bill Donovan, the legendary OSS chief who was affectionately nicknamed “Wild Bill.” “Europe was poor, very poor,” Braden related. “People wanted economic improvement, and the only unions that were fighting for the people were the communist unions. The only unions that were making headway were the communists’. All that counted in 1948 was, can we get enough to eat? Freedom and democracy we can talk about later.”¹⁷ A way had to be found to reach these people who then thought of capitalism as the enemy.

Through such programs as the Marshall Plan, C.D. Jackson and Tom Braden would align themselves primarily with socialists in the intellectual communities of Britain, France, and Italy, and amongst their leftist unions.

They worked with creative, like-minded, liberal elements in the nascent Central Intelligence Agency, the successor to the Office of Strategic Services (the OSS itself had been considered leftist to the extent that its critics nicknamed it, “O So Social”). The CIA took on many employees of that organization. Apart from trying to influence the emerging political landscape in post-war Western Europe, Jackson and the CIA would do battle with the Soviet Union for the allegiance of Eastern Europeans through the broadcasts of the newly created Radio Free Europe. Radio Free Europe, which became one of America’s most powerful weapons in the “battle for men’s minds,” was likewise beholden to Jackson for the spirit, energy, and organization he brought to that institution. The “balloon operation,” in which RFE infiltrated into Eastern Europe mass information as well as messages of hope, was directed by CDJ and was a model for the more progressive covert operations of the Cold War. Although not always in consonance with Jackson on the utility of specific operations, Braden believed that “C.D. was on the right track in trying to influence the non-communist left in Europe.”¹⁸

C.D. Jackson’s contributions to President Eisenhower’s more carefully considered- and effective-attempts to halt the spread of communism were sweeping in scope and grandeur. In addition to crafting much of the “Atoms for Peace” address which was designed to lessen the likelihood of a global nuclear war, Jackson was also the architect of Ike’s post-Stalin peace feeler, the “Chance for Peace” speech which, had it been accepted by the Soviets, might have saved the world from many of the costs and dangers created by the long-enduring Cold War. Additionally, America’s furtive, domestic war of “arts and letters” had a powerful ally in Washington when C.D. Jackson arrived in the White House in 1953. The CIA’s Congress for Cultural Freedom benefited greatly from its association with Jackson (he was a board member of the American Committee for many years), not the least of which was due to the publicity that he could provide in Luce publications by virtue of his position of vice-president of Time-Life Inc.

Eisenhower’s 1954 CDJ-inspired proposal for an “Open Skies” weapons inspection program—which, Ike was convinced, could lead the two superpowers closer to disarmament—originated within Jackson’s National Security Affairs Office, and was promoted by his replacement in the White House, Nelson Rockefeller, and the President himself. Administratively, Jackson contributed much to the establishment of the Operations Coordinating Board. Supplanting the less efficient Psychological Strategy Board, the OCB produced a cohesive exchange of foreign intelligence data among the National Security Council Committee Chiefs in order to execute

U.S. policy in a highly effective manner.

Jackson's legacy as a Cold War liberal is tarnished somewhat by his alliances—expedient politically, though they may have been—with several Hungarian exiles whose politics can only be described as fascist. These connections led him to petition Eisenhower for a military response to the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. Ike's failure to acquiesce to Jackson's entreaties resulted in a major ideological split between the two, and a temporary loss of influence by Jackson within the Administration. But C.D. Jackson's overall contributions to Eisenhower's policies are a major factor in the story of the Cold War.

ENDNOTES

1. Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace, The Origins of the Cold War* (New York, Penguin, 1977, 1990 rev.) pp.4, 5

2. At one juncture in World War II in June 1944, the United States Air Force actually occupied a large airbase at Poltava in the Ukraine. It had been jointly built by American and Soviet forces, and served briefly as an important transit point for the shuttle bombing of Germany. See John Stern, "*Poltava, The Road Not Taken*," *Voprosy Istorii*, 9/98, passim.

3. D.F. Fleming, *The Cold War and its Origins, Vols. I & II* (New York, Doubleday, 1961), Fleming, an early Cold War revisionist, provides sweeping insights into events after 1917 that shaped the postures of both superpowers, and created much of the history of the Twentieth Century. P 685 and passim.

4. Kai Bird, The Chairman, John J. McCloy - *The Making of the American Establishment* (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 413.

5. See Jackson speech, "*The Battle For Men's Minds*," before the American Management Association, 2 October 1950. C.D. Jackson was then publisher of *Fortune Magazine*, a subsidiary of Time-Life Inc, for which he served as vice president. C.D. Jackson Papers, box 101, file 2.

6. Blanche Wiesen Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower, A Divided Legacy* (New York, Doubleday and Company, 1981), p. 13.

7. Ibid., pp. 121-123.

8. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower, Volume II, The President* (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1984), p. 112.

9. See campaign speech delivered by candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower in San Francisco, 8 October 1952, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 1.

10. See Jackson to Maryland State Teachers Association, 31 October 1947, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 102, file 2.

11. Ibid.

12. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*; p. 153.

13. See note 10.

14. Ibid.

15. Abbott Washburn, oral history.

16. See note 10.

17. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.

18. Ibid.

CHAPTER 1

THE HUNGARIAN UPRISING: PROPAGANDA AND THE ROAD TO REVOLUTION

Revolution is not a dinner party, nor a literary composition, nor a printing, nor a piece of pretty embroidery; it cannot be carried out “softly, gradually, carefully, considerately, respectfully, politely, plainly, and modestly.”

Mao Tse-Tung

The United States has in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.

George Frost Kennan, July 1947

Like many world leaders, Adolph Hitler believed that revolution and propaganda were intrinsically linked. It was to the *Fuehrer*, the “supreme” and “most sublime mission” of the Nazi Party to “provide for the expansion of the idea.” He saw as the “greatest task” for his party, the capture of the ideological struggle through the element of psychological warfare.¹ After the war, German propaganda methods during the reign of National Socialism held great appeal to those in the evolving American intelligence community, and even amongst many in certain elite circles of the American media. Behind closed doors, some members of the American foreign policy establishment did little to conceal their admiration for Hitler and Joseph Goebbels, although of course, they professed disgust at the purposes to which Nazi propaganda was put to use.

In 1947, the Council on Foreign Relations conducted a series of studies on the techniques of propaganda, especially, in their words, “a study of the Hitler technique.” The committee directing the study—which included among its distinguished participants, C.D. Jackson of Time-Life Inc, James P. Warburg of *Cross Country Reports*, William Paley of CBS, Lester Markel of the *New York Times*, and political scientist Harold Lasswell—concluded that

public opinion and propaganda were terms that could be used almost interchangeably. Thus was the power, they claimed, that effective propaganda could exert over a nation. At the initial meeting of the group on 27 March 1947, Mr. Markel asked how one could differentiate between “propaganda” and “information” in a free and open society such as ours. “Realistically,” proffered James Warburg, “we must get rid of the idea that we tell the truth ... we tell a piece of the truth, but not the whole truth.” William Paley added that, the “aim was propaganda,” but the “method is information.” All agreed, nonetheless, that “intent” was the criteria by which American propaganda would ultimately be judged. According to C. D. Jackson, “the techniques used” to disseminate information depended “on the circumstances.”² Not everyone in the American intelligentsia, it must be said, accepted uncritically the omnipotence of propaganda and disinformation, or even its overall utility in the Cold War. Professor Arthur Schlesinger Jr., eminent historian, Kennedy Administration political adviser, and member of the Radio Committee of RFE, “thought psychological warfare much overrated,” and criticized C.D. Jackson for “overselling the power of propaganda.”³ Schlesinger’s sentiments, however, did not reflect the dominant view of United States Intelligence, nor of those who watched the “circumstances”—as Jackson would likely characterize them for propaganda purposes—unfold in Hungary in 1956. Revisionist historian, Herbert Aptheker, called the Hungarian Rebellion “counterrevolution” that was described as revolution by the “U.S. propaganda machine.” However one chooses to define the events in Hungary, it was the broadcasts that emanated from RFE which “explicitly urged the overthrow of the Hungarian Government.” Though the Hungarians did the shooting it had been the “hand of Western radio” that incited the insurgents, reported *Newsweek Magazine* at the time.⁴

The conflict within the Central Intelligence Agency regarding RFE’s mission in Hungary, had been whether to promote gradual de-Stalinization and liberalization, trends that the Agency had hoped to effectuate, or to encourage outright revolt with the implied commitment of U.S. assistance to the insurgency.⁵ Frank Wisner, the CIA’s Deputy Director for Plans, backed the liberation of Eastern Europe and the rollback of Soviet forces as the “goals set forth” in Eisenhower’s 1952 presidential campaign. Wisner and Cord Meyer, Jr. head of the Agency’s International Organizations Division were pushing RFE broadcasts in the direction of confrontation.⁶ “You can read those broadcasts today” said Abbott Washburn, and “put yourself in the shoes of the Hungarian leaders and very easily get the notion that we would come and help.” It was never spelled out in so many words, “but if you were

in their place you would want to think that.”⁷

Radio Free Europe had been calling for the liberation of the enslaved East European satellite nations for years. By 1956, therefore, it was hardly surprising that the broadcasts had spurred spontaneous anti-Soviet uprisings in both Poland and Hungary. The paradox for American propaganda in Hungary lay in the source of the response. Stalinists Matyas Rakosi and then Erno Gero were the Hungarian leaders whose repressive rule was to cancel out the economic progress made by Hungary’s Communist Party after World War II. Once the communists had rooted out the monarchical remnants of pre-war Hungary, the economy underwent a vast industrialization process. Journalist Howard K. Smith, an American correspondent covering Eastern Europe after the war, was inspired to write that the standard of living is “higher than it had ever been in Hungarian history.”⁸ While Hungary’s liberals and intellectuals preferred the more progressive Imre Nagy to Stalinists Rakosi and Gero, both Jews, it was the reactionaries, led in part by Cardinal Josef Mindszenty, who posed the larger problem for Moscow. Mindszenty, the spiritual leader of Hungary’s influential Catholic Church, called for a return to monarchy, the restoration of the Hapsburgs, and the cessation of the prosecution of fascist war criminals and collaborators.⁹

Nagy replaced Gero in October 1956 as Premier of Hungary, but the turmoil that had impelled the Soviet Union to make the change in government, continued unabated. Radio Free Europe called for the overthrow of the Nagy Government, and Cardinal Mindszenty demanded that a Catholic Party lead the Hungarian people.¹⁰ In the midst of the fighting between the Hungarian police, who were now supported by Russian tanks and soldiers, and the Hungarian “freedom fighters,” as they were dubbed by RFE and the Western press, disturbing reports from the battlefield began to appear. The *New York Times* reported that the “patriotic” Hungarian resistance had started to take on a “fascist” appearance. The *Times* also noted that the “entry of Soviet troops into Budapest stopped the execution of scores, perhaps thousands of Jews.”¹¹ An Israeli newspaper, *Maariv*, ran stories about former Nazis being released from Hungarian prisons and joining other fascists who had crossed the Austrian border to take part in the rebellion. The roving gangs of fascist thugs put up posters in Budapest, said the Israeli reports, that read “Down with Jew Rakosi,” and “Down with Jew Gero,” or in most instances, “Down with the Jews.”¹²

C.D. Jackson and others in the CIA, the media, and in Congress, clamored for the White House to take action despite the fascist leanings of

many of the Hungarian dissidents. While he acknowledged that any direct participation by the United States in the conflict could trigger a wider war, Jackson attempted to “dust off” his idea for a Volunteer Freedom Corps (a subject to be detailed in a later chapter) to “counter Russian volunteers.”¹³ Jackson also pressed Eisenhower for a public statement, “expressing his horror ... at the genocidal deportations of Hungarian youth now under way.”¹⁴ All of Jackson’s public statements pertaining to the Hungarian crisis characterized Soviet actions as genocide. He made use of anything that would stir recent memories of Nazi atrocities. Both fascism and anti-Semitism, however, should have made our relationship with the resistance in Hungary an untenable one. Radio Free Europe and much of the American media spun their stories the same way as did C.D. Jackson. *Life Magazine* was particularly zealous and partisan in its coverage of the fighting—unsurprising since Jackson served on its editorial board. It featured pictorials with captions that read “Patriots strike ferocious blow at tyranny.”¹⁵ It was ironic, then, that American Intelligence as supporting, in this case, the remnants of Hungary’s notorious Arrow Cross, “fascist formations that ran Hungary” at the end of World War II.¹⁶ In contrast, Jewish refugees from the uprising told the French Press that, “Soviet soldiers had saved their lives.”¹⁷

Eisenhower resisted the frantic pleas of CIA officials to allow the Agency to parachute arms and supplies into the rebels. Despite assurances from CIA officer William Colby that Hungary was “exactly the end for which the Agency’s paramilitary capability was designed,” Ike refused to be drawn into a conflict whose objectives were not clearly defined and from which disengagement was likely to be difficult.¹⁸ (A similar scenario would play itself out in but five short years at a different Cold War “hotspot,” the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, and with a different besieged Chief Executive, John Kennedy). The President also rebuffed entreaties from his advisers that called for the introduction of NATO troops into Hungary. And he was equally adamant in rejecting a stunning NSC recommendation, supported by Frank Wisner of the CIA, that the United States consider “massive preemptive use of nuclear weapons” against the Soviet Union in a so-called surgical strike that would, “prevent World War III.”¹⁹ Eisenhower did, however, respond to C.D. Jackson’s persistent memos demanding “positive action” with his own appeal to reason: “(T) o annihilate Hungary ... is in no way to help her.”²⁰

When the dust settled in Hungary, the Soviet Union remained firmly in control of that nation’s destiny—for the time being. The issue, though, according to Abbott Washburn, was whether “RFE had gone too far and given the impression that the United States would send troops to defend the

resistance if they revolted.”²¹ Radio Free Europe denied emphatically that any direct U.S. participation had ever been promised the insurgents. Jackson assured RFE’s critics, that from his “personal knowledge ... there has never been broadcast a program designed to incite rebellion ...”²² Former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, Chairman of the Board of the Free Europe Committee which operated Radio Free Europe, issued a public statement denying that RFE had promised “armed intervention by the West ...” or raised “the hopes of our audiences in this fashion.” In seeking to keep alive the ultimate hope of freedom, he said, it has “never been our policy to incite rebellion.”²³ But RFE’s central role in fomenting the Hungarian revolt was undeniable. Countless numbers of European correspondents from nations aligned with American interests reported hearing RFE programs whose “impassioned tone” cried desperately for “revolt.”²⁴

Former CIA official Tom Braden, recalled how his friend and former Agency colleague Frank Wisner, a key player in the Hungarian operation, had “fallen apart” when the United States failed to go to the rescue of the Hungarian resistance:

I knew Frank very well and he broke down over it. He stood at Hungary’s border and cried. RFE and C.D. Jackson made a grave mistake by giving the impression that we would go in. It was terrible because we did not mean it. It was pure propaganda, and I think we knew it at the time. I was not reading what RFE was saying on the air. I don’t know who was. But we certainly misled them and I think it has been proven since. To some extent, I think Frank went overboard in permitting it. And I think Allen (Dulles) did, too. C.D. said the time has come when we have to help them. Wisner pulled out all the stops to get Ike to do something. You see every department runs their own foreign policy. You believe in what you are doing. Wisner argued that we were losing a lot of good Hungarians by not going in. It took guts on Eisenhower’s part to refuse to move. But I don’t know if he was right or wrong. Wisner, though, was too caught up in the revolt. Allen Dulles was more removed.²⁵

Emotionally, Wisner probably never recovered from the circumstances surrounding Hungary and he could also be counted as a casualty of the rebellion. He was guilt-ridden over having let down those that he had encouraged to take action. It “haunted him,” explained another CIA veteran. By 1965, he was suffering from depression and was losing touch with reality. On October 28 of that year, he took his own life.²⁶ “Wisner blew his brains out over Hungary,” claimed Braden. “He just never got over it.”²⁷

The many tragedies of the Hungarian Revolution did little to deter American psychological warfare or, for that matter, covert operations. Braden likened, in some ways, the Hungarian revolt to the CIA’s attempt to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro. A lot of people in the Agency, he charged, were pressuring Kennedy to “use the air force” to take out Castro’s planes

during the Bay of Pigs fiasco. We can't let those people die, they said. He opined that, "Dick Bissell (Deputy Director for Plans at CIA) tried to put one over on Kennedy. I think he felt that when push came to shove, Kennedy would cave in to the Agency's demands and order the military to take out Castro's tiny air force."²⁸ The CIA had been bombarding Cuba with disinformation that claimed the Castro Regime was about to fall. A similar ploy had worked in the Guatemalan coup in 1954, but Castro had apparently learned from the mistakes of Guatemala's President, Jacobo Arbenz. Fidel was well-prepared to deal with the Agency's legerdemain, and this time the propaganda failed to create the hoped-for uprising.²⁹ John Kennedy, as had his predecessor Eisenhower in the Hungarian conflict, refused appeals for direct U.S. involvement. Kennedy was "quite right," concluded Braden, "to keep the United States military from invading Cuba in 1961, as well as during the Cuban Missile Crisis the following year."³⁰

The American plan to provoke counterrevolution in Cuba at the Bay of Pigs went awry. And subsequent decades of continuous propaganda as well as numerous covert operations and assassinations attempts on Fidel have also failed to topple the Castro Regime. But the case of Hungary is far more complex, and not as easily given to appraisal in terms of success or failure due to events in the intervening years. In Hungary, America's psychological warriors had identified the Kremlin's "Achilles' heel": the Eastern European satellites. C.D. Jackson had pointed out this Russian weak spot to Eisenhower on numerous occasions.³¹ More tellingly, in an 11 November 1956 draft for a *Life Magazine* editorial he wrote called "Grasping The Nettle," Jackson noted that the Hungarian Revolution is but the first step in the breaking up" of the "Soviet Empire." The piece suggested to the President, that while direct confrontation with the Russians was not desirable in the absence of a "clear act of aggression against U.S. personnel installations or vital interests," *Life Magazine* believed that "this is the moment for America to stand toe to toe with the Soviet Union." Jackson contended that the United States was justified in creating the kind of grave troubles for the Kremlin that could only exacerbate a "seething situation," like Hungary. The Hungarian revolt, he claimed, meant that the end of the U.S.S.R. was near: "*Life* believes that every piece of historical evidence points to the fact that this is the way of drift, war, and national disaster."³²

Though he expressed disillusionment with the Eisenhower Administration for its failure to respond forcefully in the face of Soviet aggression in Hungary, Jackson knew that from the standpoint of public relations America and the West were, in the eyes of the world, clearly the

winners. American democratic propaganda had triumphed in Hungary. Communism in Eastern Europe was on the wane, and the Soviet Bloc was beginning to crumble, he proclaimed. Jackson delivered that message to the Council on Foreign Relations in a speech he gave in Chicago on 15 January 1957. In an address that he called “Opportunity Instead of Crisis,” C.D. Jackson announced to his audience—and to the world—that “25,000 Hungarian martyrs have destroyed the Soviet Empire. Goodness knows what form the ultimate breakup will take or when it will occur, but things will never be the same again in the Kremlin after the Battle of Budapest.”³³ With the perspective that history affords us, he was probably right.

ENDNOTES

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3. Letter to author from Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 15 April 2001.
4. Herbert Aptheker, *The Truth About Hungary* (New York: Mainstream Publishers, 1957) pp. 230, 231 and passim.
5. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1974, rev. ed.1980), pp.146, 147.
6. John Ranelagh, *The Agency, The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986, rev. and updated), pp. 307, 308.
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11. Aptheker, *The Truth About Hungary*, p. 221.
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13. See C.D. Jackson to William H. Jackson, 17 November 1956, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 69, file: 1956 log, 4.
14. Ibid.
15. Loudon Wainwright, *The Great American Magazine* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), p. 227.
16. Ranelagh, *The Agency*, p. 303.
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19. Ranelagh, *The Agency*, p. 306.
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22. See C.D. Jackson to General Willis D. Crittenger, 5 December 1956. General Crittenger was then the President of the Free Europe Committee. C.D. Jackson Papers, box 54, file: FEC 1956, 1.
23. See statement of Joseph C. Grew, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Free Europe Committee Inc, 16 November 1956, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 54, file: FEC 1956, 1.
24. Aptheker, *The Truth About Hungary*, pp. 230, 231, and passim.
25. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.
26. Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men- Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA* (New

York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp. 318-320.

27. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.

28. Ibid.

29. See Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit, The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc, 1982), for a thorough analysis of the U.S.-inspired overthrow of Guatemalan President, Jacobo Guzman Arbenz.

30. See note 27; See also Ranelagh, *The Agency*, Marchetti and Marks, *The CIA*, and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), for a comprehensive evaluation of events surrounding the 1961 invasion at the Bay of Pigs.

31. See C. D. Jackson policy paper entitled, "*The Kremlin's Achilles' Heel - The Eastern European Satellites*," undated, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 69, file: 1958 log, 2.

32. See C.D. Jackson draft entitled, "*Grasping The Nettle*," 11 November 1956, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 69, file: 1956 log, 4.

33. See C.D. Jackson speech to Joint Luncheon of English-Speaking Union and Council on Foreign Relations entitled, "*Opportunity Instead of Crisis*," 15 January 1957, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 69, file: 1957 log, 2.

CHAPTER 2

THE STRUCTURES OF DEMOCRATIC PROPAGANDA

There is a great deal of self-love and arrogance in judging so highly of your opinions that you are obliged to disturb the public peace in order to establish them.

Montaigne

I

On 28 June 1961, C.D. Jackson was interviewed by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. His interlocutor pressed him for his thoughts on the increasing influence of the mass media, notwithstanding the largely negative criticism it had recently been subject to. Jackson staunchly defended the communications industry, and pointed out that even television retained the “tradition of integrity and valor which attached to the printed word.” The interview was the perfect forum for this man of letters to expand on the centrality of the press in society. “The press can plant an idea and if the idea takes hold it can lead that idea along,” he insisted, though quickly noting that in a free and open society “the press really can’t do anything except what the public wants to have it do ... (N)o press lord can impose his will upon the American people”¹

This was vintage C.D. Jackson: magnifying the import of communications on American society but assuring his examiner that, ultimately, it is the American people who determine the success of your product. *Life Magazine*, he announced, “is now moving from an emphasis on knowledge to helping the people understand the meaning of that knowledge.”² While cautioning that, “as soon as we would begin thinking of ourselves as great educators or calling ourselves that, we would lose our power to educate.” Nonetheless, he cast “our” cause—the cause of Time-Life Inc—in heroic and patriotic prose: “We’re willing to say publicly that we will stand up and be counted on the two points: winning the cold war and creating a better America.”³

C.D. Jackson has been called “an imaginative public relations man ... a

self-styled ‘sucker for a crusade,’”⁴ and Henry Luce’s “designated choreographer” for the “American Century.”⁵ Journalist Carl Bernstein of Watergate fame claims that he was “Luce’s personal emissary to the CIA.”⁶ And Blanche Wiesen Cook points out that this “largely unrecognized public relations genius” was simply “one of the most significant figures in United States Cold War history.”⁷

Assessing the importance and overall impact of an elusive and sometimes shadowy figure like C.D. Jackson was made all the more timely by the opening—to historians and researchers—of the Cold War Archives at repositories like the Eisenhower Center in Abilene, Kansas. Among the small number of surviving Jackson intimates from the Eisenhower Era, Abbott Washburn remained one of Jackson’s greatest admirers.^{*} During World War II, Washburn served in the OSS. Shortly after the war while serving as Director of Public Relations for General Mills, he was sent by the company to New York to join with General Lucius D. Clay in working up a campaign to elicit public support for Radio Free Europe.⁸ In that “Crusade for Freedom,” Washburn first met C.D. Jackson. Later, they served together on the Board of Directors of the National Committee for a Free Europe.⁹ Both then campaigned for Eisenhower for president in 1952. Upon Eisenhower’s election, Jackson went to work in the new administration as an adviser on psychological warfare, and Washburn became C.D. Jackson’s deputy in the White House. Washburn’s official title was Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA), which Jackson had been instrumental in creating.¹⁰ In my August, 2001 interview with Abbott Washburn, he remembered Jackson as “wonderfully warm,” with a “sort of a built-in charisma about him.” He could get people “excited about an idea, a project, or a program.” For example, he would decide to “push something at the United Negro College Fund (on whose board he served as chairman), which wasn’t a very popular thing to do at that time. But Jackson spent a lot of time raising money for it, and he was very successful.” CDJ provided extremely effective leadership to the various committees on which he served, according to Washburn, and was a true visionary in the area of democratic propaganda. “We lucked out having him there (in the White House), and then Luce pulled him back to Time Inc,” Washburn lamented.¹¹

Other colleagues, however, were not as kind, and some were less impressed with Jackson’s particular talents for confronting Soviet propaganda during those early Cold War years. Tom Braden collaborated with CDJ on several gambits during Eisenhower’s tenure that were generally considered to be of utility to U.S. diplomatic aims. But Braden expressed profound

misgivings about the overall value of Jackson's Cold War policy contributions. In our August, 2001 conversation on Cold War propaganda tactics, he described some of Jackson's exploits as just "a bunch of baloney." Braden conceded that he was "probably prejudiced against C. D. (whom he referred to as "Seedy"), because I was running what I thought were very successful operations for the CIA, and here come these guys from New York." They created The National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE) to help fund their operations and "they would ask the public to send in their dimes." And he scoffed at other Jackson-led covert machinations like sending propaganda-filled baskets attached to balloons over Eastern Europe: "Come on, this was comic strip, carnival atmosphere stuff. It made the U.S. public think we were doing something," but Braden questioned the effectiveness of trying to penetrate a closed society with what he characterized as pure "gimmickry."¹²

Braden acknowledged, nonetheless, that his boss, Allen Dulles (Director of Central Intelligence), "encouraged it, always encouraged C.D. But in my opinion, he should have known better." Jackson "had good intentions," Braden allowed, and he was a "smart guy, but he never knew what we in the CIA were doing." And what we were doing was "very effective, much more sophisticated, although occasionally we did do some stupid things. God knows there were guys in the CIA as stupid as can be." Braden then recounted some of the Agency's more infamous intrigues, including bizarre plots against Communist leaders such as Premier Nikita Khrushchev and especially Fidel Castro. "But remember," Braden pointed out, "I was on the same side as C.D. although perhaps he was looking at a broader picture than I was." Essentially, "my criticisms of him were all over specific propaganda operations. I thought he was just a guy from New York who was running around and doing things extraneous from what we were trying to do." "Write an editorial for *Time* or *Life*," he suggested to Jackson, "and get out of my hair." Braden added, "I think Allen (Dulles) got stuck with C.D." Summing up our talk, he noted, "I thought I was working in the trenches, and he was, euphemistically, living up on a high mountaintop."¹³

II

Charles Douglas Jackson—C.D. as he was known to just about everyone—was born in New York City in 1902, the son of an international marblestone import entrepreneur. Upon graduation from Princeton University, he

was an accomplished linguist and intended to teach French at a university. The premature death of his father sidetracked Jackson's ambitions, obliging him to take over the family business. The Depression wiped out the building industry, forcing Jackson to seek employment elsewhere. In 1931, Jackson ran into an old classmate and close friend from his Princeton days, Parker Lloyd Smith, who worked at *Fortune Magazine*. Smith recommended Jackson for employment to his boss, Henry Luce, and C.D. became Luce's personal assistant at Time-Life. Thus began a thirty year relationship with Time Inc that included "various high level and occasionally indefinable jobs."¹⁴

Jackson was "Luce's kind of man, schooled in the social graces, well-spoken, and a jack-of-all-trades," notes Henry Luce biographer, Robert E. Herzstein. With a self-styled talent for words, and a healthy appetite for gossip, CDJ became Henry Luce's surrogate crusader throughout their close and enduring relationship. In 1941, Jackson took a one-year leave of absence from *Time Magazine* to become the first President of the Council for Democracy (CFD), which, he hoped, would strengthen public opposition to fascism, Nazism, and isolationism. Like Harry Luce, an enthusiastic interventionist, CDJ considered antiwar groups subversive. Against them, he intended to make use of "all the major communications media, including radio, press, film, advertising, and publishing"—whatever would carry his message. But the CFD, Herzstein explains, was actually "a Time Inc propaganda subsidiary."¹⁵

During World War II, Jackson was named Deputy Director of The Office of War Information (OWI). Initially, he led OWI activities in Africa, Turkey, and the Middle East. Later, he was flown into North Africa to ameliorate what Blanche Cook called the "public relations disaster" caused by the American alliance with Admiral Jean Louis Francois Darlan, a Vichy French collaborator with the Nazis. It was considered politically useful to enlist Vichy support in an area where the United States would encounter fierce Nazi resistance; but General Eisenhower, Commander of Allied Forces, suffered at the time a tremendous loss of prestige. Jackson, however, was able to make the situation "satisfactory", according to Eisenhower's brother Milton.* Ultimately, the "Darlan Affair" brought together C. D. Jackson, Time-Life Inc's public relations wizard, and Dwight David Eisenhower, future President of the United States. The long and close association between Jackson and Eisenhower grew out of their shared belief that psychological warfare was essential to military strategy and, along with a restructured and revitalized postwar international trade policy, must be integrated into American diplomacy.¹⁶

III

Even before World War II ended, a consensus was building amongst foreign policy elites that the United States must soon fill the military and economic void about to be left by the crumbling British Empire. Organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations and Jackson's Council for Democracy shared Henry Luce's vision of an "American Century," projected throughout the world by American business interests. In 1948, the CFR conducted a study group on the subject of "Foreign Policy and Public Opinion." Jackson prepared for the group an analysis of private enterprise's role in expanding America's share of foreign markets. His report, "How Private Enterprise Can Carry The American Word Abroad," promoted the idea of utilizing the United States' corporate information links overseas to counteract Soviet influence among the nonaligned nations. Jackson conceived a multi-faceted strategy to spread American democratic capitalist values through our already highly developed conduits of communication.¹⁷

"On the institutional level," Jackson wrote, "there are America's schools, which regularly exchange professors and students with schools in foreign countries." The foundation of Jackson's plan for American corporate hegemony was the full integration of the United States Government with its business community and media centers in a coordinated effort to thwart the spread of communism in Europe. He believed that the strength of this business-oriented campaign was in enlisting "America's companies and industries, whose representatives and advertising campaigns overseas have kept alive—and fostered the acceptance of—the concept of functioning American democratic capitalism as the system which has yet to meet its equal in supplying the most to the most at the least cost." Promoting the message would be the work of the agencies of organized communication that held the most potential for Jackson's brand of democratic propaganda: "America's established informational media." Jackson would promote the American way of life through "radio, movies, books, press associations, newspapers and periodicals—whose business it is to tell everyone everywhere in the world about all things, including America."¹⁸

Jackson, a major architect in the creation of *The American Century*, wanted to package and sell overseas democratic capitalism in the American style. But first he had to sell his concepts here at home to a skeptical business community. From his perch at Time-Life Inc and *Fortune Magazine*, Jackson labored to unite business and government as partners in the "takeover ... of

foreign economic policy.”¹⁹ The captains of industry had steadfastly opposed most New Deal programs, and continued their opposition when government proposed an alliance to rebuild a war-torn Europe through the Marshall Plan and Point Four policies. After World War I and continuing through the Depression, the American economy had transformed itself, as historian Michael Hogan describes it, into a “brand of neo-capitalism that went beyond the *laissez-faire* political economy of classical theory but stopped short of statist syndicalism.” Jackson recognized the need for government to subsidize growth while American business competed primarily with European state-run economies. The trend toward state subsidy of the economy that Hogan defines, reshaped American Diplomacy, “which for all practical purposes sought to restructure the world economy along lines similar to the corporative order that was emerging in the United States.”²⁰

Jackson’s ideas for this new alliance of government with business were spelled out in a speech before the Economic Club of Detroit in 1949. The address, entitled “*Who Will Win The Cold War Between Free Enterprise And Statism?*” outlined his simple theorem for the campaign:

- 1 — America is an all-important part of the world;
- 2 — Business, with a capital “B,” is an all-important part of America;
- 3 — U.S. businessmen are the important men in the U. S. Q.E.D.²¹

CDJ exhorted his audience of business people to assume the administration of the country’s growing international economy. That would include corporate backing of the government’s Point Four Program. This collaboration between American business and the government was necessary if the United States were to match the state-run economies—which he found to be largely inefficient—that were engulfing Europe. For an alternative to the burdensome tax rates that were a hindrance to growth and a salient feature of purely statist economies, Jackson proposed “The export of private capital, the export of private enterprise know how,” which, he promised, “can bring Point IV about, can raise standards of living decimal point by decimal point, and can create the kind of demand that will tax the productive capacity of the world.” Washington needed private enterprise as an active partner, but business would also require the government to do the one thing that business could not do on its own: “create a favorable climate for U.S. investment.”²²

These, then, were the structures of C.D. Jackson’s realization of

“Enterprise America.” They would ultimately, according to Blanche Wiesen Cook, “transform private domestic business ... into a cooperative effort involving international expansion, military defense for international business expansion, government support, and interchangeable business-government personal practices.” The attraction of unending markets and untold natural resources as well as cheap labor would convert ideologically conservative isolationists into free-marketers and the economically liberal internationalists of the modern age. The conversion, in part, was a product of the facile mind of C.D. Jackson, as was the “massive public relations campaign” that would popularize the new direction of the American economy. For Jackson, the economic “power vacuum” that existed after World War II, “represented the greatest opportunity on earth,” writes Cook, and the challenge it posed “immediately became a *Fortune Magazine* crusade.”²³

Jackson called for an army of crusaders, carefully selected from academia and industry, to be groomed “for leadership in the business and government world of foreign affairs.” The idea of an “Institute for Democratic Leadership,” had first been suggested by CDJ to his alma mater Princeton University in 1941, but it was The Johns Hopkins University that adopted it in 1944 as the School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS). SAIS eventually subsumed The Foreign Service Educational Foundation which had been sponsored by Jackson under the direction of Christian Herter. Johns Hopkins University then incorporated The Foreign Service Educational Foundation in June of 1950, and SAIS became the nation’s foremost center for turning out our “pro-consuls of democracy.” The School for Advanced International Studies was a graduate school, but differed from other graduate schools in that it prepared students not for academic research but to become “urbane and erudite ‘Americans for World Careers.’” In addition to Jackson, trustees at SAIS included Allen Dulles, future head of the Central Intelligence Agency, Senator J. William Fulbright, Paul Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), former Ambassador to Japan and Undersecretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, and many other notables from the world of business, finance and government.²⁴

When World War II ended, Jackson realized that an essential element in Germany’s drive for world domination had been its “special training for leadership at home and abroad.” In support of this training, the Nazis created the *Fuehrer Schule* concept. “American democracy, too, must maintain a leadership institute” claimed Jackson, although not “in slavish imitation of the Nazi idea ... These young men must be ready to devote two years of their lives to a serious and intensive course in democratic leadership, with the

earnest devotion of the zealot rather than the casual interest of the dilettante.” Jackson proposed for his future American leaders, an intensive program in the normal studies of an advanced academic institute: world history, international law, psychology, advanced languages, the history of religion, government, and military law. The curriculum “should not adhere to theoretical training, but should place special emphasis on actual work-training.”²⁵ Jackson’s young charges would then be ready to take the field against the Kremlin’s Commissars.

Apart from the more straightforward task of preparing young Americans to occupy positions of leadership at the highest levels of international relations, government, economics, law, and foreign business and trade, SAIS would offer its students a thorough and expert curriculum in the “educational side of the fight against communism.” As an elite vanguard in the anticommunist struggle, graduates would be expected “to increase the public’s understanding of the nature, aims, strategy and tactics of communism and the methods of combating it—thereby promoting the nation’s security and morale.” Jackson’s Cold War media crusade would utilize these new spokesmen to broadcast—through television and radio—programs that would “educate” the vast majority of Americans who oppose communism but “without knowing clearly just what this thing is that they are against.”²⁶

The plan for an anti-communist educational program could not be sponsored by the government, and therefore be seen as blatant propaganda. Millions of dollars in private donations, however, were solicited from the Motion Picture Association, the National Association of Manufacturers, trade unions, newspaper and publishing groups, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and other like-minded organizations. The goal was to present entertaining programs “designed not for propaganda, but for interest and information.” Sports and entertainment figures would headline shows with titles like “Know Your Enemy” and “It Can Happen Here.” Jackson’s Institute For Democratic Leadership both enlightened and entertained with the purpose of opening the eyes of the American public to the insidious nature of the enemy.²⁷

IV

While CDJ displayed a rare talent for employing the tools of propaganda within a democratic framework, he was defined ideologically by his commitment to a liberal, internationalist trade policy. He was, therefore,

equally engaged in a quest to lift the economic wellbeing of all the world's peoples, out of humanitarian instinct as much as concern for strategy. Jackson's economic crusade was supported—perhaps even inspired—by Henry Luce. After the war, Luce had told an audience, “Bread and liberty are essentials of any human destiny. It is for America largely to provide them now and to show how they are provided.” As editor-in-chief of *Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune Magazines*, Henry Luce had resolved with his fellow visionary, Jackson, to create a worldwide economy. The Time-Life International World Trade Campaign eventually became a Jackson project to promote a World Economic Policy. It would, Jackson said, champion “a dynamic, functioning system,” and reflect our “interest in the status of other countries.”²⁸

C.D. Jackson's central belief was that the world was one integrated political and economic unit. After a Jackson-encouraged Presidential address calling for world peace in April 1953, the issue next on his agenda was a World Economic Plan. He drafted for Eisenhower, an economic stimulus package designed to foster “the economic independence of all free peoples.” In a 1954 memorandum to Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, CDJ pointed out the importance of an American commitment to the “enlarged, long-term development of underdeveloped areas without military or political strings, designed to raise the personal welfare status of the individuals in those underdeveloped areas ...” This would show the world, he added, “that the Free West offers more than the Communist East.”²⁹

Jackson's long-time secretary, Marie McCrum, confirmed his “worldwide interest” in bettering the lives of all peoples. Jackson was consumed with the idea of building an economic framework that would integrate all free nations. Shortly after joining the Eisenhower Administration, Jackson labored continually to transform vision into policy: “A World Economic Policy occupied our attention, it seems to me forever, but it was probably a matter of three or four years,” recalled McCrum. Ms. McCrum, who accompanied Jackson to Washington from his New York corporate headquarters, was sure that his economic plan originated at Time Inc, and was shared by others in the organization, along with Chairman Luce. The objective, she said, “was to urge the government to adopt a policy of promoting economic growth throughout the world by means of government and private loans and investment—a program that would encourage free trade and higher living standards.” Overall, the concern was to “generat(e) well-being through the peaceful means of economics rather than money used for destructive purposes.” Jackson promoted his new World Economic Policy through editorials in *Time* and *Life Magazines*.³⁰

By early 1954, Jackson was becoming increasingly frustrated by the war-like atmosphere that enveloped American foreign policy. The United States, he argued, had “unfairly earned a reputation for armaments while the Soviets were unfairly earning a reputation for peace.”³¹ Jackson’s long-range strategy entailed a sweeping move away from the confrontational aspects of the Truman Doctrine toward a more productive allocation of U.S. resources. His decisive policy paper, “The Crisis of 1954,” expressed a deep concern that American leaders were being probed and tested by a unified Soviet Bloc. Sticking to the business themes that informed his thinking, Jackson saw a grave political and psychological crisis that could be remedied with economic nostrums. He implored the Administration to recognize the parlous situation that would arise with the loss of United States leadership—especially in Europe—and to remember “the original peaceful purposes of the Marshall Plan ... and even more to project to our friends the long-run purposes of foreign economic policy.”³²

A World Economic Policy reflected a new direction in the Cold War for the Eisenhower Administration, and for the United States. The contours of the economic plan were refined at a meeting of representatives of the State Department, CIA, RFE, and members of MIT’s Center for International Studies (CENIS). The Princeton Conference of May 1954,^{*} first suggested by C.D. Jackson, offered the Eisenhower Administration an imaginative proposal that “calls on the U.S. to launch a Free World ‘Partnership for Economic Growth.’” A feature editorial in *Time Magazine* in December of 1954 entitled “New Front in the Cold War,” praised the Administration’s ambitious initiative to reshape its foreign policy along lines similar to the Marshall Plan. The strategy aimed at proving “that democracy and capitalism have more to offer—in terms of freedom, justice and plenty—than the communists ever can.” The policy also recognized that as the challenges of the Cold War were constantly evolving, opportunities such as the recent death of Joseph Stalin offered the hope of a positive transformation of Soviet strategy. Jackson advised both the President and Secretary Dulles that, “The objective is to shift the emphasis of U.S. world strategy away from military containment (which leaves the initiative with the communists), closer to economic ‘liberation,’ with the emphasis on advance.”³³

Jackson brought to the Eisenhower Administration a more cogent analysis of Cold War realities than did the hard-liners with their constant drum beat for war. In becoming militarily prepared to repel enemy incursions into our economic spheres of influence, the United States had “fallen into the posture of over-reliance on military and ‘negative’ policies—atomic

preparedness, arms for our allies, opposition to East-West trade. This has cost us confidence among under-developed nations, who are less interested in being armed for a war they hope to stay out of than they are in their own economic progress.” Jackson maintained that the peaceful weapon of economics held the key to Cold War success. He continued his peaceful stratagems as a member of the Eisenhower Braintrust, where he found in his Chief Executive a ready ally in rejecting military solutions when economic solutions were available. He cautioned Ike continually, that our survival with superpower status was intrinsically entwined with the uplifting of underdeveloped countries if “the U.S. wishes to maintain its own rate of economic growth and its free way of life.”³⁴

Eisenhower’s other key advisers carefully considered the significant changes to American international economic policy, proposed by C.D. Jackson. When Dr. Gabriel Hauge, Ike’s top economic adviser, looked at Jackson’s call for a “World Partnership for Growth,” he was impressed by its “sweep” and its “intensified use of exciting programs.” Specifically, Hauge noted, the Jackson Plan refined the parameters of the Marshall Plan loans and encouraged the further broadening of trade liberalization policies while stepping up Point Four. He reasoned that, a World Economic Plan was “analogous to Export and Import Bank lending” in that it “enlarged and broadened U.S. Government extension of grant or loan credit.”³⁵ The Marshall Plan, in effect, would be imposed on U.S.-style capitalism, bolstering the economies of all targeted nations so that they, in turn, would have the capacity to enrich the United States. It was inspired internationalism—inspired by the ideals of Woodrow Wilson.

The President’s military adviser, Brigadier General Paul T. Carroll, also submitted a confidential report regarding Jackson’s paper on Foreign Economic Policy. It included an analysis by a group of outside experts that determined “the problem of Capital Formation in the Underdeveloped Countries is of critical importance.” Recognizing that the “heart of the Jackson Document is a stepped-up investment program,” General Carroll and his team recommended that the United States “should undertake a major initiative in Foreign Economic Policy next year.”³⁶

The economic policies formulated at Princeton were beginning to take shape, and in speeches crafted by the Jackson people Eisenhower pitched their initiatives. As the themes could “now be translated into effective and constructive action,” Jackson noted, the country would reassert its place as leader of the Free World, “backed by new and sustained lines of action.” The

resolution to the nation's crisis of 1954 "would be firmly grounded in a fresh view of long-run American interests." Staying true to his vocation of publicist, CDJ believed that since "the crisis centers on what the Free World believes our interests and objectives are ... we must find the words ... which will restore and strengthen the image of the United States not merely as a military bulwark of the Free World but as the major source of its democratic faith, its constructive energy, and its initiative in the pursuit of peace."³⁷

The proper development of a new foreign economic policy was but one component of Cold War strategy. Selling this economic policy to our putative allies would be augmented by the promotion of our entire culture abroad. But projecting the productive capacity of American-style democratic capitalism behind the Iron Curtain where it could undermine the Russian "master-plan" for world domination was a job for another of Jackson's projects: Radio Free Europe.

V

The National Committee for a Free Europe was founded in May, 1949. C.D. Jackson became its President in 1951 and, although he resigned the post in 1952, he remained on its board of directors throughout the 1950s. Abbott Washburn attributed the origins of RFE to General Lucius D. Clay, architect of the Berlin Airlift. John Foster Dulles, Washburn said, had the same idea of reaching by radio the peoples under communist rule. Radio Free Europe was created in July 1950 as the broadcasting division of the NCFE.³⁸

Subsequently, a nation-wide campaign called The Crusade for Freedom got under way in October 1950 under the stewardship of General Clay. The Crusade for Freedom was designed to expand the operations of RFE by raising funds, and in general building "the broadest (public) support for it" at home. The NCFE, RFE, and The Crusade for Freedom were organized as "private independent agencies," and the intention was to make the whole movement appear "popular" and "spontaneous." Such was not the case. According to former CIA officials Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, "the Agency heavily subsidized Radio Free Europe." CIA funds continued to flow into RFE well into the 1960s, they note. The East European regimes went to great lengths to disrupt Radio Free Europe's programming, but saturation broadcasting techniques frustrated communist attempts to jam RFE's signals. The messages being sent behind the Iron Curtain, claims Blanche Cook, had to be dispiriting to the Soviet leaders who strove to maintain solidarity within

the satellite bloc. And CDJ observed, exultantly, that the sub rosa sponsorship of the broadcasts allowed RFE to operate “as a non-official organization ... not hampered by governmental restrictions and diplomatic niceties.”³⁹

That ninety per cent of RFE’s operating budget came directly from the CIA afforded it great latitude in its expenditures and operations. The arrangement did, however, run counter to C.D. Jackson’s belief that the American public favored such a program, and would support through private agencies, “an expanded overseas information program.”⁴⁰ At one point in 1953, Eisenhower and CDJ held a private dinner at the White House for “business and national organization big shots.” It was reported that Jackson “managed to raise \$10 million from the dinner ... and Radio Free Europe became ‘credible.’”⁴¹

The broadcasts, especially of Ike’s “Chance for Peace” address, explained Operations Coordinating Board member Walt Rostow, served to “really build the new structure of themes that the RFE boys ... so badly needed” in the wake of “the Princeton meeting.”⁴² The combination of idealism and deceit that characterized the funding of RFE had its parallel in the broadcasts, or so the varying evaluations of the programming would together indicate. According to Blanche Cook, the project intended to undermine communism by sowing “uncertainty” and “distrust” amongst people living under communist dictatorships.⁴³ The U.S. State Department defined RFE aims more beneficently “to keep alive ... (among captive) peoples their sense of connection with the West and with Free World ideals.”⁴⁴ State also characterized RFE as being of “extraordinary importance for US policy,” with the unique ability to counter “phony” Russian propaganda in Eastern Europe.⁴⁵ All this places Radio Free Europe pretty much in step with the Cold War itself, where high principles went hand-in-hand with ruthless tactics. But the charter of RFE required a commitment to the moral component of the war on communism. That, in any event, appears to have been central to the ideology of CDJ as a cold warrior.

In order to facilitate RFE’s larger objective, the ultimate liberation of the enslaved nations, Jackson supported another course of action that would employ the services of the Eastern European exiles: The recruitment of the ever-growing population of Iron Curtain escapees into an exile army.

VI

In October 1951, Representative Charles J. Kersten of Wisconsin, a Republican whose anticommunism was that of a devout Roman Catholic, attached to the National Security Act an amendment providing funds for the organizing of East Europeans who had escaped to the West. A Volunteer Freedom Corps (VFC) offered the real possibility of a liberation force within the satellite nations. The Truman Administration, already embroiled in a protracted conflict on the Asian Peninsula, the Korean “police action,” exploited the defections for propaganda points but would take no part in promoting a volunteer exile army. The incoming Eisenhower Administration, however, contained fervent advocates of the proposal, the most prominent being Jackson who thought the “VFC fit in with our overall Cold War planning.”⁴⁶

C.D. Jackson envisioned the VFC as one more psychological warfare ploy, which could also be utilized in the event of armed conflict. It was typical of this consummate businessman and publicist to serve as chief spokesman for the project at high-level meetings of the National Security Council. Jackson lobbied the idea of an exile army as being “very merchandisable” in Eastern Europe. President Eisenhower concurred with the VFC proponents and, in May 1953, had the National Security Council initiate the first steps toward the establishment of a Volunteer Freedom Corps—in both a “modest and austere” fashion—under NSC 143/2, and designated the army to operate the recruitment of exiles as well as the overall project.⁴⁷ The VFC program, Ike reasoned, could be highly useful if properly implemented, especially in light of the fact that the “escapees are a troublesome area to the communists.” Jackson advocated promoting “a steady flow of interesting news” regarding the program and proposed to the NSC that it become an integral part of our “overall Cold War planning.” When queried by NSC colleagues about what type of reaction the plan could be expected to arouse behind the Iron Curtain, he proffered that it could instill “hope” in the captive peoples. Hope for ultimate liberation was what Jackson and his propaganda team were selling.⁴⁸

The creation of the Volunteer Freedom Corps came at a time in early 1953, when the Soviet Union had extended to the United States “peace feelers” in the midst of a post-Stalin transition in policy. Jackson, nevertheless, thought the VFC would “act as a stimulus” to get the Russians to be “sincere” in their “offers.” Along with contributing to the already existing political discontent within Soviet borders, the composition of an exile brigade would reflect the ethnic disillusionment with the pro-Soviet Regimes in Eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria

would be targeted for recruits so that they could promote further unrest behind the Iron Curtain. This, Jackson argued at meetings of the NSC, would weaken Eastern Bloc “communist leaders who, in turn, would convey it to Moscow.”⁴⁹

A real plus domestically for the VFC was the support it would be sure to garner with U.S. Congressmen, whose constituencies were heavily represented by countries where recruitment would be most active. There was one major drawback to this defection program which otherwise promised to strike a psychological chord behind the Iron Curtain. Both Ike and CDJ were set on Germany as the host country for the project. German sponsorship, however, would leave the United States open to charges by the Russians that the West was reconstituting “units such as were formed by the Nazis from Soviet prisoners of war in the latter stages of World War II.” This caused many in the State Department, including the new undersecretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith (having just left his post as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency), and former head of the Policy Planning Staff, George Kennan, to harbor great reservations about the overall utility of such a plan. There was added concern about the appearance of such an army to our allies in London and Paris.⁵⁰

When rioting broke out in East Germany in June 1953, an exile army was considered too provocative a proposition for Western Europeans to embrace and was quickly set on the backburner. But C.D. Jackson continued to push the idea to the President’s Special Assistant, General Bobby Cutler: “Isn’t this just about the right moment to revive the Volunteer Freedom Corps?” asked Jackson on 5 October 1954. Eisenhower eventually scrapped the proposal owing to his wartime experience with the victims of Nazi atrocities. As leader of the Free World, Ike was sensitive to any propaganda emanating from “the communist regimes ... that despite the West’s brave words regarding peace and freedom, all we really cared about was a rearmed Germany.” Ike worried that the VFC idea had the potential to backfire in the very countries we were trying to win over.⁵¹

VII

Besides the liberation of the satellite nations, CDJ was committed to coordinating the economic interests of the West, and creating unity among competing European and American multinationals. To that end, he attached himself to the Bilderberg Group as organizer and representative of the

American wing. The Group reflected a confluence of the political and economic interests of the Free World.⁵²

Founded in 1952-53 by Dr. Joseph Retinger, Secretary General of the European Movement, and by Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, husband to Queen Juliana, the organization was designed, according to historian Kai Bird, to influence public opinion by “bringing together leading American and European personalities once a year for a free-wheeling discussion of their differences.”⁵³ The meetings were first held in the Hotel de Bilderberg in Holland, near the German border. The list of invitees to the first Bilderberger gatherings included top-level people from both sides of the Atlantic. Among them were British and German industrialists, Italy’s postwar political and economic architect Alcide de Gasperi, and the Americans David Rockefeller, Dean Rusk, Paul Nitze, and C.D. Jackson. They came to strengthen the “Atlantic Consensus” while assessing communist gains around the globe. Later sessions at the seaside resort of Buxton, North Carolina took up such issues as the admission of mainland China to the United Nations; growing nationalist sentiment in the Middle East; coordinating monetary policies amongst the Western nations; the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and, perhaps most significant, free trade.⁵⁴ The Group, strongly internationalist, was represented on the American side entirely by members of the Council on Foreign Relations.

The Bilderberg Conferences were blacked out to the general public—secrecy that is currently fashionable among the small circle of the world’s economic elites—and so their agenda and content are for the most part left to conjecture. Supporters ascribe to them the benevolent intent of planning for higher standards of living throughout the world. This would be achieved, according to design, through economic integration and dissolving the barriers to trade that had become a hindrance to growth. Marie McCrum recalled:

the purpose (of the secrecy) was that in a congenial setting, with no minutes kept, no transcripts distributed, not a lot of faldral, but with a good solid agenda among intelligent men who really knew what was going on in their respective countries and who were men of good will, discussions could be held that would cut down infinitely on red tape between nations over a period of time—that getting together like a group of people in the living room and talking as friends on subjects about which they were highly knowledgeable would be a useful and productive exercise.⁵⁵

The effects of the Bildeberg Group on political and economic policy both domestically and internationally is hard to determine, as was probably intended by the selective members of the organization. But Eisenhower as President supported and worked closely with the Bilderbergers, and their

internationalism coincided perfectly with C.D. Jackson's vision for success in the Cold War.

VIII

Testifying before the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee on 18 June 1959, CDJ declared that, "to win the Cold War, to master communism in political combat, we must have more and better trained political warriors."⁵⁶ Jackson mastered this political warfare better than any of his contemporaries in the Eisenhower era. He embraced the Cold War concept that political and psychological warfare must motivate all American policy. His vision fully embraced the idea of American rectitude: that through our democratic institutions and capitalist ambitions, we could fully realize a more civil world. At the same time that we were lifting up all the world's peoples, so Jackson was confident, we would create "The American Century."

Jackson's conception of an American Century meant political liberation for all those shackled by the chains of retrograde governments behind the Iron Curtain. It entailed economic liberation for the United States through the integration of American business with markets and resources worldwide, for which governmental institutions were to provide the necessary "atmosphere" for expansion. That amounted to the extension abroad of American business interests, long strapped by the backward thinking of many corporate leaders. The American Century would bring as well, political and economic unity between the United States and Western Europe, along with Japan. It promised to raise living standards around the world, especially in Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Latin America (areas soon to be collectively defined as the "Third World"), where a wealth of natural resources made them vulnerable targets for communist incursion. Above all, the American Century was to instill among Americans a sense of destiny and mission, a conviction that our way of life was right for the world, and that it was our time to rule.

C.D. Jackson was greatly influenced by the inimitable "Harry" Luce. When Luce's magisterial piece, "The American Century," appeared in *Life Magazine* in the 17 February 1941 edition, Jackson was quickly moved to join his friend's crusade to save the Free World for democracy, as Woodrow Wilson professed to do. While Luce "argued that American culture had already illuminated the path to this century,"⁵⁷ Jackson would take up the cause of American businesses' place in the campaign. Initially written with a missionary's fervor to rally Americans on behalf of interventionism in the

face of the fascist threat in World War II, Luce's American Century ideas would be utilized by Time-Life after World War II to rouse the public's ire against another menace to United States hegemony: the Soviet Union. Luce increasingly perceived the Russians as standing in the way of an American Imperium, and Jackson agreed.⁵⁸

Jackson shared Henry Luce's vision of a strong and just America, and he carried his beliefs to the Free Europe Committee where he served as president from 1951 until the presidential election of 1952. There, he would apply the doctrine that American values would make all men free. President Eisenhower also held to this ideal and, in turn, adopted many American Century concepts; he later made Jackson one of his most valued consultants and speechwriters during the campaign and throughout much of his tenure in office. During the Eisenhower Presidency, Jackson continued to fulfill many and varied roles. As a Special Assistant for the President he took charge of Cold War psychological operations. His assistant, Abbott Washburn, marveled at how "he was able to accomplish through this personal quality of his (the) coordinat(ion) (of) the heads of the various N.S.C. (National Security Council) agencies involved in Cold War activities."⁵⁹ Jackson also had an important place in the proper functioning of the Operations Coordinating Board, where he "ironed out an awful lot of problems", according to Washburn, and generally kept the ship on course.⁶⁰ In 1954, CDJ became this country's delegate to the Ninth General Assembly of the United Nations, bringing to the assignment his customary enthusiasm in dealing with the kinds of issues that that body addressed. In that year these issues included, especially, the seating of mainland China, and the boiling cauldrons that were Poland and Hungary.

While liberal and internationalist views drove Jackson, his was a sophisticated and furtive style that substituted guile for overt confrontation. These qualities met with vigorous opposition from some within the Republican camp, from other members of the Administration itself, and certainly amongst the many reactionary circles in the United States. The McCarthy wing of the Republican Party, formidable during Eisenhower's first term, preferred a more bellicose brand of anticommunism. Jackson thought that, "McCarthy was attempting 'to establish McCarthyism as Republicanism.'"⁶¹ Tactics also separated CDJ from the more truculent stance of then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. When in 1958, Jackson pushed the Administration for another summit conference with the Russians to confront "Khrushchev's aggressive diplomacy on disarmament issues ..." Dulles demurred, sticking strictly to his hard-line views. Jackson feared that

“Foster Dulles was hamstringing the Administration’s ability to break out of a defensive mode.”⁶² Standing by his ambitious conception of America’s leadership role in the world—though often disappointed with Eisenhower’s lack of leadership and initiative in implementing a more activist foreign policy—C.D. Jackson managed to serve his President faithfully and well.

Jackson much regretted having to leave the world of Washington power brokers, at Henry Luce’s insistence, for the more lucrative confines of a global publishing empire. He was tempted to return to the nation’s capital when, in 1957, Eisenhower suggested he again become White House adviser for Cold War planning. By 1958, in fact, Ike longed enough for Jackson’s counsel to explore the idea of C.D. as Secretary of State with John Foster Dulles switching to Special Assistant and Adviser. Dulles robustly opposed, however, any diminution of his power over the Department of State, although he did acquiesce to the President offering CDJ the position of undersecretary of state. Not surprisingly, Jackson declined. While he and Foster Dulles remained friends, Jackson knew that his ability to shape Cold War policy would be undermined by a subaltern status in the Administration.⁶³

When Jackson’s “official” days in Washington were over, it may be said that in the end he was less committed than Eisenhower to disarmament and détente, preferring in effect more covert efforts to topple communist regimes. But his style, his intellect, and his idea of a more benevolent America played a major role in maneuvering United States Cold War policy in the 1950s toward what he deeply believed in: America’s inevitable victory.

Footnotes

*Abbott Washburn passed away December 11, 2003, at the age of 88, before this manuscript went to press.

*On Christmas Eve 1942, Vichy Admiral Jean-Francois Darlan was assassinated by a member of the French Resistance, who was then himself court-martialed and shot, according to Sgt. Len Scott RAPC in his wartime remembrance, "A Merry (Murderous) Christmas in Algiers (1942)", BBC History Homepage, 17 May 2004.

*There had been an earlier meeting at Princeton in the spring of 1952—convened at the behest of C.D. Jackson—ostensibly to discuss psychological warfare.

ENDNOTES

1. See C.D. Jackson interview, conducted by The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (part of the Ford Foundation's project on the American character), 6 June 1961, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 97, file 3.
2. Ibid., See interviewer McDonald to C.D. Jackson.
3. Ibid.
4. Robert E. Herzstein, *Henry R. Luce—A Political Portrait Of The Man Who Created The American Century* (New York, Scribners, 1994), p. 218.
5. Ibid., p.217.
6. See Carl Bernstein "The CIA and the Media," *Rolling Stone*, 20 October 1977, p.63. Bernstein's revelatory article on the nature of the media's incestuous relationship with the intelligence community was considered groundbreaking for its time. Time-Life Inc, in general, and C. D. Jackson in particular, had close ties with the Agency that afforded the magazine access to a wealth of information theretofore classified. In return, former personnel report, CIA often used Time-Life correspondents for covert operations. Also see Herzstein, *Henry Luce*, p. 259
7. Blanche Wiesen Cook, "First Comes The Lie: C. D. Jackson and Political Warfare," "Radical History Review," Issue 31, 1984, p.45; see also, Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, passim.
8. Abbott Washburn, oral history.
9. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington D.C., August 2001.
10. Abbott Washburn, oral history.
11. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington D.C., August 2001.
12. Tom Braden, interview with author, Virginia, August 2001.
13. Ibid.
14. Loudon Wainwright, *The Great American Magazine*, p. 34.
15. Herzstein, *Luce*, pp. 217, 218.
16. Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, pp. 9-15; see also Marie McCrum, oral history.
17. See Jackson Report, "How Private Enterprise Can Carry The American Word Abroad." The Report is a chapter of a study conducted by The Council on Foreign Relations, 29 April 1948, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 45, file 1.
18. Ibid.
19. Cook, "First Comes The Lie," p.47.
20. Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan - America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952* (Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.3, and passim.
21. See Jackson address, "Who Will Win The Cold War Between Free Enterprise And Statism?" before The Economic Club of Detroit, 24 October 1949, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 83.
22. Ibid.
23. See Jackson speech, "The Public Relations of Survival," delivered at the annual meeting of The Institute of Life Insurance, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, 16 December 1949, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 102; also see Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, pp. 124-126; and see Cook, "First Comes

The Lie,” pp. 47-48.

24. C.D. Jackson Papers, 25 May 1951, box 52, file 1; also see Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, pp.123, 124.

25. See Jackson proposal for an Institute For Democratic Leadership, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 50.

26. See correspondence, C.D. Jackson to Hamilton Robinson, Vice President, Foreign Service Educational Foundation, 5 May 1952, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 52.

27. Ibid.

28. See Jackson to National Association of Public Relations Counsels, 20 March 1947, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 102, file 3.

29. See C.D. Jackson to Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, C.D. Jackson Papers, 3 August 1954, box 32.

30. Marie McCrum, oral history.

31. See Jackson brief on “*Operation Kremlin Kracks*,” (sic) 21 February 1955, C.D.

32. See Jackson position paper, “The Crisis of 1954,” C.D. Jackson Papers, box 83. Jackson Papers, box 22, file 2.

33. See *Time Magazine* editorial, “*New Front in the Cold War, The U.S. Searches for a World Economic Policy*,” 13 December 1954, pp. 87-88; see also C.D. Jackson to Eisenhower, 29 April 1954; Jackson to John Foster Dulles, 9 April 1954; and Jackson to Professor Max Millikan, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 3 May 1954, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 83, file 2.

34. See Jackson policy paper, “*Reasons For World Economic Policy*,” C.D. Jackson Papers, box 32, file 1.

35. See Dr. Gabriel Hauge notes to Eisenhower on C.D. Jackson economic proposal, 13 August 1954, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 22, file: Ann Whitman, 1 (declassified 29 December 1976).

36. See note 31.

37. Ibid

38. See “*Report on Radio Free Europe*,” 15 December 1952, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 54; see also Abbott Washburn, oral history.

39. Ibid.; see also Washburn oral history; and see Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA*, pp. 21, 148-149; Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men*, pp. 61, 137; and Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, pp. 121-132 and passim.

40. See Time Inc press release: “*American Public Favors Stronger U.S. Information Program Overseas*,” 24 January 1948. The release referred to a C.D. Jackson article entitled “Today, Words Speak as Loud as Actions — Abroad,” published in a contemporaneous issue of *Export Trade and Shipper Magazine*, C.D. Jackson papers, box 102, file 3.

41. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 113.

42. Walt W. Rostow, *Europe After Stalin — Eisenhower’s Three Decisions Of March 11, 1953* (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1982), p. 147. The book was dedicated to the memory of Rostow’s colleague, Charles Douglas Jackson.

43. Blanche Wiesen Cook, “*First Comes The Lie: C.D. Jackson and Political Warfare*,” *Radical History Review* 31, 1984, passim.

44. FRUS, 1955-1957, XXV, p. 123.

45. FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, pp. 14 & 63.
46. Ibid., p. 206; See also Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1997) pp. 67-68.
47. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, p. 69.
48. FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, pp. 206-207.
49. Ibid., pp. 206-208.
50. Ibid., pp. 226-229; See also George Kennan to C.D. Jackson, 15 September 1953, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 4.
51. Ibid., pp. 236-237; See also Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, p. 70.
52. Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, p. 342.
53. Kai Bird, *The Chairman*, p. 471.
54. See Bilderberg Group, Buxton Conference, 13-15 September 1959, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 36.
55. See Marie McCrum oral history.
56. See statement of C.D. Jackson before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, 18 June 1959, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 98, file 5.
57. Herzstein, *Henry R. Luce*, p. 180.
58. Ibid., p. 383.
59. See Abbott Washburn oral history.
60. Ibid.
61. Bird, *The Chairman*, p. 416.
62. Ibid., pp. 470-471.
63. Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, p. 205; See also Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 444; and Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington D.C., August 2001.

CHAPTER 3

WHAT IS DEMOCRATIC PROPAGANDA?

Nothing appears more surprising to those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few, and the implicit submission with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers. When we inquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall find that, as force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion only that government is founded, and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments as well as to the most free and most popular.

Of The First Principles of Government

David Hume (1758)

I

“The most effective message about communism was the truth—skillfully told.” So spoke James Olson, former Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA, at a Cold War Propaganda Conference at Texas A&M University in 1998.¹ The art or artifice of disseminating this “truth,” entailed putting the theory of propaganda to practical use. Olson was describing the psychological element in the struggle to counter communism which, C.D. Jackson had called, “a very dynamic idea that has reached well beyond the limits of Slavic desperation.”² Jackson warned that our leading foe after World War II, the Soviet Union, was “a very large country with some very dynamic ideas as to how things ought to be and some very ingenious ideas as to how to play the game.”³

The United States was also well-equipped for the game of RealPolitik with public relations gurus like C.D. Jackson, whom President Eisenhower had “enormous confidence in ... particularly in this field of opinion-molding and propaganda.”⁴ Jackson maintained that the craft of modern political warfare “traditionally begins with words. The goal is not to bomb and destroy, but to woo and seduce.”⁵ This art of seduction and opinion-making, and how they gave rise to democratic propaganda, has its roots on Madison Avenue.

Edward L. Bernays, usually acknowledged as the “Father of Spin,” “almost single-handedly fashioned the craft that has come to be called public relations,” writes biographer Larry Tye. Image-making and opinion-molding were the cornerstones by which American entrepreneurs created their markets. The same techniques soon became common in political campaigns. They were “how Richard Nixon was able to dig his way out of his post-Watergate depths and remake himself into an elder statesman worthy of a lavish state funeral.”⁶ Bernays’ inspiration for this signal achievement—one that would greatly swell capitalist coffers—was none other than his uncle, Sigmund Freud. Bernays applied to collective experience Freud’s ideas about human behavior. In commerce he could predict, “then adjust, the way people believed and behaved.” Best of all is that they did not even seem to notice.⁷

Much like C.D. Jackson, Bernays couched his magic in partial truths, but also cloaked his product in deception. His expertise and marketing genius enabled American tycoons to make “it socially acceptable for women to smoke,” and turn drinking into a pastime of accepted moderation. Politically, Jackson and Bernays joined forces in 1953 when they helped to design a plan along with the CIA—which had the support of certain self-interested corporations*—to overthrow Guatemala’s legally elected President, Jacobo Arbenz. The “spinmeisters” then moved on, separately, to expand the frontiers of American capitalism, having now helped engineer the demise of democracy in Guatemala, with its subsequent four decades of civil war and slaughter firmly established as this nation’s legacy in Latin America.⁸

Well before this escapade, during Calvin Coolidge’s 1924 reelection campaign, the president’s Republican advisers worried that his lugubrious demeanor would cost their man the office. Bernays, who had yet to apply his public relations wizardry to a political contest, was called in. Eager to test his advertising techniques in the rough and tumble world of American politics, the PR expert brought together many of the Broadway stage’s leading performers to dine, and to be photographed with their White House hosts, Mr. and Mrs. Calvin Coolidge: “The newspapers loved it. The *New York Times* headlined its story ‘actors eat cakes with the Coolidges ... President nearly laughs.’” With the election only three weeks away, Bernays had achieved a significant reconfiguration of Coolidge’s public image, and the President was reelected in a landslide. It may not be proved that the “Bernays touch” had instantly transformed the bland Coolidge’s funereal campaign into a lively and attractive political ticket capable of winning the election by a prodigious margin, but the perception by the press and the public was that Coolidge appeared presidential. And in politics, whether national or on the world stage,

perception is reality.⁹

Almost thirty years later, C.D. Jackson stood before the Association of National Advertisers in New York as a major player in constructing the nation's propaganda war with the Soviet Union. The central architect of Radio Free Europe, the country's broadcasting instrument for liberation behind the Iron Curtain, Jackson defined this new method in the struggle to capture the diplomatic promontory "For the first time we have adapted American advertising and sales techniques to the business of propaganda." He regaled his listeners with stories of RFE's efforts to win the competition for the allegiance of Eastern Europeans, "just as WCBS competes with WNBC", Jackson pointed out, "and by their sales ingenuity capture(s) the audience and let(s) the propaganda take care of itself."¹⁰

For the most part, the strategy of Jackson and Radio Free Europe was not to allow Western broadcasts to sound like crude attacks on our communist adversaries. "We tried to be objective and factual, therefore more credible," claimed Abbott Washburn who, like Jackson, had significant public relations experience.¹¹ RFE broadcasts would feature American sales methods to project "democratic ideals." In essence, RFE adopted the format of American radio with entertainment, music, humor, international commentary, and local news. The shows could be wholly devoid of vitriol and still be effective. But the philosophy was to remain both furtive and protean in all its guises. To an already receptive audience of advertisers, Jackson described one of his favorite covert operations: 15,000,000 leaflets carried by 15,000 balloons to the peoples of Czechoslovakia and Poland. Reminiscent of the schemes he had once concocted for the OWI during World War II when billions of Allied leaflets were dropped behind German lines, the message to those who now were enslaved behind the Iron Curtain was the same: liberation and democracy over enslavement and totalitarian communism. This was democratic capitalism being packaged—like any other product—as democracy, by the nation's public relations master. Jackson advised his listeners: "What is the product that we are selling? The product is freedom—keeping alive the hope for freedom and maintaining the will for resistance."¹²

C.D. Jackson loved to tell his audiences about an experience he had in World War II as a member of the Psychological Warfare Group with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). His team had dropped literally tons of propaganda pamphlets in the months preceding D-Day Normandy, and transmitted disinformation "on a 24-hour radio schedule over untold transmitters in England, North Africa, everywhere." He recalled

that:

With every bridge over the Rhine destroyed by the Germans, our army found the Remagen Bridge standing, and we were able to establish an immediate bridgehead which probably shortened the war by months. After the war, I ran into a colonel friend of mine (who) was the Operations Officer of the unit that came upon the Remagen Bridge and I asked him why he thought the Germans had not blown the bridge. My friend said that we had been dropping leaflets in Polish on this group urging them to disregard the orders and sabotage the efforts of their German masters. At least one of the Poles had paid attention, because on inspection they found that the cable had been sawed in two, all except for a few strands which did detonate but didn't destroy the bridge. There you have the equation: the months of effort, the tons of paper, the millions of dollars spent by Psychological Warfare equals one tiny piece of paper fluttering into the hands of a Polish conscript at the German end of the Remagen Bridge, who reads, believes, and acts—and shortens the war, with its incalculable costs, by months.¹³

Jackson and his psychological warfare cohorts in the Eisenhower Administration were all supplicants to a Bernays, “Madison Ave” vision of democracy. To Bernays, “the very essence of the democratic process” is “the freedom to persuade and suggest.” This, Bernays advised, was the “engineering of consent.”¹⁴ Joining forces with Eisenhower’s psychological warfare team as an adviser to the USIA in its battle against “godless communism,” Bernays drew for the world a sharp parallel between communism and Christianity: “Hate is the driving force of communism,” and “charity is the impelling motive of Christianity.” Communism provides “no personal liberty,” Christianity “means liberty is possible.” Linking Christianity with liberty, and, by extension, with Western-style democracy, could not have escaped the attention of the largely Catholic populations of all-important France and Italy (both of whom had sizable and active communist parties). Moreover, the symbolism was sure to encourage, if not incite, the Church in Eastern Europe—the backbone of its society—to champion the cause of freedom and democracy as Christ’s own.¹⁵

II

Perhaps M.I.T. Professor Noam Chomsky, a leading critic of American foreign and domestic policy, has most closely captured the underlying function of propaganda in a democracy. Chomsky holds that in a pluralistic society the function of a mass media is “to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society.” This, he distinguishes from the methods of a state-run (communist or anti-

communist) press, under which tight controls and official censorship are transparent. The contrast was especially evident during the Cold War, when many allies of the United States behaved no better than did our “evil” enemies.¹⁶

Democratic propaganda was born in an age when the technology of communication had experienced its second profound revolution. The efficiency of the printing press in “abstracting reality,” noted renowned political scientist Harold Lasswell, provided Europeans of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries with a broad range of cultural and scientific advances. Besides nurturing public education, science, and industry, the development in the exchange of information “brought with it broad participation in politics and government, and political revolution.”¹⁷ Mass communication in the twentieth century through film and other electronic media increased and quickened the size and pace of the flow of information.

“Consequently, it is the size and pace of information flow, rather than the nature of it, that typifies human communication today.” Moreover, the ability to control and manipulate this flow in an “Age of Information” is a source of power that rivals political, economic, and military might. In fact, it enhances the nature of all three.¹⁸ Much of the news that is delivered by modern communication outlets is analyzed and then interpreted by people who, in some fashion, have gained the public trust. The new American punditocracy conveys to the audience the significance of what has happened. “Assuming that professionalism and good intentions prevail ..., still this raises disquieting questions,” observed Lasswell. “What is not being reported that we need to know?” And, “Is there any systematic bias operating in the news channels and consequently being reflected in the pictures we store away in our heads?” Chomsky suggests that the subtle biases inherent in mass media under corporate control are the *sine qua non* of modern reportage.¹⁹ Professor Chomsky notes, that in the United States “The mass media are not a solid monolith on all issues.” He allows that “there will be a certain diversity of tactical judgements on how to attain generally shared aims, reflected in media debate. But views that challenge fundamental premises ... will be excluded from the mass media.”²⁰ The method of communication which I define as democratic propaganda appears more often liberal and informative rather than dogmatic; and it almost always adheres to the prevailing elite consensus. Chomsky argues that, “The propagandist naturally cannot reveal the true intentions of the principal for whom he acts.”²¹ Bernays would contend that the public must want to buy your product; and this applies to political and economic paradigms as well as to toothpaste.

A seemingly “independent” media, then, is the very essence of democratic propaganda. Therefore, the American media because of its independent appearance, moved to the forefront in the political war against communism. “Words, however used, comprise the vertebrae of political warfare,” declares Blanche Cook.²² Success in the superpower war of words and ideas that went on in the 1950s required that psychological warriors like C.D. Jackson create a language to suit the culture, and a public relations approach to promote it. In Jackson’s world, the language, as well as the covert nature of the endeavor, had “to appear to be independent from government; to seem to represent the spontaneous convictions of millions of freedom-loving individuals. That was the cover,” notes Cook.²³

No notion was more fervently held by Jackson and his associates than their belief in the force of words and ideas, and their commitment to this nation’s ideals: “If men and women in other countries are to believe that American objectives and their own aspirations have much in common, this is to be brought about not merely by our telling them so. It is to be done by our acts, explained and interpreted by our words,” asserted Jackson before an American Legion audience in St Louis. “Words are important,” he averred. “What we say does have an effect. But words which do not match deeds are not persuasive. Furthermore, they can be dangerous to our interests.” Jackson cited an extract from The Report of the President’s Committee on International Information Activities (known as the Jackson Report because of the three Jacksons who sat on the Committee), that posited “except for propaganda, there are no psychological warfare instruments distinct from traditional instruments of policy.”²⁴

III

President Eisenhower, related Abbott Washburn, had become an ardent supporter of political propaganda and psychological warfare when, as Commander of Allied Forces during World War II, he was “impressed by the effect that these operations had had on undermining the morale of the enemy ... and thus shortening the war ..., and he’d been impressed by the influence of an instrumentality like BBC (British Broadcasting Company)” which was an important purveyor of Allied propaganda.²⁵ Ike and Jackson realized early in the Cold War, that a powerful and autonomous—but malleable—media were natural allies in America’s quest to capture the world’s markets and resources. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, in some ways a Third World

economy with great natural resources (though largely underdeveloped) and a powerful military, was forced to resort to the standard crude “coercive persuasion which has since characterized propaganda in most communist societies.” The very extent of censorship that inheres within state control of mass communications is also the greatest factor in enervating its ultimate effectiveness, credibility, and public acceptance. In the Soviet propaganda model, “the Communist Party must control all means of communication.” The overt character of communist censorship played into the hands of America’s postwar propaganda strategies.²⁶

Jackson’s greatest asset in understanding the utility of propaganda was his recognition that the psychological war against the Soviet Union would be enduring and evolutionary. He also understood that because economic and social conditions in Russia were likely to improve, the people would learn more about the outside world and slowly, inexorably, demand more change. The thrust of American propaganda in this period, therefore, intended to exploit these changes and project them into the Eastern Bloc countries where ethnic enmities could be exacerbated through covert operations. Sowing the seeds of nationalism and dissension among the satellite peoples was also to render the Soviet Union less likely to promote Marxism beyond its sphere of influence. Ultimately, American psychological operations proved so effective that “the lid blew tragically in Hungary,” explained Marie McCrum.²⁷

While the psychological propaganda offensive was, for the most part, subtle and nuanced, it would remain throughout the Cold War “all-inclusive.” It was designed “To ‘counter any threat of a party or individual directly or indirectly responsive’ to communism in a free-world country.” Media outlets like *Time* and *Life* magazines (Jackson was a vice-president of Time-Life Inc, and served on the editorial board of all of its publications) were utilized to destabilize “imminent” threats in countries like Iran and Guatemala. While Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America (VOA) beamed their harassing beacons behind the Iron Curtain, *Time-Life-Fortune* publications ran daily features aimed at upending democratic but non-aligned governments such as Arbenz’s in Guatemala and Mossadegh’s in Iran. “For two years,” according to Professor Cook, “*Time* published stories concerning Arbenz’s government dedicated to making it look vicious and ridiculous.” Scare stories and headlines screamed, “The commies are at our borders” (in the case of Guatemala), and “The commies are about to take control of the world’s oil” (in Iran), creating public acceptance—especially amongst the intelligentsia—for all diplomatic policy initiatives, including economic blockade, sabotage, and even assassination and other mayhem.²⁸

The overthrow of democratically elected leaders in Guatemala and Iran is certainly justifiable cause to question the liberal *bona fides* of C.D. Jackson, and the seemingly progressive direction of the Eisenhower Administration's diplomacy. But it was the nature of the anti-communist hysteria of that time that caused otherwise rational men to behave without regard to the heavy costs that would be exacted upon those they were ostensibly trying to "save." As it pertained to Jacobo Arbenz, Jackson as well as President Eisenhower relied heavily on the CIA for "hard information ... that arms from Czechoslovakia were being clandestinely introduced into Guatemala (with or without the assistance of the Russians.)"²⁹ Although Secretary of State John Foster Dulles admitted that, it would "be impossible to produce evidence clearly tying the Guatemalan Government to Moscow,"³⁰ Arbenz's nationalization of United Fruit Company lands—a company represented by the Dulles's law firm, Sullivan and Cromwell—was sufficient in the eyes of the Administration to label it "red."

The decision was made in August 1953 by the 54/12 Committee (the group that directed covert operations for the NSC), to topple the leftist government of Guatemala and Jackson, a member of that body, gave his approval for the *coup d'état*.³¹ Tom Braden, a veteran of Central Intelligence Agency clandestine operations, described the Guatemalan coup as "a forty year tragedy."³² The abattoir that defined Guatemala's political turmoil in the succeeding decades was a lasting stain on the reputations of the CIA and all who gave their assent to the coup, including C.D. Jackson and Dwight Eisenhower.

Before the June 1954 overthrow of the Guatemalan Government materialized, the United States CIA had arranged a coup d'état in Iran in August 1953 to oust the nationalist regime of Dr. Muhammed Mossadegh. Mossadegh had made the mistake of nationalizing the properties of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, one of Britain's principal suppliers. Operation Ajax, the code name for the coup, was formulated first by John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles in June 1953 in reaction to Eisenhower's alarm over the prospect of Mossadegh's nationalization plan. Kermit Roosevelt, the grandson of Theodore Roosevelt and an OSS veteran, directed the operation. Now a CIA spymaster, Roosevelt would have the fiercely independent Mossadegh deposed in favor of the more friendly—and servile—Shah Muhammed Reza Pahlevi. Working in tandem with British Intelligence, the United States brought about an international consortium to replace Anglo-Iranian Oil in which American companies such as Gulf, Mobil, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Standard Oil of California, now would all have the same percentage of

control as the British did.³³ The Iranian Affair contained all the pro-business requisites of C.D. Jackson's concept of Western democratic propaganda. Its ultimate result, a Middle East rent by religious turmoil and sectarian violence in which modern day Iran plays a central role, smacks of covert operations blowback: the unintended consequences of foreign political interference and misguided alliances.

IV

In 1953, the Psychological Strategy Board and the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. were presented with a profound change in the face of the enemy. In March of that year, Joseph Stalin suffered a cerebral hemorrhage. His eventual passing caused the Soviet Union to seek new leadership; with it came the hope of a positive alteration in its relationship with the West. Stalin had been the archetypal villain. Often compared to Adolph Hitler, he was the perfect foe for American democratic propaganda. But strategists like C.D. Jackson advised Eisenhower to reevaluate U.S. relations with the U.S.S.R. and to institute bold new policy changes, while at the same time keeping up the propaganda barrage in Eastern Europe. Jackson observed that the changing of the Russian Guard "offers a unique opportunity to exploit all stresses and strains within the Soviet system."³⁴

Although the covert operations of the United States often involved destabilizing neutral and leftist governments while supporting despots for their presumed anti-communism, Jackson more often favored a kind of benevolent, economic diplomacy as a tool of successful psychological warfare. He was considered the liberal conscience of the Eisenhower Administration. In the immediate post-World War II period, Blanche Cook notes, Jackson suggested "that Point Four and The Marshall Plan could be ... used to build up consumer demands and raise the worlds' standard of living. 'There are two billion people on this globe, and 50% of them have a sub-marginal standard.' To increase that by even 'a fraction of a percent created a demand' for production beyond all current capacity in the U.S. and Western Europe, and CDJ urged that it would be unwise 'to exclude from that billion-plus of sub-standard human beings those under Russian domination.'"³⁵ After Stalin's death, Jackson proposed a new direction for American foreign policy—one that was designed to keep the incoming Soviet leaders off balance. None of his proposals, however, was as grandiose and audacious as the recommendation that Eisenhower deliver, "a substantial speech and proposal

... to seize the political initiative, to get and keep the Soviets on the defensive.” In a bit of trenchant analysis that reflected the overall progressive nature of his political views, Jackson urged the President to seize the spirit of the moment and offer the world peace.³⁶

The new approach to the Soviet Union, having been “fully explored” by senior members of the PSB and the PPS, and reviewed by the State Department, was fashioned to reflect, in Jackson’s words, the “disarray and lack of unity” that the new Russian regime under Malenkov was exhibiting. Diverging from hardliners like Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and many in the intelligence community, Eisenhower posited that Stalin had adopted an aggressive stance after the war because he “had to come to terms with other members of the Kremlin ruling circle.” In a candid and revelatory moment which ran counter to the entire “official” American postwar diplomatic perspective, Ike theorized that Stalin might have “sought more peaceful and normal relations with the rest of the world ...” were it not for the Soviet Union being “something of a committee government.” Now, both Jackson and Eisenhower intuited, was a propitious moment to reach out to the new Soviet leaders with a cautious offering to scale down the increasingly dangerous Cold War conflict.³⁷

Perhaps the most important underlying feature of the plan that Jackson and his psywarriors drafted was its sincere intent to change the course of what would become our Cold War history. C.D. Jackson’s stratagem called for “a dramatic psychological move ...,” one that would also be interpreted “as a serious policy proposal not to be dismissed as merely a propaganda effort.” Jackson, along with other members of Ike’s gifted stable of speech writers (Walt Whitman Rostow and Time-Life journalist Emmett J. Hughes), prepared a presidential address that in Jackson’s words “contained no mere pious platitudes ...” The speech they composed, “Chance for Peace,” called for a Foreign Ministers’ Conference of the Big Four, and negotiation of “all the major outstanding issues between the Free World and the Soviet Bloc, including the unification of Germany and disarmament.” “Everything in our plan for peace,” Jackson stressed, “would flow from the President’s speech.”³⁸ It was a prime example of American democratic propaganda in action.

In reaction to State Department objections, promulgated in the main by John Foster Dulles, Jackson remained steadfast in his belief that the United States and the world must not let this opportunity fade into history. To whomever doubted the wisdom of negotiating for peace, Jackson pointed out

that Ike's presidential campaign, while calling for the liberation of all peoples, remained committed to ending war and human suffering. And since the President's address would be broadcast throughout all of the nation's vast network of media outlets, sent to all American Missions abroad, and be disseminated by the United States Information Agency, RFE, and Central Intelligence Agency assets, it had the potential of reaching untold millions for "immediate exploitation."³⁹ Jackson and his supporters presupposed that, for Eastern Europeans who found "a fundamental lack of content in enunciated American policy," the "Chance for Peace" speech would signal a new direction in addressing them "in terms of their problems and aspirations." Joseph Grew, former Ambassador to Japan, lamented that the United States had failed to make just such an effort to signal its intentions to the Japanese people in 1940 and 1941.⁴⁰

V

The term "democratic propaganda" has a nice benign ring to it. But U.S. plans for coordinating governmental operations overseas in order to "sell" lofty American ideals, while at the same time establishing a doctrine of corporate hegemony at home, left many critics considering the Orwellian aspects of it all. As special adviser to Eisenhower for psychological warfare, C.D. Jackson appropriated "almost unlimited powers" for himself. The policy blueprints that Jackson designed worried even members of his Psychological Strategy Board. Former PSB officer, Charles Burton Marshall, would later reflect that American psychological strategy "accepts uniformity as a substitute for diversity." It advances a system that justifies "a particular type of social belief and structure," administering "a body of principles for human aspirations," and includes "all fields of human thought." This rare apostate among former U.S. psywarriors concluded that American propaganda processes were getting a little too close to becoming "as totalitarian as one can get."⁴¹

According to other dissenters, "the PSB planned to work on the elite in each area so as to predispose its members to 'the philosophy held by the planners.'" Of course the planners reflexively accepted the integrity of their government's position. And this "crusade" came at a time when the nation was waging a psychological war for freedom abroad, when much of its black population at home was systematically disenfranchised; when citizens who did not sufficiently adhere to the prevailing anti-communist dogmas were

routinely hounded out of government jobs, academia, and Hollywood; when women were bound by gender roles to second-class citizenship; and, when conformity was stressed over diversity, to an increasingly acquiescent populace.⁴²

The late journalist Walter Lippmann, a leading progressive voice in the American political choir, saw nothing inherent in democratic propaganda that violated the valued precepts of the American way of life: “He described the practice as a ‘revolution’ in the ‘practice of democracy.’” Moreover, Harold Lasswell—whom Lippman greatly admired—advanced the “revolutionary” idea, “that when elites lack the requisite force to compel obedience, social managers must turn to ‘a whole new technique of control, largely though propaganda.’” In a democratic state, he added, “we must recognize the ‘ignorance and stupidity (of) ... the masses’ and not succumb to democratic dogmatisms about men being the best judges of their own interests.” Paradoxically, the methods advanced by men such as Jackson, Lippman, Lasswell, and Bernays, to promote liberal democracy—both here and abroad—have, in the judgment of Noam Chomsky, “an unmistakable resemblance to the Leninist concept of a vanguard party that leads the masses to a better life that they cannot conceive or construct on their own.”⁴³

C.D. Jackson and Henry Luce fully embraced the proposition that the twentieth-century would be the American Century: “an updated preconception of nineteenth-century Manifest Destiny claims to markets, influence, and empire,” according to Blanche Cook.⁴⁴ But as the American Century ended, many of the same architects of this *Pax Americana* now abjured the very concepts that were the foundation for their actions. No less a Cold War combatant than George Kennan rejected the propaganda monolith that the government had constructed for its prosecution. Examining the costs of the Cold War to the peoples of this nation, and especially to Third World inhabitants whose bad fortune and valuable natural resources would place them in the line of fire, Kennan proclaimed the crusade a moral failure. He disavowed, as he said, “any and all messianic concepts of America’s role in the world, rejecting that is, an image of ourselves as teachers and redeemers to the rest of humanity, rejecting the illusions of unique and superior virtue on our part, (and) the prattle about Manifest Destiny or the “American Century”.” These, of course, were the “central myths” around which much of the Cold War had been constructed, claims British cultural critic Frances Stonor Saunders.⁴⁵

The United States has met the dawning of a new century as the clear-cut

winner—however temporary—in the high-stakes Cold War contest. It remains equally clear that the political gambits and machinations of the 1950s were major components of both foreign and domestic policy. C.D. Jackson and his psywar colleagues contributed much to shaping these policies. And as it is important to understand the extent to which the strategies of this epoch contributed to our victories, it is equally imperative that we look at how the process worked and how it changed us as a nation.

Footnote

*United Fruit, which owned 42% of Guatemala's lands, was represented by the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell on whose Board sat DCI, Allen Dulles and Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.

ENDNOTES

1. James Olson, “*Propaganda Use During The Cold War*,” Texas A&M Conference, 7 March 1998.
2. Blanche Wiesen Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, p.126.
3. See C.D. Jackson speech to Maryland State Teachers Association, 31 October 1947, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 102, file 2.
4. See Abbott Washburn oral history.
5. Cook, “*First Comes The Lie*,” p. 43.
6. Larry Tye, *The Father of Spin—Edward L. Bernays & The Birth Of Public Relations* (New York, Crown Publishers, 1998), pp. viii, ix.
7. Ibid., p. vii.
8. Ibid., pp. viii, ix.
9. Ibid., pp. 77-79.
10. See C.D. Jackson speech to the Association of National Advertisers, Hotel Plaza, New York, 26 September 1951. C.D. Jackson Papers, box 101, file 1.
11. Abbott Washburn interview, August 2001.
12. See note 10.
13. Ibid.
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16. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent, The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York, Pantheon Books, 1988), p.1.
17. Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Hans Speier (edit.) *Propaganda and Communication in World History Volume III: A Pluralizing World in Formation* (Honolulu, The University Press of Hawaii, 1980). See Wilbur Schramm essay, “The Effects of Mass Media in an Information Era,” p. 295.
18. Ibid.,pp. 297 & 298.
19. Ibid., p. 320.
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21. Ibid., p. xiii.
22. Cook, “*First Comes The Lie*,” p. 44.
23. Ibid., p. 49.
24. See speech by C.D. Jackson before the National Security Commission & Committees of The American Legion, St Louis, Missouri, 28 August 1953. C.D. Jackson Papers, box 100, speech texts, file 3.
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27. Marie McCrum, oral history.

28. Cook, "*First Comes The Lie*," p. 58.

29. Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, p. 266.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 269.

31. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, p.108; see also Bird, *The Chairman*, p. 435; and see Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA*, for C.D. Jackson's involvement with the CIA and covert operations, pp. 86-99; and see Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, p. 57.

32. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.

33. John Ranelagh, *The Agency*, pp. 260-263.

34. FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, p. 1114.

35. Cook, "*First Comes The Lie*," p. 48.

36. FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, p. 1114.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 1118 & 1119.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 1119.

39. See Jackson morning conference of the Operations Coordinating Board, 30 November 1953 (Declassified 19 August 1980), C.D. Jackson Papers, box 1.

40. FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, pp. 1173 & 1174.

41. Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War—The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York, The New Press, 2000), p. 149.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 150

43. Chomsky, *Detering Democracy*, pp. 367-371.

44. Cook, "*First Comes The Lie*," p. 44.

45. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, pp. 413 & 414.

CHAPTER 4

COLD WAR LIBERALISM: “FIGHTING WORDS”

What kind of peace do I mean and what kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for their children—not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women—not merely peace in our time but peace for all time ... For in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet, we all breathe the same air, we all cherish our children's futures, and we are all mortal.

President John F. Kennedy,
Commencement Address, American University, 10 June 1963

I

It has been theorized by many historians, that the Cold War ideology that drove the United States into the Asian Continent and conflicts in Korea and Vietnam was inherently liberal in intent and therefore salutary in thrust. This belies the underlying expansionist predilections of some of those who crafted these interventions, and how, in essence, their policies diverged greatly from the truly progressive Cold War strategies of the anti-interventionists and anti-neocolonialists. C.D. Jackson and his many like-minded psychological warfare operatives would—and did—define large-scale American military intervention as a failure of policy illiberal in design and unsophisticated in practice.

After his service as an OSS man in Europe in World War II, and preceding his stint in the CIA, Tom Braden returned to his alma mater, Dartmouth, to teach Political Science and Literature. He had occasion to speak to poet and dramatist, Archibald Macleish, who shared his concern that the recently issued Truman Doctrine was “provocative” and “downright inflammatory.” While Braden contended that the Cold War was inevitable —“There had to be a Cold War, my life was a Cold War”—he nonetheless maintained that, “Truman pushed this thing too hard.” In 1953, however, a new administration led by a venerated World War II General offered the nation a unique opportunity to significantly alter the direction of the incipient

East-West conflict.

With Eisenhower in the White House, the United States had a president who was as firm as Truman had been in his commitment to stem the tide of communist expansion. But the former Supreme Commander of Allied Forces possessed a more realistic and tempered view of what American military prowess might achieve without rendering the U.S. a permanent garrison state. Simply put, Ike announced he would utilize all existing instruments of policy including psychological warfare to confront Soviet advances. Ironically, his point man in this exercise, C.D. Jackson, thought the phrase “psychological warfare”—as distinct from diplomacy—was not quite appropriate since “It is not ‘psychological’ because the men and women we seek to persuade are going to be persuaded mainly by what the United States does, what the United States is, and stands for—not by what we say or by any cute tricks of psychology or salesmanship.” Jackson was, nonetheless, a nonpareil salesman who believed unfailingly in his product: American democratic capitalism. His job, as he described it, was “the positive task of creating conditions (through his post at the White House) of freedom and happiness and well being for human beings, building the kind of world which meets not only the interests and aspirations of the United States, but also of men and women everywhere.”¹ When Jackson and his team grasped the nettle in January 1953, they were not sanguine about the events and circumstances that faced them: the death of Russian President Joseph Stalin, and the apparent lack of any preparation to deal with a new Soviet Union.

The passing of the second most powerful leader in the world on 5 March 1953, instantly changed the superpower equation, but “no one in the United States knew what to do about it, how to take advantage of it, or what was going to happen next,” related Eisenhower biographer, Stephen Ambrose.² Abbott Washburn remembered very clearly “how amazed we were that there was no plan in the Truman Camp to deal with Stalin’s demise ... There was only the sketchiest kind of addressing the possibility of his death, so we had to start from scratch, and there wasn’t much time.”³ In the immediacy of this momentous historical juncture, Stalin’s successor, Georgi Malenkov, seized the propaganda opportunity with a call for peace and mutual understanding between the two nations. Eisenhower was compelled to answer in kind, not least because of the favorable reaction the Soviet peace offering was garnering across Europe and much of the globe. Over John Foster Dulles’s strong protestations, C.D. Jackson and his co-speechwriter, Emmett Hughes, would craft the President’s initial response; Jackson would then team up with the CIA in developing a more varied course of action to deal with this not

entirely unexpected turn-of-events.⁴

Although President Eisenhower's thinking was already attuned to reaching an accord with the Soviet Union thereby lessening the potential of a nuclear showdown, Abbott Washburn concluded that, "if we had more time and a better plan, we could have done more with it." Stalin's death was "certainly an opportunity that was missed."⁵ Ike was truly tiring of the animosity that attended all postwar relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. He thought the time lent itself to the full realization that the path of nuclear brinksmanship was a perilous one. Jackson wholeheartedly concurred, but always felt that our response to the profound changes occurring in the U.S.S.R. could have been more effective "if we hadn't found so little planning had been given to it," emphasized Washburn. He added that this was also discussed later at the Jackson Committee meetings. You see, "if we had been better organized to do this kind of work, it wouldn't have been more or less overlooked." But, he explained, the "Truman crowd had just not addressed it, which is hard to believe. But it proves again, they weren't thinking along those lines." The change in Russian leadership was addressed by the new Administration, and the challenge presented by the Soviet peace offering was quickly met. Washburn again lamented, that "C.D. could have confronted this historical turn in much greater detail ... That was the sort of thing he understood at once—how are we going to capitalize on this?"⁶ Nevertheless, a plan was devised—one that included perhaps Eisenhower's most memorable speech in the hope of capturing this transient spirit of peace.

II

In the months before Eisenhower ascended to the presidency, C.D. Jackson and members of the NCFE and RFE were quietly structuring the foundation of his "peace agenda." Discussions that had been held at the Princeton Conference of 1952 and carried over in the offices of key players of the Eisenhower election team, became the basis for "a blueprint of policy and (a) plan for U.S. psychological warfare." What was being proposed was an answer to "the absolute paucity of policy in Washington," as RFE chairman, Frank Altschul described it, with regards to America's geopolitical strategy. C.D. Jackson and his Free Europe colleagues, outlined a "new" approach whereby the United States could "preserve the dynamic" of being the leader of the Free World: "What do we want? Where are we going? What is our plan?" Jackson confided to his "secret team," that the incoming

administration would be forced to wrestle with these simple questions. And he was supremely confident that his responses would befit an Eisenhower Presidency.⁷

The problem, or so it appeared to chairman Altschul, was that “We are only, or seem to be, interested in protecting our living standard ... we don’t give a damn for the rest of the world. And the rest of the world knows it.” In the wake of the Princeton Meetings, it had been agreed upon that America lacked a cohesive “overseas program” which contributed to the negative and often warlike image that the nation projected internationally. Jackson assumed—depending on the outcome of the November election—that new leadership could provide inspiration from which the United States might derive a more purposeful direction. “Princeton,” he proclaimed, means “things will be different.” Ever mindful of the selling aspect of a new foreign policy, Jackson availed himself of America’s unique business/government symbiosis when he asserted, “there must be a product. A new note sounded from America that will ring through the Free World, echo behind the (Iron) Curtain. A complete change from the present USA on (the) defensive, afraid, wallowing in (our) own materialism—with overtones of (a) world-wide fear of (the) U.S. getting belligerent and plunging the world into atomic war.”⁸ This was the promotion: Ike, the likable war hero, would be the salesman, and the United States, guided by its corporate/political partnership, would capture the hearts and minds of the world’s people by selling them freedom—along with our overabundance of consumer products. Eisenhower’s psychological warriors were enjoined continually by CDJ to stay on message. The message: America stands for freedom.⁹

Jackson’s acute political antennae flowed from his highly developed business acumen. It afforded him a perspective that few American politicians of that era ever acquired: the ability to deal with failure by reinventing your product; which is to say, reinventing yourself. Jackson saw the failure of Truman’s message as an “opportunity to recapture our world dynamic ... our dynamic up to now: self-protection and \$.” This, he insisted, “must be replaced by the earlier American dynamic of dedication to an ideal.” To C. D. Jackson, the obstacle to America’s resurgence was clear: “The problem is one of method.” The method would be a government-funded promotion to sell American ideals across the globe. It would not be an easy sell. The United States was, after all, selling capitalism, a commodity still readily associated with European fascist regimes of the 1930s and 1940s. Jackson understood “that selling this product cannot be carried out by little groups of alphabetical letters (referring to NCFE, RFE, and VOA) scattered here and there with no

plan or guidance.” Altschul agreed: “We have flooded the world with dollars and propaganda; and we are more unpopular than when we started.”¹⁰

To prevail in this Cold War contest, Jackson would devise a three-pronged strategy that would, in effect, allow America to again present itself as a nation borne of a revolutionary struggle, and living by the tenets of a thriving democracy. That notion, in fact, comprised the all-important “ideological” component of the plan. The content of the message would always be couched in the ideas of “freedom” and “democracy.” The second part of the equation was “organization,” the machinery or institutions by which the message of freedom would go forth. The machinery might include radio, television (a relatively new mode of communication in that era), motion pictures, newspapers, magazines, labor unions, and, ultimately, “balloon-transmitted” messages delivered behind enemy lines. The third component of Jackson’s idea entailed targeting specific areas of the world in order to promote different degrees of input. He listed first, the “non-Soviet world;” next, the “captive world (differentiating between Asia and Europe);” and then there was the “Soviet Union.” Of course all bets hinged on Eisenhower winning in the fall: “Ike can put us back on course,” observed Abbott Washburn, before the upcoming presidential election of 1952.¹¹

Eisenhower’s support of these endeavors affirmed Jackson’s belief that Ike was the perfect figure to “sell,” so to speak, America’s new image. The nation’s World War II hero heeded CD’s call to arms—a non-belligerent calls—in a letter in the spring of 1952:

Dear Mr. Jackson,

As you and your associates gather to discuss ways and means to improve our penetration of the Iron Curtain, I give full endorsement to your efforts. I learned the importance of truth as a weapon in the midst of battle. I am sure that to win the peace, we must have a dynamic program of penetration designed to accomplish our objectives to bring freedom to those who want it, and lasting peace to a troubled world.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower¹²

After Eisenhower’s easy victory in 1952 had bestowed upon him a mandate for change, the stage was quickly set to confront the dilemma of the growing appeal of communism around the world. C.D. Jackson hoped to direct for the incoming administration a change in Cold War policy, and he believed fervently that the underpinnings of successful diplomacy rested largely on the prosecution of a skillful psychological battle with the Soviets. Once the magnitude of Stalin’s removal from the world’s stage was fully

comprehended, Jackson and his closest aides prepared for the new Chief Executive what was, in the eyes of many Cold War historians, the most important statement of his Presidency.

The “opening gun of the post-Stalin phase of the Cold War,” the “Chance for Peace” speech that Eisenhower delivered to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 16 April 1953, “was hailed as a serious bid for international harmony,” explains Blanche Weisen Cook.¹³ The address was a tocsin, beseeching both superpowers to explore the heavy costs of the escalating arms race, and the toll it was taking on all the world’s peoples. Eisenhower appeared bold and resolute in his “eagerness to seek peace ... based not only on his resistance to the cost of the arms race, but also on his horror at the thought of the amount of destructive force available to him,” noted Stephen Ambrose. Moreover, Ike’s peroration highlighted the depravity of countries that allocated their national treasuries to arms, while “those who hunger ... are not fed, who are cold ... are not clothed.” To Eisenhower, as well as to author, C.D. Jackson, “This is not a way of life at all ... it is humanity hanging from a Cross of Iron.”¹⁴

Abbott Washburn described the “Chance for Peace” address as “vintage” C.D. Jackson: “It was full of Jackson stuff.”¹⁵ The President’s words certainly bore Jackson’s trademark yet, “Insofar as it was a response to the Soviet peace offensive, it was propaganda—eloquently put, but still propaganda,” claimed Ambrose.¹⁶ As “peaceful” propaganda, however, it was vigorously opposed by the State Department which issued a high priority memorandum to CDJ; to the Director of Central Intelligence; to the under secretary of defense; to the Director for Mutual Security; and, to the acting director of the PSB. The memo outlined in detail—and at great length—the department’s skepticism about any peace overtures to the Soviet Union at a time when “Stalin’s death had produced ... unity and coherence in the regime.” As such, “the department (is) opposed to a major presidential speech at this time.”¹⁷ Nevertheless, Eisenhower went ahead with “Chance for Peace;” but in a major concession to his right wing, Ike omitted “two paragraphs he very much wanted. It would not be the last time his own efforts at greater détente would be short-circuited,” asserts Blanche Cook.¹⁸

But hard-line resistance just stiffened Jackson’s resolve, and while he initially “was unable to persuade (Eisenhower) or the Secretary of State, plus quite a few lesser characters, that it was essential to act immediately on the single most important event since V-J Day, the death of Stalin,” he ultimately won the day, moving the President in a direction that suited his political

agenda, and regained for the United States the peace offensive from the Russians. The historic importance of the timing of the President's address was revealed in a memo to Eisenhower in which Jackson conveyed "that it is my responsibility carefully to select those urgent moments which do require a command decision and to present them to you on that basis."¹⁹

The primacy of this declaration of American foreign policy in reaction to the transition in the Politburo is evident in the meticulous attention that C.D. Jackson paid to every phrase and detail of the "Chance for Peace" speech. While he fretted that the U.S. had "given a virtual monopoly to the Soviets over the minds of people all over the world," by not moving with greater alacrity in response to Stalin's death, Jackson, along with Walt Rostow and Emmet Hughes, carefully structured the President's ground breaking proposal to extract maximum propaganda effect.²⁰ In putting together the draft of the address, Jackson emphasized to his co-authors "the importance of the wording regarding the satellite countries," fearing the speech would "be construed as an indication that we will sell these people down the river in the interests of a Cold War truce between Russia and ourselves." Attentive also to the fact that the satellite bloc "is the area where the gravest problems to the new Soviet regime can be started," Jackson added that "Walter Rostow's phrasing on human dignity and Free World unity would sound mighty good in there."²¹

Prior to its presentation by Eisenhower, "Chance for Peace" had still to be vetted by what CDJ labeled Ike's "College of Cardinals," who would pore over "almost every policy speech ... and sometimes things got diluted," recalled Marie McCrum. It was an element of formulating policy, said McCrum, that "Mr. Jackson found ... somewhat frustrating ... trying to accommodate everybody's ideas."²² Cognizant of the bureaucratic stumbling blocks, Jackson alerted his boss that I "may, in my eagerness to ... capitalize on the opportunities of 1953, inadvertently create grumblings in your official family." The President, however, was firmly in Jackson's corner, and thought the speech, as "psychological warfare was not just propaganda, but the public presentation of the posture of the entire government."²³

The speech was a stunning success. Its dramatic text resonated throughout the world and penetrated the Soviet citadel. "Chance for Peace" was broadcast by RFE and the VOA into Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania; disseminated by newspapers and magazines in Germany; appeared on millions of pamphlets throughout Europe and Latin America; and was translated for thousands of eager listeners in Yugoslavia.²⁴ Predictably, the stirring oration received plaudits from leaders on both sides

of the political aisle who cheered the President's efforts in taking the "first great step" toward global peace. Eisenhower had "seized the initiative," said both Republicans and Democrats, and had moved this government to a position of "world trust" by striking "precisely the right note." To the U.S. Congress, Eisenhower had, in essence, delivered "a warning to the Russians that the Free World would and could defend itself ..., accompanied by a willingness to meet them halfway in any negotiation in good faith toward an honorable settlement." The New York Times' James Reston, thought "The speech struck a balance between a tough set of political terms for a general settlement and a generous offer of economic concessions if those terms were met." The influential journalist noted that the President had ostensibly offered the Soviets "an effective disarmament program with a worldwide, United States-backed plan of economic reconstruction—a sort of combination of the Marshall Plan and Point Four." This, he added, "brought the current Soviet diplomatic offensive down to specifics and placed the new Malenkov Regime in a position of having to respond to the Eisenhower offer."²⁵

Most important, and in the eyes of C.D. Jackson the compelling motive for Eisenhower's effort, was the overwhelmingly positive response "Chance for Peace" received in foreign embassies, and especially amongst the Fourteen Powers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The permanent Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance, Lord Ismay, observed, "In my personal opinion it is a most important, most noble, and most moving speech ... it is worthy not only of the President of a great country ... but of a great soldier who knows war well and hates it." While the President's plea for treaties in Austria and Germany, international control and supervision of atomic energy production, and worldwide disarmament, was not totally unique (similar proposals had been offered by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson in 1950), Ike effectively linked his plan to an overall program of "developing the so-called underdeveloped countries of the world." And, as if to underscore Jackson's axiom of matching words to deeds, Eisenhower's plan was both specific and clearly defined. Moreover, the proposal came from a military leader who was respected by much of the Soviet leadership, especially the soldier class, and was also highly thought of by most ordinary Russian citizens for his wartime support of their country. Eisenhower's moving words to the newspaper editors took notice of the hunger for peace that "is in the hearts of all people, those in Russia and of China no less than our own country."²⁶ It was a remarkable affirmation of faith in the integrity of all nations. And it was a perfectly orchestrated performance by "maestro," C.D. Jackson.

III

Within days of Eisenhower's inauguration, the new President had established a committee to evaluate the "international information policies" and "activities of the executive branch of the government." It would be known as the President's Committee on International Information Activities, or IIA. The IIA was comprised of representatives of The Department of State, The Department of Defense, The Department of Mutual Security, and various administrative assistants to the President. C.D. Jackson was quickly appointed to the Committee representing the State Department in light of the fact that it was his survey of the American Cold War effort, done at Eisenhower's behest only weeks after his election, which provided the stimulus for its establishment.²⁷ Jackson's directive for the Committee included a comprehensive study of what the United States had done in psychological warfare to date, and what the program should be for the future.²⁸ Shortly thereafter, the IIA issued a recommendation in addition to its psychological warfare proposals that would, in effect, "find better means for coordinating the flow of policy and action among the various arms, military and civil, which, in fact, dealt with the outside world."²⁹

Thus was born on 3 September 1953, the Operations Coordinating Board, "in order to fill the gap which it found to exist between the formulation of general policies by the National Security Council and the operations necessary to give effect to them."³⁰ The OCB superseded the Psychological Strategy Board (created in 1951 by Harry Truman), and was empowered, according to Walt Rostow, "with a mandate ... to render day-to-day operations mutually consistent and reinforcing."³¹ Essentially the Board would, in concert with the NSC, coordinate political, economic, and psychological warfare. In creating the new agency to implement policy, Eisenhower had once again embraced C.D. Jackson's strategic imperative "that deeds often are more effective than words in the 'Cold War' against Soviet imperialism." It was also clear the President had acknowledged the soundness of Jackson's advisement that "psychological warfare did not exist as such, and that desirable psychological impacts and effects naturally flowed from effective leadership."³² Abbott Washburn noted that "Jackson personally had a hell of a lot to do with the creation of the OCB. He and the President spoke at length about it. They shared the same belief in these types of exercises, to put them all together under one aegis and to let the director of that agency (now under-secretary of state, William Bedell Smith) report to the

President.”³³ The Board provided Jackson the perfect conduit to transform his panoptic vision into policy, something that the President often faltered at within the maelstrom of the Oval Office. Dissenting opinions and discordant voices frequently sidetracked Ike from clear-cut decisions. He needed a CDJ to bat ideas up to him for approval, and then champion those ideas within the relevant bureaucracies.

The major obstacle, as assessed by the Jackson Committee staff, was President Truman’s PSB, which provided inadequate information evaluation due to an inability to effectively coordinate the Cold War activities of the NSC agencies. While noting this prior bureaucratic ineptitude, Washburn heaped praise on Jackson’s ability to straighten out existing problems and bring together the operations of the various NSC bodies: “all these people were more or less the executive vice-presidents of their agencies. They met every week for luncheon, and whatever was going on at the time would come up for discussion in the group.” Washburn pointed out to the author that, John Kennedy dissolved this body the first week or two after he took office. “Now I’m not so sure,” he opined, “but that if he had retained it (OCB), the Bay of Pigs might have been a different story.” This was one agency that “shouldn’t have been dissolved, because on any operation of this sort (Bay of Pigs), there would have been superb coordination.”

Abbott Washburn’s secretary during both his years in the Eisenhower Administration, and his association with C.D. Jackson, was his wife, Wanda. Her thoughts on Jackson’s ability to “get things done,” are much in tune with those of her husband. Looking back at her long years of service in government in which she worked closely with many agency bureaucrats, Ms. Washburn remembered that “the problem was, effective coordination (which) rested with the meshing of personalities, and C.D. was the key to a lot of that. After C.D. left, frequently the Committee (OCB) didn’t function as effectively as it had when C.D. was here ... I think the relationship between people is probably the most important thing going, even in government ...”³⁴

C.D. Jackson’s ability to merge the faculties of the oft-warring governmental bureaucracy was exceeded only by his talent for discovering individuals whose ideas could be incorporated into a coherent Cold War strategy. Washburn remembered that:

The Jackson Committee was set up almost as soon as we got to Washington. I was working for C.D. over there at the old Executive Office Building. We spent a lot of time in the early part of 1953 trying to get the best ideas we could get from anybody who was supposed to know anything about the Cold War. We even went so far as to get Oppenheimer in there, even though he was under a cloud, poorfellow. But C.D. felt he might know something

about the relationship among physicists, internationally. Anybody who had written anything about the Cold War, or was noted for having done something in this area was called in. I would have to convince them to come in before this thing. It was like a hearing. You had top people there listening, like the under secretary of defense. If there was an idea that fit, C.D. would jump on it.³⁵

Marie McCrum also saw her boss's association with the OCB as being vital to the effective facilitation of the policy that was approved by the President, the Congress, or the State Department. She felt strongly that Jackson's mission was to ensure the proper interpretation of American initiatives in order to "accomplish the desired effect for this country." In this sense, "he wasn't a propagandist ...(B)ut where the proper conduct of adopted policy could influence things one way or the other, he wanted to be sure it was properly carried out by working through and with the people charged with carrying it out."³⁶

In early 1953, Ike's psychological team moved with great abandon to improvise a comprehensive plan to deal with the expected death of Joseph Stalin, thereby avoiding any Soviet misinterpretation of official Washington policy. Abbott Washburn remembered that "Jackson and I were amazed that there wasn't (a) plan ... as to what to do if Stalin dies ... (but) we went ahead and did various things."³⁷ To begin with, Jackson believed that the United States should maximize its overt efforts to reach the more liberal elements in the Soviet leadership, while at the same time covertly undertaking comprehensive steps to exploit any weaknesses in the Soviet Bloc. While neither CDJ nor the President harbored any illusions that peaceful American overtures to the Russians would have sufficient impact to produce a salutary transformation of Soviet society, they both saw Stalin's demise as a supreme opportunity to make real progress toward our own national objectives. The "Chance for Peace" speech was a building block, meant to satisfy Europe's call for détente before the establishment of the United States-inspired European Defense Community. The EDC, much desired by America's geopolitical strategists, was designed to deter Russian aggression in Europe once nuclear stalemate became a reality in September 1949, the year that the Soviets successfully detonated their first nuclear bomb. America's Western European allies were at once politically and economically constrained from developing a counterforce in Central Europe without assurances that America would first seek an accord with a post-Stalin Soviet government. Walt Rostow was certain that this factor influenced Jackson's position that "it was the duty of the United States to hold up to the new Soviet leadership the option of ending the confrontation in the center of Europe and elsewhere ... and that the initiative could be mounted in ways which might reinforce rather than obtrude

upon the European Defense Community (EDC) initiative.”³⁸ Jackson expressed his greatest fear that, “without such a prompt U.S. initiative ... EDC would be postponed until our allies had a chance to test the new Soviet regime’s intentions.”³⁹

Allaying the fears of America’s allies while undermining Soviet domination in Eastern Europe and containing her influence throughout the rest of the world, would be a formidable task for the NSC of which the OCB would play a key role. England’s mixed feelings about American global objectives were illuminated by R.H. Crossman, a veteran of Britain’s psychological warfare effort in World War II, and a distinguished member of the British Parliament. In a lecture to the Royal United Service Institution in August 1953, Crossman, a much admired wartime ally of C.D. Jackson (their paths having crossed in the course of joint British-American psychological warfare operations), stressed that “it would be fair to say that the Eisenhower Regime believes that one of our aims must be to ‘liberate’ the people of Eastern Europe.” Despite the fact that Western Europe in general and the British in particular, viewed that aim with unconcealed alarm, Crossman argued that psychological warfare “accelerates the ... process of diplomacy” by causing “despondency in the enemy ...” And success in this area was, he noted, predicated on the ability to “carry out good propaganda” by “never appearing to be carrying it out at all.”⁴⁰ In that regard, he was of a mind with C.D. Jackson.

Holding the Western Alliance together, then, was of paramount importance to the Eisenhower Administration, but C.D. Jackson and the newly created OCB would still be charged with devising a plan for the “psychological exploitation of Stalin’s death.” Pursuant to National Security Council Directive on Covert Operations, 5412/2, plans to “create and exploit troublesome problems for international communism,” were developed. Though the strategies to take advantage of the transition in the Kremlin originally took shape in early 1953 under the aegis of the PSB, responsibility would now fall upon the OCB to secure coordination of the various agencies to implement the recommendations of the NSC. The scope of operations would involve a political, military, and economic offensive against the new Soviet regime, consistent with the furtherance of United States global hegemony.⁴¹

It would be fair to assess that many American initiatives toward the Soviet Bloc reflected a dual strategy by Ike’s “psywarriors,” rather than just a clearly divided consensus within the Eisenhower hierarchy. Divisions, where

they existed, were more inclined to be instigated by hardliners who questioned the value of any policy that did not call for Soviet surrender, or preemptive war. For his part, President Eisenhower consistently expressed a sincere desire to bring about a peaceful resolution—and coexistence—to the worsening Cold War situation.

Though Eisenhower recognized that the instability of the circumstances in Moscow could be “exploited for psychological purposes ... he believed that the moment was propitious for introducing the right word directly into the Soviet Union.” This kind of overture, he said, could make “the Russians ... so interested in the reaction of the rest of the world that it would be possible on this occasion to penetrate the Soviet Union.” Jackson agreed with his Chief Executive. He proffered that the death of a tyrant like Stalin offers the United States an opportunity “to stress our devotion to peace, and it would enable us to counteract with real forcefulness the ‘hate America’ campaign in the Soviet orbit and to calm anxieties elsewhere in the world by reassuring peoples everywhere of America’s devotion to peace.”⁴² But there was another side to the plan—vastly different in language and motive—to deal with the “new” Soviet Union.

The National Security Council, created by President Harry Truman in 1947 to coordinate the foreign intelligence information and activities of top-level policy makers in the Executive, provided for concerted measures with which to combat the covert activities of the USSR and Communist China. To foment discord in the Communist Bloc, NSC Directive 5412/2 called for US policy to:

Impair relations between the USSR and Communist China and between them and their satellites ... Discredit the prestige and ideology of International Communism, and reduce the strength of its parties and other elements. Counter any threat of a party or individuals directly or indirectly responsive to communist control to achieve dominant power in a free world country. Reduce international communist control over any areas of the world, (and) In areas dominated or threatened by International Communism, develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerilla operations ...⁴³

The NSC directives were adopted first by the PSB, and eventually by its successor, the OCB. The OCB’s Strategic Concept Plan called for fostering “divisive forces within the top hierarchy of the Kremlin,” stimulating “divisive forces between the Kremlin and the satellite governments,” and maximizing the “disaffection between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Regime.” The Strategic Plan, however, had to be matched by a tactical political warfare plan, and that is where Eisenhower’s wartime experience with propaganda and the liaisons he cultivated with proponents of psywar

would leave his Administration better prepared to face off with communist propagandists. Ike's advocacy of C.D. Jackson's Cold War "psychological symmetry" would provide the impetus for much of America's political warfare strategy in the 1950s—and well beyond. The OCB would promote significant efforts to "confront the communist rulers with difficult major choices in a way which does not encourage them to close ranks, but which tends to isolate them ..." In addition, furtive attempts would be made to plague important communist officials "with doubts ... about (the) reliability of key individuals and groups." Another OCB approach was to "combine" 'carrot' and 'stick' both in direct support of the main effort and in executing the other supporting efforts." In essence, the American Government would put into effect an array of psychological operations in order to apply maximum pressure on communist leaders around the world.⁴⁴

The Strategic Concept Plan basically defined the covert action program about to be directed at International Communism. It would be left to cunning tacticians like C.D. Jackson, and intelligence agents such as Tom Braden, to carry out the specific covert activities that were designed to apply pressure, harassment, and cause "confusion and suspicion" in the communist world. An all-important aspect of clandestine activity was inducing "defections of Soviet and satellite officials." Also on the agenda, the Plan called for the development of "plausible material to be picked up and reported factually by overt information media ..." to create "confusion and uncertainty in the ranks of the communist parties in the satellite areas and the Free World."⁴⁵

C.D. Jackson, along with key members of the CIA (including Director Allen Dulles and CIA Office of Policy Coordination Chief Frank Wisner), worked through institutions like RFE and NCFE to keep all diplomatic options open to U.S. purposes. Throughout his years as adviser to Dwight Eisenhower, both as a team player inside the Oval Office and later as a private citizen at Time-Life Inc, Jackson most often encouraged and supported forward-thinking ideas to deal with the perilous events that his President faced on a daily basis. It was, in fact, in Ike's first year in office, when CDJ devised another proposal that was designed to decrease the risk of nuclear annihilation.

IV

Among the most important functions performed by C.D. Jackson on behalf of the Eisenhower Administration was, in Marie McCrum's words, the

“orchestration” of “the adopted policies of the government abroad to maximum effect ...”⁴⁶ This required a coordinated effort on the part of the Jackson team along with other principal advisers in the Eisenhower White House. When the President was seized with a sense of urgency after reading J. Robert Oppenheimer’s “Cassandra” article entitled, “American Weapons and American Policy,” in the July 1953 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, he appointed the famed nuclear scientist to head an advisory group that would offer recommendations to deescalate the arms race. Oppenheimer’s alarming commentary portended the inevitability of mutual nuclear destruction if the United States and the Soviet Union remained on their present course; and he insisted that the truth about the seriousness of this matter be presented to the American public.

With uncharacteristic dispatch, Ike “put Jackson to work on a speech designed to meet Oppenheimer’s call for candor.” Jackson called the preparation of the speech “Operation Candor,” and he worked on it through the spring and summer of 1953. C.D. Jackson was an “enthusiastic supporter of Oppenheimer’s basic idea,” according to Eisenhower biographer, Stephen Ambrose.⁴⁷ But, as Marie McCrum acknowledged, “I think that probably the policy was just to exploit it in every possible way ...”⁴⁸ The Eisenhower-Jackson atomic energy project was designed to encourage the peaceful and productive use of the awesome power of the atom in concert with nuclear rival, Russia. It was decided upon to keep the project secret until all facets of the endeavor could be properly explored. However, “the *Washington Post* got news of this,” recalled McCrum, “and ran a column on Operation Candor.” The leak made it necessary for the President to make public his plan to transcend the destructive capacities of atomic energy. High-level meetings were convened to study and consider more positive uses of the atom. The discussions were held at a group breakfast meeting with the President. C.D. Jackson light-heartedly nicknamed the convergence “Operation Wheaties,” said his secretary, and that “became our code name for the speech the President would deliver to convey his new, more optimistic tone on the arms race” to an increasingly apprehensive world. The final product, the “Atoms for Peace” address, was delivered by Eisenhower to the United Nations in December 1953.⁴⁹

Politically speaking, Eisenhower’s new stance on atomic power was not without its pitfalls. While the progressives in the Cabinet and throughout the nation welcomed the President’s wakeup call to the increasing dangers of a nuclear arms race, there were many on the political right who were satisfied that the specter of nuclear war presented acceptable risks, as long as the

United States remained militarily superior to her enemies. C.D. Jackson felt that the absence of public disclosure about the destructive capabilities of these new weapons would render the population too blithely hawkish. He believed, said Ms. McCrum, that “the awesome potential of international nuclear war ... was recognized to be so absolutely devastating ... that it might be advisable to inform the American people at least to some extent what this potential consisted of.”⁵⁰ Jackson then set out to sell the idea that America was intent on defusing the arms race. Besides the good publicity this more enlightened posture would bring the United States in its battle in Europe for the political and moral high ground, both Ike and CDJ sincerely embraced the concept that a more peaceful, more useful atom would be a cornerstone of the Eisenhower legacy. In fact, Jackson was so “enthusiastic about the prospect of turning from the negative to the positive ... he told Eisenhower that the speech ‘can not only be the most important pronouncement ever made by any President of the United States, it could also save mankind.’”⁵¹

Though Jackson was clearly elated over Ike’s awareness of the present danger of nuclear proliferation, the President’s sagacity in this matter did not by any means extend to all levels of the U.S. Government. In fact, Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, a Wall Street millionaire whom an unwitting Eisenhower had appointed Chairman of the AEC,^{*} was a steadfast supporter of the military and political expediency of building a hydrogen bomb. While the President was determined to “disarm” nuclear energy, especially in the wake of the frightening reports emanating from the initial H-bomb tests, Strauss was equally adamant that the United States should remain well ahead of the Soviet Union in military technology. His ardor for American nuclear superiority, by all accounts, caused him to ignore Eisenhower directives to explore all avenues of cooperation with the Russians on these matters.⁵²

Nevertheless, Eisenhower was resolute on the idea of introducing a plan to transform the atom into a source of energy that could feed the power-starved areas of the world. Ike’s proposal called for the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain, to “make joint contributions from their stockpiles of fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency.” The agency, he suggested, would work under “the aegis of the U.N ... (and) would draw on the talents of scientists from all over the world who would study ways to use atomic energy for peaceful activities.”⁵³ Eisenhower felt strongly that he needed the approbation of the British to go ahead with his proposal. Therefore, at the Three-Power Conference in Bermuda in which he “took Mr. Jackson along because they were working up to the delivery of the Atoms for Peace speech,” Ike discussed the contents of the address with Churchill to

“get his reaction as (a) courtesy,” according to Marie McCrum. “Churchill had brought along Lord Cherwell from England,” she remembered, “who was his atomic man, and they were able to give their opinion that it would be fine”⁵⁴

Although the primary purpose of Operation Candor was to alert the American public to the threat of nuclear war, Eisenhower advised C. D. Jackson, “not to scare the country to death.”⁵⁵ But Jackson recognized, as did the President, that it was imperative the United States and the Soviet Union reduce their arms stockpiles incrementally before some international incident became the *casus belli* for Armageddon. Transforming weapons of war into instruments of peace was a proposal that would bolster Eisenhower’s image in the eyes of the world, as well as establish his legacy as a peace seeking soldier-president. Jackson understood that the “atomic weapon (was) the first weapon which ever really scared America, because for the first time American industry, which won previous wars, could be crippled before war started.”⁵⁶ This factor alone made Ike’s political adviser supremely confident that he could produce a speech that the President could effectively “sell” to a majority of Americans. Eisenhower would demonstrate, according to Jackson’s plan, that the “peaceful development of atomic energy ... could have a dramatic punch.”⁵⁷

It was decided then by Jackson, that the State Department would alert our Ambassadors overseas that “the speech to be given was ... of major importance.” Moreover, the Ambassadors would be asked “to get word to the Foreign Ministers of their respective countries that the contents were to be taken with the utmost seriousness.” And since Jackson would direct the President’s solemn but hopeful words toward the Russian people, our Ambassador in the Soviet Union would personally deliver a “message to the Kremlin, emphasizing that the United States was about to make a major policy pronouncement on which it solicited the support and cooperation of the Soviets.” Next, CDJ worked to make sure the United States Information Agency would “pick up the theme” in their international broadcasts, and “publicize the President’s proposal” around the world.⁵⁸ Nothing could be left to chance. Jackson directed all aspects of the promotion of the speech, as well as the design of the “Atoms for Peace” proposal itself. Marketing the President’s call for “disarmament” in precisely the right manner was an integral part of seeing to it that it would be successfully received in foreign capitals, and here at home.

On 8 December 1953, barely eleven months after taking office, President

Dwight D. Eisenhower made his second major policy statement aimed at changing the parameters of American-Russian relations. Almost on the heels of his “Chance for Peace” fig leaf, Ike challenged the leaders in the Kremlin to put aside their differences with the West and join with the United States in creating an “atomic stockpile for peace.” Smiling and waving as he stood before the United Nations General Assembly, the President—citing recent disclosures that estimated the strength of current fission bombs to be twenty five times more powerful than those detonated over Hiroshima and Nagasaki—called on the Soviets to “take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers (and) put (it) into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.”⁵⁹ Though his demeanor seemed to belie the solemnity of his words, Eisenhower expressed optimism that this “entirely new approach to the problem of atomic energy control” might also lead to “a more constructive spirit to the task of military control.”⁶⁰ As a throng of well over 3,000 enthusiasts stood outside the world’s edifice of peaceful coexistence, the President spoke inside to “a silent, raptly listening audience of 3500 who sat almost unmoving throughout the twenty-minute address.” When it was over, the General Assembly Hall erupted into thunderous applause, including the five Soviet Bloc members.⁶¹

Worldwide, the “Atoms for Peace” speech was hailed as a positive counterpoint to the dire prospects of nuclear escalation. Most foreign leaders — though not the cynical rulers of the Kremlin—saluted the Leader of the Free World for replacing fear with hope. Looking back at Eisenhower’s address at the United Nations, Abbott Washburn expressed pride that his boss, C.D. Jackson, had “worked with the President on that breakthrough proposal.” Jackson, he said, urged Ike to follow up on the speech with international exhibitions of what peaceful purposes the atom could be put to. Eisenhower complied with this advice, and American scientists created “some very impressive touring exhibits.” “Atoms for Peace” exhibit designers “had a specially built truck that you could walk through and get a notion of what this is all about.” Washburn, recalling a friend of his who “drove one of those touring trucks, claimed that people became fascinated by the scientific possibilities of atomic energy.”⁶²

The CIA’s Tom Braden thought, however, “Atoms for Peace” was strictly for show: “Who were we propagandizing, the American people?” Though he conceded, somewhat contradictorily, that the speech as propaganda was one of “C.D.’s good ideas and he did a good job with it.”⁶³ Apparently the Soviet hierarchy were inclined to agree with Braden’s appraisal of the speech as pure propaganda. They rejected Eisenhower’s proposal outright, and expressed

skepticism that the President's plan was other than a clever deception, designed to maintain and perhaps even widen the American lead in the stockpiling of fissionable material. In an ironic twist to the story, Eisenhower acknowledged in his diary the validity of the Soviet position on "Atoms for Peace," and how he used the concept of continued Western nuclear superiority to sell the plan to Churchill.⁶⁴ Still, the President was not finished reaching out for peace to his Russian counterparts.

Eisenhower's next major "peace proposition" to the Soviets came during the Geneva Summit in July, 1955. Though C.D. Jackson had since "officially"* returned to his executive management position at Henry Luce's Time-Life Empire, his disciples (including Nelson Rockefeller, who had taken Jackson's place as Special Assistant to the President) had refined Ike's plan to enable both the Soviet Union and the United States to inspect one another's nuclear facilities. The on-site inspection or "Open Skies" program, was considered a bold and controversial offering by America's Chief Executive who would, in effect, permit the Russians to conduct continuous reconnaissance missions over American airspace if the Russians did likewise. Under the terms of "Open Skies," Ike called for both nations "to give each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other."⁶⁵ Eisenhower claimed the idea had spawned from his wartime experience with air reconnaissance, which proved, he said, extremely effective in determining enemy strongholds. The President surmised that the great advancement in technology since World War II would only make such an undertaking more feasible. He lobbied John Foster Dulles for his support of "Open Skies" on the eve of the Summit, pressing his Secretary of State to "propose this as a specific plan." Ike's tenacity won him the day with the more conservative Dulles, who surprisingly offered that at least "nothing could be hurt" by the proposal.⁶⁶

Domestically, Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal promised to lessen the pressures that were building from "Ban the Bomb" groups. This was important to the President, since Eisenhower's military cost-cutting campaign was largely predicated on American nuclear superiority, and "Open Skies" did nothing to upset that equation. Time-Life journalist James Shepley found the program imaginative, and credited Ike with putting "forward some really interesting ideas to the world."⁶⁷ In as much as the United States was already engaged in covert aerial reconnaissance over Soviet airspace, and American technology in this field was far superior to the Soviets Union's, "Open Skies" could yield a low-risk, high-propaganda advantage for the President. But the Soviets would first have to bite.

Having assured the Soviet delegation at Geneva that previous inflammatory Cold War rhetoric need not be an impediment to achieving meaningful progress toward removing the nuclear “Sword of Damocles,” Ike seemed hopeful when Ambassador Nicolai Bulganin found “real merit” in his proposal. His optimism was quickly dashed, however, when Nikita Khrushchev broke ranks with his delegation chairman and characterized the inspection program as “nothing more than a bad espionage plot against the Soviet Union.” At this juncture in the reconstituted Soviet Regime, Khrushchev was First Secretary of the Communist Party, and as Eisenhower was quick to recognize, the man-in-charge. The President would therefore suffer another setback in his quest to reach an arms accord with the U.S.S.R.⁶⁸ While fairness to Khrushchev dictates that we recognize his opposition to Open Skies was based primarily on existing military realities (“The United States had ... many military bases outside its borders”⁶⁹ that were not subject to inspection under the present terms of the plan), Eisenhower was, nevertheless, sincere in trying to scale down, if not reverse, the arms race. And the President’s method in this case won him propaganda points even as his idea was being rejected, bolstering once again the strategies of C.D. Jackson and his cohorts on Ike’s psychological team.

V

While balloons seemed an unlikely choice of weapons with which to prosecute a war, they were the centerpiece of a covert-sabotage scheme called “Project Focus.” In the Byzantine world of “dirty tricks” departments, the CIA, NCFE, and RFE teamed up “in the early rough-and-tumble era of the Cold War,” according to Agency veterans Victor Marchetti and John Marks, and used balloons “to carry anti-communist literature into the denied areas behind the Iron Curtain.” Significantly, the pair claims, “these operations, although lacking in plausible deniability, normally a prerequisite in covert propaganda efforts, had scored high—judging from the numerous angry protests issued by the Soviet Union and its East European satellites.”⁷⁰ The man most responsible for launching this balloon-invasion, and, according to leading Washington journalist Drew Pearson, America’s leading “balloonitic,” was none other than C.D. Jackson.

After Dwight Eisenhower had secured the Republican nomination for president in 1952, much talk emanated from his camp concerning the “captive” nations of Eastern Europe. Many in the GOP would make a

campaign issue of liberating the satellite nations; and “rollback” would replace “containment” (former Russian Ambassador George F. Kennan’s long-term strategy to defend U.S. global interests) in America’s Cold War lexicon. George Kennan’s “X” article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947 titled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” had, in essence, mapped out a course of action for the US in response to the specter of Soviet expansion. His proposal split the American foreign policy establishment into two opposing wings: those that supported Kennan’s plan to meet Russian aggression symmetrically in the areas we considered our “spheres of influence;” and a more vocal group that advocated “rendering the Soviet Union helpless to hold their satellites in check.” Though the Dulles brothers rejected outright Kennan’s policy of “containment” (going so far, according to Washington “insiders,” as to help engineer his dismissal from the Policy Planning Staff in favor of hard-liner, Paul Nitze), Eisenhower, as both candidate and later President, was firmly committed to the proposition that the United States “should use all peaceful means” to achieve liberation for the enslaved peoples of East Europe.⁷¹

The balloon project, begun in August 1951, fit nicely into the Jackson template of a more cerebral Cold War offensive; later, his intriguing would become increasingly more truculent. These “messages from the sky,”⁷² as Abbott Washburn characterized the balloon literature that was dropped on the Eastern Bloc nations, “addressed specific policy issues behind the Iron Curtain.” It was important, he noted, to convey to these people, that the “U.S. was sympathetic to their grievances, and might help.” In addition, the balloons “provided information about their own country that they could not readily obtain.”⁷³

The home base for “Project Focus” was West Germany (although some flights evidently also originated from Austria), where leaflets were dropped mainly over Czechoslovakia, Poland, and later, Hungary. The balloon blitz delighted CDJ, who reveled in “the helplessness of the authorities to do anything about it.” The initial foray into communist airspace involved “11,000 balloons carrying 13 million leaflets ‘to boost the morale of the entire non-communist population’ and to fortify ‘spiritual resistance’ until the day liberation arrived.”⁷⁴ Soviet Migs were scrambled in a vain attempt to shoot down the balloons, but the Russians were humiliated in the face of superior US technology and “psywar” inventiveness.

Once Eisenhower took office, C.D. Jackson stepped up his balloon antics much to the chagrin of the Soviets who, according to Abbott Washburn, “just about went crazy.”⁷⁵ By the summer of 1953, the Vienna Bureau of RFE was

reporting, “people were jumping like frogs to catch the leaflets as they came down. Many soldiers were checked out from their army units to collect the leaflets.” The response from the communists was as predictable as it was satisfying to Jackson and his colleagues: “The Czechoslovak Government sent a note to the American Embassy in Prague, in which it protests violently against spreading on Czechoslovak territory some leaflets, calling for anti-state activity.” Acting with demonstrable concern, the Czech Government sent their gendarmerie to the violated areas to interview citizens who may have picked up the offending material. The literature was then confiscated by authorities, as were the coins and bank notes that filled the small baskets attached to the balloons.⁷⁶

Abbott Washburn recalled the balloon idea first being hatched by Jackson and others at the NCFE in 1951: “I think the military had been stockpiling materials (weather balloons) and were thinking about using it politically.” Thereafter, the military advised the NCFE to improvise a plan, and the CIA was also asked to get involved. Radio Free Europe ultimately directed the balloon operation, and “C.D. dumped a lot of it in my lap,” said Washburn. Jackson then decided to facilitate his plan to utilize the talents of the East European exiles: “Something had to be done with them so C.D. pressed them into service, crafting the literature that would be, so to speak, smuggled behind the Iron Curtain.” At some point, it was “decided to use balloons to deliver the literature. They would burst at a certain altitude and pamphlets would blow all over the territory. It was an eclectic group at RFE, and C.D. would take ideas from anyone,” underscored Abbott Washburn.⁷⁷

The leaflets bore messages that were inflammatory, inciting, and provocative—and they were directed at the center of the Soviet Union’s Achilles heel: the political bondage that engulfed Eastern Bloc nations. In bold type, the message was clear:

The Soviet Union is getting weaker;

The people of the captive countries are growing stronger;

Only those will survive who detach themselves from the sinking communist boat
in time.

The resistance of the people will grow⁷⁸

The printed material also highlighted the recent uprisings in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany, and hailed the flare-ups as a sign of what was possible if “the people showed their strength.” In addition, the

pamphlets carried support from those in exile who wanted their “brothers” in bondage “to know that you are not alone ... Among the masses of people behind the Iron Curtain the fire of revolt is smoldering and its sparks are flying from country to country.” The coins that accompanied the literature featured an emblem of RFE’s Freedom Bell replica, which had now become a symbol of The Free Europe Committee. Adorning the leaflets in the balloons were photographs depicting the riotous demonstrations in East Germany; added text described, in detail, the excesses perpetrated by the “uncivil” East German communists against the fettered masses. The inscription on the banknotes highlighted a piece of bitter irony for the Soviet Regime, and one that was readily exploitable: On one side of the note was written, “Down with the collective; Insist on workers’ rights; Today demand concessions; Tomorrow—freedom.”⁷⁹ The symbolism of these images, projected colorfully throughout much of Eastern Europe, was indeed a case of hoisting the Kremlin leaders by their own petard. And it was a powerful blow to the confidence of the Soviet hierarchy.

At one point in the “balloon caper,” Abbott Washburn suggested to CDJ that plastic balloons developed by his former employer, General Mills, were sufficient to transport food stuffs to East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia: “We could produce a sensation throughout all of Germany and Eastern Europe by delivering the Eisenhower food gifts by balloon.”⁸⁰ Jackson then wrote a top secret memo to the CIA’s Allen Dulles outlining Washburn’s plan to “have General Clay go back to Berlin in a sort of triumphal progress to be present at the first launching, and recall the days of the Airlift, to which this operation could be likened.”⁸¹ Washburn and Jackson were both excited at the idea of reviving the appearance of a kind of “second Berlin Airlift.” The first airlift, led by General Lucius Clay in July, 1948 in response to the Russian blockade of the western sectors of Berlin, was successful in dropping thousands of pounds of supplies a day to the beleaguered city. By May, 1949, the Russian blockade had been broken. Washburn wrote his boss, “I am confident that, with the right approach, Uncle Lucius (Clay) can be had for this exercise. Think of the effect of his personally going back to Berlin to supervise the delivery ...”⁸² This “second Berlin Airlift” plan was soon scrapped, however, giving way to the risk of charges by the Soviets that the United States was using foodstuffs for bacteriological warfare. It was also deemed unwise to send balloons directly into the Soviet Union. Upon conferring with Tracy Barnes of the CIA “to talk

balloons,” C.D. Jackson agreed that it was “inadvisable to get into (the) balloon act to Russia at this time, and equally inadvisable (to) send ‘things’ by balloon, which could be polluted by the enemy in order to substantiate ‘germ warfare’ charges.”⁸³

VI

Many of the covert antics concocted by C.D. Jackson and other members of the NCFE and the CIA enlisted the services of the East European émigrés. Jackson had always expressed both a sense of kinship and obligation toward the Iron Curtain escapees. He told Abbott Washburn, “we have to take care of the exiles, we can’t let them starve.” Ultimately, they proved to be very valuable assets. Washburn likened some of the more prominent exiles to “an Edward R. Murrow, or a Walter Lippman—high-caliber people.”⁸⁴ Tom Braden shared the view of Jackson and Washburn, that the émigrés were helpful to the mission of the NCFE and RFE, as well as Radio Liberty. Although not always in accord with the NCFE on strategy in those early years, Braden conceded that, “there was a time when the National Committee for a Free Europe was useful because of those poor, indigent Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian diplomats. The NCFE paid for those guys to live; that was a good thing to do. Allen Dulles started that. He was sympathetic to diplomats; after all he had been one. And these men were not eating. Their clothing was threadbare.”⁸⁵

In Braden’s view, encouraging the exiles to vent their anger toward the Soviet Union in a manner designed to exacerbate ethnic tensions in the Eastern Bloc and to destabilize communist regimes, was also a clever ploy. Not surprisingly, he maintained that, “once the CIA took over RFE, it became more effective.” The former Agency spook noted that RFE was not nearly as effective when run by the NCFE because, “they did not realize that sheer, blatant propaganda would not work. We could not live on pure propaganda. News had to be useful—real news. I think the exiles understood that and knew their former countrymen.” Jackson, too, well understood that aspect of propaganda—“democratic propaganda.” To penetrate the enemy’s fortress-like borders with information blackouts, propaganda had to appear to be informative, and untainted by political ideology. C.D. Jackson “worked closely with the CIA on these projects,” remembered Braden.⁸⁶

Jackson’s personal relationship with the East European émigrés, stemmed from the intensive work he did for the Free Europe Committee after World

War II. In the course of his various FEC activities he became closely linked to the representatives of all the leading exile groups. Jackson especially developed ties to the most prominent exiles such as Hungary's Monsignor Bela Varga, leading member of the Hungarian Parliament, and a man who had personally protected hundreds of French resistance soldiers from the Nazis when they became trapped in Hungary. For this deed, he was awarded membership as Commander in the French *Legion d'Honneur*.⁸⁷ Marie McCrum recalled her boss as being "genuinely moved when he saw what happened in those countries. He witnessed how the Soviets operated, and it deeply disturbed him." As Jackson's secretary, McCrum knew Monsignor Varga as "a very brave, wonderful man who had operated in the Hungarian Underground—and he and Mr. Jackson became very close friends and remained so until Mr. Jackson's death in September, 1964." Another notable exile she remembered as befriending her boss, was "Dr. Bela Fabian ... also Hungarian and greatly concerned with political prisoners."⁸⁸

Notwithstanding the fact that Jackson seemed sincerely interested in the political liberation of Eastern Europe, many in the exile community, among them the Hungarian émigrés, were strident reactionaries in their politics. According to the U.S. Legation in Budapest during this period, "The Americans gravitate toward the most dubious elements remaining in Hungary." Among them, said Chief Public Affairs Officer for the Legation, O.W. Riegel, were "the remnants of the gentry, industrialists, the Higher Clergy, and the motley assortment of fascists and opportunists."⁸⁹ It must be noted here, that this American affinity for right-wing governments throughout the world was not historically peculiar to the Cold War epoch, and indicates some predilection to support authoritarian and, in some cases, clearly fascist, regimes. This was merely codified during the United States' war on communism. The threat from the left, especially to American economic hegemony, seemed to justify for even many well-meaning progressives a "no-holds barred" attitude toward crushing independent movements, and undermining any "outbreaks" of nationalism that were not servile to American business interests.

The FEC was involved mainly with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Jackson's links to the more politically active exiles from these countries afforded him great opportunities to consult and collaborate with them on the many intrigues that were being churned out by the US intelligence establishment. His work with the émigrés was connected to the "Central Intelligence Agency (which) had a certain input there," said Ms. McCrum.⁹⁰ Jackson utilized these associations on behalf of the

broadcasting division of the FEC: Radio Free Europe. The émigrés had a great deal of involvement in helping create the kind of radio that would be sure to cause unrest among their former countrymen. A separate exile operation involved publishing anti-communist literature in various forms (especially for the balloon operations), all of which made its way behind the Iron Curtain. The exiles proved a valuable resource to institutions like the Crusade for Freedom and the NCFE, and were equally costly to the aims of the men in the Kremlin.

The NCFE also provided work for the exiles through its Division of Intellectual Cooperation; and the organization groomed them for the day when they were expected to assume leadership roles in a communist-free Eastern Bloc. An émigré research center was created in Washington under the auspices of the Library of Congress; and lecture tours were scheduled in order to promote throughout America an understanding of the plight of these abject victims of totalitarian states under Kremlin dominance. The Free University in Exile in Strasbourg was also established to prepare the future leaders of the “soon-to-be liberated countries to take their rightful places in government,” according to Blanche Wiesen Cook. Jackson, she explained, “considered the councils not quite governments in exile, but power centers capable of filling the power vacuum that would follow liberation.”⁹¹

Radio Free Europe used the exiles to broadcast news, conduct discussions with exiled leaders, and generally encourage dissension and counterrevolution behind the Iron Curtain. Great efforts were being advanced by RFE, Jackson told his secretary, “to promote access of news and information in the satellite areas,” and, to “use every means to create imbalance and uncertainty in their total domination by the Soviet Union ...”⁹² In one of the more memorable and successful American psywar capers (one that caused the communists to look silly and unsophisticated), RFE broadcasters and CIA operatives got together to “stimulate ‘a nationwide buying panic in Czechoslovakia.’” Even before its inaugural broadcast from Munich on Mayday 1951, RFE intelligence analysts had been watching Czechoslovakia’s precarious currency situation. After months of careful study, Radio Free Europe, using both the diverse talents and cultural expertise of the exiles, decided on a frontal broadcasting assault. In January 1952, the station started warning the Czechs of impending currency devaluation, and a resulting monetary crisis. This stunt reaped its expected reward as a frenzied populace strained the limits of the Czech nation’s meager supplies. Operations such as these stirred the restive population of the satellite bloc nations, and caused significant cracks in the uneasy relationships between the Kremlin and

East European leaders. Moreover, it showed the American team of psychological warriors that the purveyance of this type of propaganda was based on sound logic: The communist satraps could not be saved by their “Russian masters.”⁹³

The work of the Radio Committee of RFE was painstaking in its detail and analysis of the complex issues that surrounded many aspects of the Cold War, but which ultimately had to be considered in simple human terms. In order to pierce these seemingly impenetrable Iron Curtain, RFE had first to understand the psyche of its listeners. To accomplish this, there was a constant need for “sufficient background information” in order that Radio Free Europe’s writers and editors would “always be able to visualize the true situation of the audience” that they were speaking to. The émigrés adopted the “psychological” role in this endeavor, and helped their American benefactors coordinate attempts to expose the truth to the still enslaved citizens of Eastern Europe. Marketing the ideas with which to “reach” these people became the primary function of those who had, at very great risk, fled bondage to find the liberty that had been promised them in the West.⁹⁴

While the instrument of choice to capture the minds of the Soviet “slaves” was the radio, the programming would focus on the essential freedoms that came with the struggle against their Russian oppressors. These included, freedom of religion, so essential to the predominantly Catholic communities of East Europe; political self-determination, sacrosanct in the wake of World War II and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights; freedom of speech, the cornerstone of all emerging democracies; and the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, a fundamental prerogative in a pluralistic society.⁹⁵ The communists offered none of the same. Radio Free Europe and its sister station Radio Liberty (whose broadcasts were directed at the Soviet Union), reasoned Jackson, could be employed both “tactically and strategically” as weapons that could highlight the important differences between the East and West. Broadcasts would define and compare the superior American standard-of-living, due of course to the American democratic, capitalist system. And both RFE and RL were adept at eliciting more visceral responses with their systematic appeals to the cause of human dignity among all oppressed peoples. Audiences were targeted carefully for content, and suitable storylines were applied with great intensity.⁹⁶

As might be expected, communist retaliation for the successful exploitation of Soviet weaknesses in the Eastern Bloc was the order of the

day. The inability of the Soviet Union to sabotage the balloon operations of the NCFE had no bearing on the risks still incurred by the exiles in their overall mission to encourage defections among their former countrymen. Abbott Washburn recalled with great anguish the tragedies that befell his comrades during the height of U.S.-Soviet hostilities:

There were assassinations of our people in Europe—at least two assassinations. The assassinations that I know of were Radio Liberty people, Radio Liberty workers. They were desk officers, and that sort of stuff. Radio Liberty was broadcasting in like, I don't know how many languages—maybe a dozen or so just to the Soviet Union. And one of those guys, who was attached to one of those desks was assassinated.⁹⁷

While the risks to RFE and RL exile employees—among others at this critical juncture in the Cold War—were real, and were taken in what was thought to be in behalf of a worthy cause, it would be a serious mistake to discount the damage done to American ideals due to its pursuit of victory in this “battle for men’s minds.” This will now be explored.

Footnotes

*During the McCarthy witch hunts, J. Robert Oppenheimer, the esteemed nuclear scientist and member of the Atomic Energy Commission, was accused of being a communist. Though the charges were unsubstantiated, he was removed from the AEC and remained under a cloud of suspicion.

*Although Strauss had been former Defense Secretary James V. Forrestal's assistant during World War II, Eisenhower barely knew him.

*Those close to C.D. Jackson maintained that his advisory role for the government in general, and President Eisenhower, in particular, continued throughout Ike's final days in office.

ENDNOTES

1. See C.D. Jackson speech before the National Security Commission & Committees of the American Legion, 28 August 1953. Jackson excerpted many of the recommendations of the recently released Report of the President's Committee on International Information Activities known as The Jackson Report. C.D. Jackson Papers, box 100, speech texts, file 3.

2. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 67.

3. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington D.C., August 2001.

4. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, pp. 91-93.

5. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington D.C., August 2001.

6. Ibid.

7. See notes of meeting between Frank Altschul, Chairman of RFE, C. D. Jackson, and Abbott Washburn, at Altschul's office, 28 April 1952, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 83, file 4.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. See Eisenhower letter to C.D. Jackson regarding Princeton Conference, 8 May 1952, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 83, file 4.

13. Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, p. 179.

14. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, pp. 93-95.

15. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington D.C., August 2001.

16. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 94.

17. See top secret security memorandum from under secretary of state to undersecretary of defense, Director of CIA, special assistant to the President for International Affairs, C.D. Jackson, acting director of PSB, George M. Morgan, and Director for Mutual Security, in regard to A Psychological Exploitation Plan of Stalin's Death, 11 March 1953, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 1.

18. Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, p. 179.

19. See C.D. Jackson memorandum to Eisenhower, 2 April 1953, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 50, file 2.

20. Ibid.

21. See C.D. Jackson memorandum to Emmet Hughes, 30 March 1953, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 104, file 2.

22. Marie McCrum, oral history.

23. See C.D. Jackson to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 2 April 1953, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 50, file 2.

24. Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, pp. 180, 181.

25. See *New York Times*, 17 April 1953.

26. Ibid.

27. See Dwight D. Eisenhower memorandum to James S. Lay Jr., executive secretary, National Security Council, establishing President's Committee on International Information Activities, 24 January 1953; see also, Dwight D. Eisenhower to C.D. Jackson, appointing Jackson member of IIA representing The State Department, 24 January 1953, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 63, file 3.

28. See C.D. Jackson memorandum to Dwight D. Eisenhower entitled, Appraisal Survey of our Cold War Effort, 21 November 1952, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 63, file 3.

29. Rostow, *Europe After Stalin*, P. 32.

30. See William H. Jackson to Dwight D. Eisenhower. Here Jackson reflects on the performance of the OCB, one year after its creation. 1 October 1954, C.D. Jackson Papers, Ann Whitman File, box 22, file 2.

31. See endnote 28.

32. See *New York Times*, Eisenhower Sets Up Unit to Implement Security Strategy, 4 September 1953.

33. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington D.C., August 2001.

34. See Wanda (Allender) Washburn and Abbott Washburn, Abbott Washburn oral history.

35. See note 34.

36. Marie McCrum, oral history.

37. Abbott Washburn, oral history.

38. Rostow, *Europe After Stalin*, p. 4 and passim.

39. FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, p. 1183.

40. See R.H.S. Crossman, O.B.E., M.P. lecture, 18 February 1953, reported in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. DCVIII, August 1953, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 45, file 1.

41. See National Security Council Series Policy Papers, subseries, undated, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 10, file: NSC 5412/2, covert operations.

42. FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, p.1092.

43. See note 41.

44. See Psychological Strategy Board plans for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death, 27 April 1953, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 1.

45. Ibid.

46. Marie McCrum, oral history.

47. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 132.

48. Marie McCrum, oral history.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 133.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Marie McCrum, oral history
55. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 133.
56. See C.D. Jackson log, 16 January 1954, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 68, file 1.
57. See Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Papers, Ann Whitman file, 16 August 1954, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 22, CDJ file 1.
58. Marie McCrum, oral history.
59. See Thomas J. Hamilton, *New York Times*, 9 December 1953.
60. See A.M Rosenthal, *New York Times*, 9 December 1953.
61. See Kathleen Teltsch, *New York Times*, 9 December 1953.
62. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington D.C., August 2001.
63. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.
64. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, pp. 148-150.
65. Ibid., pp. 258-265.
66. Dwight D. Eisenhower, oral history.
67. James R. Shepley, oral history.
68. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 265.
69. Bird, *The Chairman*, p. 487.
70. Marchetti and Marks, *The CIA*, p. 137.
71. Dwight D. Eisenhower, oral history.
72. Abbott Washburn, telephone interview, September 2001.
73. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington D.C., August 2001.
74. Cook, *First Comes The Lie*, p. 53.
75. Abbott Washburn, telephone interview, September 2001.
76. C.D. Jackson Papers, 24 July 1953, Box 2, Balloons file.
77. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington D.C., August 2001.
78. See note 76.
79. Ibid.
80. See Abbott Washburn memorandum (top secret) to C.D. Jackson, 13 July 1953, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 2.
81. See C.D. Jackson memorandum (top secret) to Allen Dulles, 20 July 1953, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 2.
82. See Abbott Washburn memorandum (top secret) to C.D. Jackson, 14 July 1953, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 2.
83. See C.D. Jackson log, undated, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 68, file 1.
84. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington D.C., August 2001.
85. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.

86. Ibid

87. Stephen Sisa, *The Spirit of Hungary* (Morristown, New Jersey: Vista Court Books, 1991) pp. 253, 54

88. Marie McCrum, oral history

89. Herbert Aptheker, *The Truth About Hungary*, (New York, Mainstream Publishers, 1957) pp. 72-73.

90. See note 89.

91. Cook, "*First Comes The Lie*."

92. Cook, "*First Comes The Lie*," p. 50; see also, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 54, file: Free Europe Committee.

93. See note 89.

94. Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, pp. 128-129 and passim; see also Cook, "*First Comes The Lie*," pp. 50-51.

95. See Draft of Overall Directive for Radio Free Europe, undated; see also, minutes of meeting of Radio Committee of Radio Free Europe, 20 April 1950, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 90, file 2.

96. *ibid*.

97. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington D.C., August 2001; see also Sig Mickelson, *America's Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 9.

CHAPTER 5

THE CULTURAL COLD WAR: AMERICA'S COMINFORM

But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought.

George Orwell

I

In the 20 May 1967 edition of the *Saturday Evening Post*, the editor/publisher of the Blade-Tribune of Oceanside, California and former Central Intelligence Agency official, Tom Braden, alias Homer D. Hoskins (although here he chose to call himself Warren G. Haskins so as not to divulge his true CIA cover¹), wrote an article to straighten out the record of the Agency's involvement with artists, writers, musicians, labor unions, and students in the United States and Western Europe. What Braden revealed was a long history of American-funded operations that bought both influence and control of many of the leading leftist cultural and social institutions at home and abroad. The article, entitled "I'm Glad the CIA is Immoral," listed some of the recipients of the Agency's largesse, and the names included were recognizable—and unsettling.²

Braden's startling revelation of the "Company's" closely guarded secret revealed that the United States Government, through the "vaults of the CIA," had given in one instance \$15,000 to Irving Brown, head of the American Federation of Labor (AFL). He went on to single out for "declassification" other such notables as Walter Reuther, leader of the United Auto Workers (UAW), "who (sic) I once gave \$50,000 in \$50 bills;" and Victor Reuther, his brother and an assistant at the UAW, who received Agency "donations" to "bolster labor unions" mostly in West Germany.³ Labor unions were a "particular target," explained Braden, because that is where the "communists spent the most money." When a communist labor organization sprang up in France or Italy after the war, "we countered it," he said. To prevent complete Soviet domination of organized labor in Europe, the CIA established the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The Confederation

immediately attracted funds and propaganda support from the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) whose executives hoped that it would successfully rival the influence of the World Federation of Trade Unions, a Soviet-front association.⁴

Jay Lovestone, an assistant to David Dubinsky, President of the International Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), was a former Chief of the Communist Party of the United States. Still, Braden secretly supported the politically converted Lovestone and his leftist, but decidedly anti-communist, *Force Ouvriere* Union in France. “Europeans strongly identified with the communists,” Braden related, for their “strong resistance to the Nazis during World War II.” Some in the United States Intelligence Community felt, “and this is no propaganda,” he insisted, that “all of Europe was in danger of falling to the communists” after the war. Irving Brown and Jay Lovestone “did a lot of work for me.” They set up various “front organizations, all funded by the U.S. Government.” The United States was trying to win over the Europeans with “ideas not bombs.” America had a message, Braden explained: “We were trying to get across that freedom was on our side, which was tough to do in the post-war period. But God knows we spent a lot of money with Brown and Lovestone,” he added.⁵

The CIA’s mission in the Cold War, as Braden construed it, was to confront the “propaganda lies of the Soviet Union that our system was rotten and corrupt.”⁶ Allen Dulles had personally recruited Tom Braden for the Agency in late 1950. Soon after, Braden approached Dulles, then Deputy Director of Operations for the CIA, with a plan to challenge a communist propaganda offensive which had appropriated for the U.S.S.R., the terms “peace,” and “freedom,” and “justice.” The idea called for a “battery of international fronts” that could grow, in his words, “into a worldwide operation with a single headquarters.” His recommendation came to fruition with the birth of the International Organizations Division (IOD) of the CIA, the first centralized effort to counter directly the myriad communist-front institutions in Europe.⁷ “I was in charge of International Organizations,” said Braden, “which is to say phony organizations. Allen backed it 100%. I think the big shots from New York (noting C.D. Jackson’s influence) forced Dulles to get on board. Most all of the money for these operations came from Dulles,” he contended.⁸ Braden proffered that the purpose of the IOD was to “unite intellectuals against what was being offered in the Soviet Union.”⁹ The IOD would simply not allow the communists to appropriate the word peace or the concept of freedom as symbols of Soviet rule.

For the IOD to succeed, it was imperative that it break the “peculiar spell” the communists seemed to have over some of the world’s leading artists, writers, and musicians.¹⁰ In order to turn the tide of communist gains in Europe, the IOD became the chief benefactor of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). The CCF, established in 1950 in Berlin, was a “spontaneous” and formerly independent body dedicated to the advocacy, by the leading leftists in the United States and Europe, of Western culture. John J. McCloy, in that period the High Commissioner of West Germany, had “sanctioned the founding” of the CCF at the Tatiana Palace Theater in West Berlin. Highly successful as a prominent voice of anti-Soviet sentiment, the Congress had sponsored dozens of cultural events that enlisted Europe’s leading intellectuals to the cause of combating communist influence.¹¹ Under the purview of Braden’s IOD, the CCF was soon the “centerpiece” of the CIA’s covert European propaganda campaign. As detailed by Frances Stonor Saunders, in her exhaustive exposé of the Central Intelligence’s Agency’s relationship with the world of “arts and letters” during the seminal Cold War years, 1950-1967, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*, the Congress for Cultural Freedom had “offices in thirty-five countries, employed dozens of personnel, published over twenty prestige magazines, held art exhibitions, owned a news and features service, organized high-profile international conferences, and rewarded musicians and artists with prizes and public performances.”¹²

The CCF, claimed Braden, was a “very sophisticated operation,” and when C.D. Jackson arrived in the White House in 1953 the IOD chief quickly moved to forge ties with him, which he felt would benefit the organization.¹³ Jackson also supported the work of the CCF, having already teamed up with Braden in 1952 for one of the Congress’ most successful projects. Braden utilized Jackson’s influence in recruiting the Boston Symphony Orchestra (Jackson was a trustee for the Orchestra), considered at the time the best of its kind in the United States, to tour Europe. The entire tour was financed, unbeknownst to the public and the musicians, by CIA “dummy” foundations.¹⁴ “It was one of the best things we ever did,” Braden boasted, “sending the Boston Symphony to Europe.” An American stereotype existed for Europeans at the beginning of the Cold War. They all thought, “America has no culture. All that Americans are interested in is money ... the United States is a grasping society.” This perplexed the intelligence community, observed Braden, which failed to understand why anyone would think that because the “Soviets have a refined culture they must also have equality—we knew all of that was muck. So we sent the Boston Symphony over there.”¹⁵

The Boston Symphony Orchestra performed in Europe to great acclaim, and changed the minds of many European intellectuals who now looked at America as a land where the arts could flourish freely. Braden told the *Saturday Evening Post* that “the tour won more accolades for the U.S. in Paris than John Foster Dulles or Dwight D. Eisenhower could have bought with a hundred speeches.”¹⁶ Jackson, too, thought the tour an overwhelming triumph and said it contributed immeasurably to overcoming Europe’s “non-acceptance of America on matters other than Coca-Cola, bathtubs, and tanks.”¹⁷

CIA agent Michael Josselson ran the CCF from 1950 until 1967. By Josselson’s account, the magazine *Encounter*, published in England, was the Congress’ “greatest asset.”¹⁸ The publication was dedicated to, in Braden’s words, the proposition that “cultural achievement and political freedom were interdependent.”¹⁹ *Encounter* featured articles by authors such as Stephen Spender and Irving Kristol; Nicolas Nabokov on music in the U.S.S.R.; Leslie Fiedler on the Rosenberg case; memoirs by Albert Camus and Christopher Isherwood; and book reviews by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Bertrand Russell.²⁰ The magazine was “notoriously left-wing, obsessively political, and militantly anti-communist.” First conceived in early 1953, *Encounter* was published in October of that year. Its maiden issue featured an editorial by Kristol that hailed the demise of Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini, “despots whose mythologies were now at an end.” In his piece, Kristol noted that “The last surviving fable was exposed only yesterday in Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, where real factory workers were unambiguously disassociating themselves from a hypothetical proletariat, achieving by that simple action what a thousand subtle arguments could not do: the destruction of the Marxist-Leninist creed.”²¹

On the “intellectual” and “enlightened” front, Braden rated *Encounter* as the “most effective publication we had.”²² It was fully funded by the CIA, but few “outside the Agency knew about it,” he claimed. The Company had one agent running *Encounter* through the CCF, and another as its editor. Together, they proposed anti-communist themes for all CCF publications.²³ Another CIA creation was *Combat*, a socialist, or certainly left-of-center daily, that Braden described as also very anti-communist. “There was no credible right-wing in Europe after the war,” Braden emphasized, “there was only the left and you had to dominate them because the communists were already doing it.”²⁴ Despite its hidden support, T.S. Eliot considered *Encounter* magazine nothing more than “American propaganda under a veneer of British culture.”²⁵ And none other than Henry Kissinger characterized the CIA’s

entire intellectual consortium as “an aristocracy dedicated to the service of this nation ...”²⁶ Nevertheless, as propagandists, the “aristocratic consortium” served America extraordinarily well.

II

In 1967, the radical magazine *Ramparts* dug deeply enough into the CIA’s support of left-wing organizations to effectively blow the Agency’s cover, and the whole sordid tale began to unravel. Shortly after the *Ramparts* revelations, Braden’s soul-cleansing *Saturday Evening Post* confessional—justifying, in effect, the CIA’s purpose while at the same time curiously exposing the entire operation—confirmed, officially, what had long been suspected. The difference was that, this was an “ex”-CIA official filling in many of the details. President Lyndon Johnson empanelled a three-member body known as the Katzenbach Committee to look into the allegations. Its final report deplored the CIA’s “aid” to “educational or private voluntary organizations,” and terminated the funding for all such operations as of 31 December 1967.²⁷

One of the more surprising aspects of the Agency’s covert *Kulturkampf* was its association with American students attending world youth festivals. It has been revealed by historian Kai Bird (among others) in his seminal work on John J. McCloy, *The Chairman*, that prominent feminist Gloria Steinem, while working with C.D. Jackson (then a Time-Life Inc vice-president and occasional “unofficial” presidential consultant) and Cord Meyer Jr. who had replaced Tom Braden as head of the IOD, led a contingent of youthful American scholars to “counter Soviet propaganda” at the Vienna Youth Festival—all at the expense of the CIA. The Company “would not only pay their way,” as Bird outlined the scheme, “but also assist them to distribute books and publish a newspaper in Vienna.” When Jackson was searching for financing for the student’s costly sojourn, John J. McCloy was brought in to “arrange a procedure for paying expenses in Vienna.”²⁸ Jackson explained to Meyer that he had been working with McCloy on the “handling of funds, on a non-attributable basis.” He said McCloy had informed him that, the “Chase Bank had done it in the past,” and gave him the “name of the man in Chase who knew all about such things.”²⁹ While seemingly embarrassed by the discovery of the whole affair and her personal role in it, in 1967 Steinem nonetheless approved, without reservation, the CIA effort in this operation “because it was the work of liberals.”³⁰

III

Shortly before Eisenhower's second term ended, the United States mounted a major exhibition (this endeavor was quite overt) that was the first of its kind in Moscow since the Bolshevik Revolution. The American National Exhibition in Moscow in July 1959 "was an ambitious effort for the Administration," explained Abbott Washburn, and the most "interesting and challenging undertaking that I had been a part of." There had been intense concern amongst Ike's "braintrust," he said, that the Soviet Union was putting more money into "trade fairs or sending ballet troupes and musicians" and "all manner of performing artists around the world ... and we were not matching it." The Jackson people especially were perturbed that the Russians "constantly portray Americans as cultural boors, materialists, and so forth." When the Soviets approached Eisenhower about putting on a large exhibition of their own in New York City, the President agreed with his advisers at the USIA that we should have a reciprocal event in the U.S.S.R. Ike could not pass up an opportunity to reach the Soviet people directly, and, according to Washburn, "the President correctly predicted that several million average citizens of Moscow would attend the fair."³¹

Eisenhower took notice—as did many U.S. psychological warfare planners—of the importance the Soviet State apparatus placed on "word of mouth" propaganda.³² All concluded that, the more exposure American culture received abroad, the greater the likelihood people behind the Iron Curtain would recognize that the "standard of living in America for all classes is unbelievably high; that Americans are in large bulk handsome and healthy; that Americans have much leisure time;" and that "nobody in America need despair, for miracles are just around the corner."³³ Ike felt strongly, Abbott Washburn theorized, "that if the Russian people got to know Americans they would not accept the lies that their leaders told them." This understanding, Eisenhower maintained, "was crucial to our Cold War strategy." Thus, the President had "great enthusiasm" for this exhibition in Moscow.³⁴ and he was "quite right," allowed Washburn, because "the exhibition had a tremendous impact on a vast number of Soviet citizens."³⁵

The exhibition was a crash operation: some 450 American companies took part in putting together everything from constructing the buildings that housed the exhibits in Moscow's Kosolniki Park (R. Buckminster Fuller designed many of the structures), to supplying the goods that were meant to impress the Soviet visitors with images of American consumerism at its

finest. Washburn called the Fair a “tour de force” for U.S. capitalism.³⁶ In addition to the attraction of America’s advanced consumer technology, there were on the exhibition’s ten acres model Levittown homes, presentations of the American cinema, a representation of the “Family of Man,” and a television with an early model video tape machine. Maestro Leonard Bernstein was also there to provide the Fair’s cultural high points.³⁷

One of the Moscow Exhibition’s more memorable moments was the Nixon-Khrushchev “Kitchen Debate.” In fact, Abbott Washburn was credited by then Vice-President, Richard Nixon, for his input in briefing him on the Fair; and, Nixon noted in his book, *Six Crises*, that “I (Washburn) was the one who came over to his office and suggested that he go over as the representative of the United States Government, on the opening day.” Washburn even provided to Nixon some Russian speakers from the Voice of America so he could “learn a few appropriate phrases to use over there.” The Vice President demonstrated the videotape machine for Chairman Khrushchev, which he used to tape their famous debate and then play back for the Soviet leader. In Washburn’s estimation, “Dick came out a little bit ahead on it,” and, he noted ironically, “certainly did better than he did in the first debate with Kennedy ...” Nixon, of course, was selling in that “Kitchen Debate,” the free market economy of the West. This was quintessential democratic propaganda.³⁸

Politically, the Fair was a great achievement. It unquestionably had great propaganda value, contended Washburn, from the standpoint that the Soviet people could meet and talk to the young American guides, many of them college students who “had mastered the Russian language ... and who day after day would stand up there and answer the questions of the Russians.” They were asked about American life; how the United States government worked; what about labor unions in the U.S.; did they own television sets and automobiles? And in some cases, they were asked hostile questions about political ideology that Washburn claimed were meant to embarrass the United States. The exhibits in Moscow were extraordinary, he added, but the young representatives of this nation that served as tour guides for the Fair were “the best exhibit the United States could have.”³⁹

During his visit to the exhibition, Vice President Nixon delivered an important message on Soviet television. In an event that Abbott Washburn characterized as a defining moment in U.S.-Soviet relations, Nixon spoke directly to the Russian people, without official censors. He drove home the point that the United States was “not a warlike nation, despite what they had

been told over and over again.” It was a “convincing performance,” said Washburn, and “showed the Russians that Americans did not want war, and if they got to know us well enough, they would believe us.” Nixon’s “talk” with the Soviet citizenry did much to elevate the Cold War dialogue, insisted Washburn, and afterward at the Fair, the Russian visitors “would look so relieved.”⁴⁰ In contrast to the successful American Fair, Washburn described “Russia’s idea of an exhibition,” which was held in New York City that same year, as “nothing but heavy machinery; in ten minutes you were bored to death with it.”⁴¹

A recently declassified document relating to doctrinal warfare revealed the design and approach of the United States’ cultural propaganda strategy, and explains efforts such as the American National Exhibition in Moscow and the CIA’s entire covert cultural campaign:

In the cultural field of human artistry, doctrinal warfare can operate to exploit the principle of creative freedom as an absolute prerequisite for artistic progress. National and international groups and associations of actors, ballerinas, creative artists, dramatists, engravers, essayists, novelists, painters, sculptors, and others, have made and could be persuaded to make declarations and official statements that totalitarian thought stifles creative production. Beyond mere propaganda exploitation, the total effect of numerous declarations of these groups that visualize themselves as the intellectual elite, would develop a doctrinal attitude hostile to communism and favorable to the philosophy of the United States and the free world.⁴²

IV

“Confessions of a Soviet Survivor”

(The following section is based primarily on a series of interviews with former Moscow University Distinguished Professor, Dr. Dmitry Urnov).

One way to assess the overall utility of America’s Cold War propaganda strategy against the Soviet Union is to view its impact from the adversary’s side. Professor Dmitry Urnov was Chair of Russia’s Institute of Foreign Relations from 1978 until 1991, Department Head of the Soviet Institute of World Literature, Editor-in-Chief of *Voprosy Literaturi* (Literary Issues), the Coordinator of Literary Projects under the Joint Bilateral Commission in Humanities of the American Council of Learned Societies and of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., and a Distinguished Professor of comparative literature. A Distinguished Professor of comparative literature at

Nassau Community College in Garden City, New York when these interviews were conducted, Dr. Urnov was a student at Moscow University when the Cold War was in full bloom in the 1950s. He firmly believes that American propaganda, especially as it concerned ideology, was extremely effective precisely because “ideology was the foundation of the Russian culture.”⁴³

To illustrate his theory, Urnov compares ideology, both political and social, and its place in Russian society to what he considers the bedrock of American culture: business. Somebody who wanted to undermine the United States political system, he explains, would have to “subvert” or “brainwash” Americans on this point of business. If “something was introduced,” Urnov suggests, “that destroyed the faith of the American people in their capitalist system, it would be devastating to the U.S.” Professor Urnov brought up both the Depression of 1893, and the Great Depression of the 1930s, as examples of the American system teetering on the brink. American capitalism, however, recovered while instituting the “progressive reforms” of the early part of the twentieth century, and the labor and social reforms that were the foundation of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. Urnov contrasts this with the Soviet Union, which was attacked ideologically by an external force and proved incapable of dealing with its restive population.⁴⁴

Dr. Urnov notes that at a certain point in the Cold War, in his judgment, American Intelligence decided to aim their propaganda strategy at both the core of Soviet culture and its ideology: Russian literature. The two, he notes, were intrinsically linked. This all goes back to the “second wave” of Russian immigration after the Bolshevik Revolution. Many “pedigreed people,” in his words, went to the United States and took with them much of “what was worth being studied about in Russia.” Urnov’s understanding of this “Soviet dilemma,” as he calls it, was influenced by a senior American colleague, Professor Ernest J. Simmons. Simmons was the founder of the Russian Institute (now the Averell Harriman Institute) of Columbia University, and Urnov was his aide at the Gorky Institute of the Soviet Union in 1961. Professor Simmons published a seminal work on the subject in 1959 entitled, *Russian Fiction and Soviet Ideology*. In his book, he wrote that Russian literature is good only when it “deviates from the Soviet ideology.” Dr Urnov vigorously agrees, and observes that this philosophy became the “whole edifice of Soviet studies and how Russian culture, literature, and art would be defined.” Russian artists, writers, and intellectuals “did not adhere to Soviet ideological dogmas,” he avers. The goal for the West, then, was to support that idea as widely as possible.⁴⁵

An early application of this strategy, claims Urnov, was carried out by an important figure of the Western cultural elite, Sir Isaiah Berlin, a man of Russian origin. Berlin, a member of the British Embassy in the Soviet Union, was a cultural attaché residing in St. Petersburg. “What Berlin did,” he recalls, and what constituted standard Western policy was to “support any seemingly dissenting thoughts in Soviet studies.” Those lonely voices of Russia’s poets and writers were, in the main, not flagrant in their dissent. Open opposition to the Regime was not acceptable, even in a post-Stalinist U.S.S.R. But by showing intense interest in literature that was even in the slightest way out of harmony with Russian doctrine, “the West drove a wedge between the Soviet intelligentsia and Soviet ideology,” notes Urnov. And the moment the West paid attention to these people, there was an “overreaction by the Soviet authorities.” Professor Urnov charges that the leadership of his country adopted a “special resolution” on this matter. From that time on, he says, all that the West had to do was support a discordant note among the Soviet intellectuals and that person or persons would be silenced. But, he opines, the Kremlin was playing right into the hands of American propagandists with this official censorship. It fed “Russian fears” that “something of substance” was being denied the citizenry. To the average, educated Soviet citizen, that was a “damning indictment of the system,” and a “betrayal of the principles of the Revolution” as I learned them, asserts the Distinguished Professor.⁴⁶

Dr. Urnov goes on to point out, that at the same time American intelligence experts were employing this strategy of support for nonconformity in the Soviet Union, they would ensure the publication in the West of any authors who were out of favor behind the Iron Curtain. Soviet intellectuals who learned of this through such vehicles as Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, or contacts that they had managed to establish in the West, were compelled to accept that if you “weren’t published” you must be “relevant.” Urnov relates that he was once approached by an American colleague on one of his Soviet-sponsored state trips to the United States and advised “if you were more of a dissident at home we would promote you here.”⁴⁷

Dr. Urnov also acknowledges the bitter irony—and ultimate hypocrisy—of Nikita Khrushchev’s famous report to the Congress of the Communist Party, in which he decried the crimes of Joseph Stalin. The Report was “kept secret,” he says. It was not published initially. The Soviet people “heard it through rumors,” then the speech was finally published in a limited number of copies that were “smuggled to the West and made available.” This, he claims, “only heightened the impact of the Report, and magnified its propaganda

value.” He adds that the speech was never discussed in Soviet universities.⁴⁸

Perhaps the most robust component of anti-Russian propaganda was that which played up Soviet censorship. As Urnov perceived it, the degree of censorship in Soviet society led to the “stigma for us internationally that we were afraid of the truth.” The “control from above” and the “stupidity of that control” were unbelievable, he says. Urnov spoke of having access to books in the university—a privilege that few in the Soviet Union enjoyed—but “I could not take them home.” If some “unmentionable name like Trotsky happened to be mentioned in a book from the West, then that book would be immediately classified.” “Books on ballet, a cornerstone of Soviet culture, were often classified because of the many ballet dancers who had defected. This was heavy-handed leadership from the Kremlin’s strategists,” Urnov charges, “and it backfired: the West used it against us.”⁴⁹

There was a concomitant rise in the number of Soviet departments of literature and culture on American campuses in the “heyday of the Cold War” that, in Urnov’s view, were important if only unintentionally in deconstructing Soviet myths. During one visit to the United States during the 1960s, he was invited to attend Russian studies classes where Soviet students who were a part of an exchange program were taught “their own history, culture, and things we were not supposed to know.” During his stay, Dr. Urnov was given by Soviet émigré writers now residing in America books by important Russian authors who could “not get published in their own country.” He managed to get some of these books back into Russia with him recognizing, in effect, the paradox of having to “smuggle Russian books into Russia.” Some of the most “successful agents of American policy” during the Cold War (although he uses the term agent symbolically, not intending to imply that they were professional spies), “were university professors who educated the masses, both in the United States and in Europe, about Soviet society—things that were hushed up in my country,” Urnov plaintively notes.⁵⁰

Summing up, Professor Urnov explains that the very strengths of the former Soviet Republic, culture and ideology, were used to undermine its support among the Russian people. The “subtlety of the undertaking as it was advanced by men like C.D. Jackson, made it all the more practical.” Urnov concludes, that Jackson’s advocacy of disseminating information—the “truth, skillfully told”—through all available mediums was “central to the triumph” of American propaganda. He remembers meeting author John Steinbeck “at a talk at the Soviet Library of Foreign Literature, a very popular place. Steinbeck discussed many Russian authors while repeatedly reminding his

audience, ‘I can read the books of these authors, but you cannot.’” “This,” Urnov reasons, “was the strongest argument one could make against the Soviet-communist system!”⁵¹

ENDNOTES

1. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, p. 399.
2. Tom Braden, *Saturday Evening Post*, 20 May 1967.
3. Ibid.
4. Ranelagh, *The Agency*, pp. 246, 247.
5. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.
6. Ibid.
7. Tom Braden. *Saturday Evening Post*, 20 May 1967.
8. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.
9. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, p. 98.
10. Tom Braden, *Saturday Evening Post*, 20 May 1967.
11. Bird, *The Chairman*, pp. 412, 413.
12. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, p. 1.
13. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.
14. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, pp. 116, 117.
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16. Tom Braden, *Saturday Evening Post*, 20 May 1967.
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18. Peter Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe* (New York, The Free Press, 1989), p. 59.
19. Tom Braden, *Saturday Evening Post*, 20 May 1967.
20. Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, pp. 65, 66.
21. Ibid., p. 65.
22. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.
23. Tom Braden, *Saturday Evening Post*, 20 May 1967.
24. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.
25. Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, p. 67.
26. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, p. 2.
27. Ibid., pp. 381-384 & 405, 406.
28. Bird, *The Chairman*, pp. 484, 485.
29. See C.D. Jackson to Cord Meyer Jr., undated, C.D. Jackson papers, box 95, file: Youth Festival, financial.
30. Ranelagh, *The Agency*, p. 252.
31. Abbott Washburn, oral history.

32. See memorandum on psychological warfare, undated, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 46, file 3.

33. See C.D. Jackson memorandum to Council on Foreign Relations entitled, "Foreign Policy and Public Opinion," 29 April 1948, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 45, file 1.

34. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington D.C., August 2001.

35. Abbott Washburn, oral history.

36. Ibid.

37. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington D.C., August 2001.

38. Abbott Washburn, oral history.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington D.C., August 2001.

42. See Psychological Strategy Board panel report: draft of "National Psychological Strategy Plan for the Use of Doctrinal Warfare, 31 March 1953 (declassified 17 December 1990), C.D. Jackson Papers, box 1, file: PSB.

43. Dmitry Urnov, interviews, New York, August 2001.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

CHAPTER 6

SOLDIERS VERSUS SALESMEN

There is a power somewhere so organized, so subtle, so watchful, so interlocked, so complete, so pervasive that they had better not speak above their breath when they speak in condemnation of it.

Woodrow Wilson

I

President Dwight David Eisenhower, long considered by many historians and ordinary American citizens to be the architect of the Allied victory in World War II, felt, nonetheless, that his debt to his country was at war's end, still unfulfilled. And although he displayed a profound distaste for politics, Ike believed that "the United States faced national and international problems of such grave import,"¹ that he would be forced at some point to become a political candidate, if only to realize his commitment to service as a product of the American heartland. One of only two American Five Star Generals at that time (the other was Eisenhower's wartime boss, George C. Marshall), Ike would choose to set aside "his disinterest in politics" and "serve his country," to pursue his vision of the future, and to fulfill his vow to help the world avoid renewed warfare.² Essentially, Eisenhower detested partisan politics. While he well understood the political exigencies that governed war, his aversion was to "petty rivalries" and "party rituals." But the war he helped to win had left the world beset with conflicts that threatened the very existence of the planet, and, much like C.D. Jackson's vision, Ike's "vision was global." However, "He had a wider vision of public life: the mission of America, and his own potential contribution to that mission."³

Though Eisenhower's political inclinations after the war were somewhat inchoate, his yearning for a durable and sustained peace placed him in the same political world as C.D. Jackson who believed more could be accomplished through economic inducements; through spreading the seeds of American culture; and through the clever manipulation of Soviet weaknesses, especially the proclivity of their leaders to engender great opposition, even amongst Western Europe's many leftist organizations. This meant, for all

intents and purposes, that the new President was a strong supporter of psychological warfare, especially as it encompassed various forms of political actions: “I do believe that they treat the term ‘psychological warfare’ in too narrow a fashion. After all, psychological warfare can be anything from the singing of a beautiful hymn up to the most extraordinary kind of physical sabotage.”⁴

The new President had charged the Jackson Committee, chaired by William Jackson and administered by C.D. Jackson, with strengthening America’s efforts in the field of psychological strategy. The Committee had advised Eisenhower that, “there is a ‘psychological’ element ‘to every diplomatic, economic, or military policy and action.’”⁵ C.D. Jackson, however, was reluctant to use the phrase psychological warfare because, as he explained to his colleague Abbott Washburn, “it pulls out all the wrong stops.”⁶ Democratic propaganda had a nicer ring to it, and “fits the character of what we are trying to achieve here,” he opined. Eisenhower was in perfect harmony with the recommendations of his “psywarriors,” and with the notion that U.S. propaganda initiatives should be in consonance with the overall interests of our friends. To Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the President expressed his agreement with both the Jackson Committee Report which stated that, “during this period our work should be carefully thought out and should be in concert with the ideas of our allies,” and with C.D. Jackson, who felt that “we must have a very definite American objective and know exactly what it is.”⁷ Forward thinking diplomacy linked to non-military solutions, however, was not the preferred policy of many of the cold warriors of this period of great international tension.

Democratic propaganda that was subtle, covert operations which were—for the most part—quietly carried out, and diplomatic gestures that extended to neutral nations economic largesse or political benefits geared to further American global interests, were all considered acceptable to the average American. We had “no enemies among the American people,” noted Tom Braden. “We did what we wanted to do and kept it quiet.”⁸ But Wisconsin Senator Joseph R. McCarthy was not your average acquiescent American citizen, and his anti-red crusaders were not likely to wink at those who preferred sophisticated diplomacy to angry public tirades and jingoistic fulminations. McCarthy’s witch-hunts had effectively savaged the legislative New Dealers; eviscerated a “pink” (according to the political right-wing) State Department, driving out in the process the few conscious intellects and sophisticates that occupied sensitive positions (among them, the China Desk’s Owen Lattimore, John Carter Vincent and John Stewart Service); wounded

the reputation of the esteemed General George Catlett Marshall, a close Eisenhower friend and colleague; tarred the public image of countless American citizens, most notably, many of the nation's most prestigious writers, actors, singers, civil rights activists, academics (e.g. the multi-talented Paul Robeson, writer Dalton Trumbo, actor Lee J. Cobb, and academic Philip Foner, to name but a few), and even journalists like the much-heralded Edward R. Murrow, all of whom were accused of being fellow travelers if their politics, past or present, were anywhere to the left of McCarthy's own; and, finally, even questioned the patriotism of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower and all who served them, from the military to the fledgling CIA, characterizing them as "red all over" or essentially serving their Kremlin masters. McCarthyism then was a real threat to any progressive policy makers of the incoming Eisenhower Administration; this though in actuality, the United States had one of the tiniest communist parties in the world. And, according to former Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby, most of the "dues-paying" communists were probably undercover FBI agents—"Hoover (J. Edgar) kept the party alive."⁹

When Eisenhower took office in 1953, people like C.D. Jackson who had adopted a less than war-like stance toward the Soviets, were likely to be in the crosshairs of Joe McCarthy. Early on, Jackson recognized the Administration's domestic enemies, especially McCarthy:

Tuesday night McCarthy made (a) sensational radio and television talk. My impression was aside from open season on lambasting Truman, that McCarthy had (A) declared war on Eisenhower; (B) by subtle innuendo had accused Eisenhower of the same thing that Brownell had accused Truman of; (C) had attempted to establish McCarthy as Mr. Republican; (D) had attempted to establish McCarthyism as Republicanism, and anybody who didn't agree was either a fool or a protector of communism.

Evincing a realistic fear along with a pragmatic appraisal of McCarthy's tactics, to his daily log CDJ added what he thought a "wonderful syllogism—I am the only effective rooter-outer of communists; there are still communists in government (Davies); this government (is) headed by Eisenhower; therefore unless Eisenhower roots them out my way, he is a harbinger of communists."¹⁰

The events and circumstances that confronted the new administration, both domestically and internationally, called for decisive and—for a growing number of intellectuals on the Eisenhower team—innovative leadership that would provide the nation with positive direction. With Soviet leader Joseph Stalin gone from the geopolitical scene in 1953, there soon was a call for an East-West Summit Conference by former Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

In response, Walt W. Rostow, who served Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson as National Security Adviser, joined his good friend C.D. Jackson and the recently “rehabilitated” containment advocate George Kennan,¹¹ in recommending that the White House seize the peace initiative from the Soviets and agree to Churchill’s offering. Although normally inclined to accept such a recommendation, Eisenhower curiously rejected a Big Four Summit at that time. According to Rostow, the President missed a chance to alter history at that propitious moment when reunification of Germany was high on the agenda of the Jackson faction, due, in no small part, to “the shadow of the Republican right wing, including not only (Senators) Knowland and Taft, but also McCarthy.”¹²

McCarthy poisoned the political waters for effective, low-key, political discourse. He affected every level of government as well as the national and international dialogue. His assaults on the Administration were so suffocating they may well have influenced the President’s decision not to intervene in the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg spy case. C.D. Jackson worried about the international implications of the decision to execute the Rosenbergs, and “urged clemency.”¹³ The execution of the couple—especially Ethel, who most government officials thought would be spared the death penalty—would certainly, in Jackson’s view, have propaganda value to the communists. He foresaw a “public-relations disaster” in this contrived “example of Eisenhower’s zealous anticommunism;”¹⁴ contrived, as it were, to appease the blood-thirsty appetites of the right-wing. Other Cabinet members “warned that virtually all Europeans would regard the killing of the Rosenbergs as another example of craven appeasement of McCarthy.”¹⁵ All appeals to Eisenhower’s humanity, however, were to no avail. Ike claimed that, “their death sentence was the result of anti-Semitism and runaway McCarthyism;” a stultifying condition that the President, in this case, seemingly capitulated to.¹⁶

McCarthy attacked on all fronts. He pressed Eisenhower to cut off all foreign aid to “The allied nations and specifically Great Britain ... unless they ceased all trade with communist China.”¹⁷ Relentlessly, he undermined the nominees the Administration sent up to the Hill for ratification. All agencies were considered fair game, but McCarthy’s siege of the State Department was viewed as an “attack on the internationalist philosophy that had guided American foreign policy since the end of the war.” If successful, it was thought that McCarthyism would usher in “a new wave of isolationism.”¹⁸

The new Chief Executive, more urbane since his tenure as President of

Columbia University, was an avowed internationalist in this delicate time of global restructuring. As such, he was himself not above “tail-gunner”^{*} Joe’s scrutiny. In the midst of the post-war anti-communist madness, McCarthy “had his doubts even about Eisenhower. Rumors were circulating that, under Ike’s supreme command in post-war Europe, there had been massive penetration of American government offices—especially in Germany—by communists.”¹⁹ So naturally when Eisenhower, upon recommendation of the Jackson Committee’s Cold War Study, created a new independent agency directly responsible to the White House that would “oversee information and cultural functions” and be separated from the Department of State, McCarthy set his sights on this potential “repository of fellow travelers.” The United States Information Agency was set up to serve this function in the fall of 1953. Abbott Washburn, its former Deputy Director, “was one of the two presidential appointees in USIA and the one responsible for liaison with the White House.” His memories of those early months of USIA were of the “terrific problem(s) in recruiting people for it because of (Joseph R.) McCarthy’s activities; (Roy) Cohn’s and (David) Schine’s antics; and the badgering which the Information Agency and the Voice of America had taken from that trio. That was a chapter,” explained Washburn.²⁰

The establishment of independent agencies whose functions would include the coordination and dissemination of propaganda with the express purpose of, “projecting a positive image of America abroad,” drew criticism from many quarters and for vastly different reasons. The fact that this revived weapon in the “battle for men’s minds” had the full support of the President, inflamed the doctrinal instincts of America’s right-wing which invariably supported confrontation to negotiation. “We never had that before,” offered Washburn, “never had that kind of access to a president. Never had a president that went over and talked on the Voice of America live.” There was immediate opposition:

From the very hard right, you had the Joe McCarthys. Well, of course, Joe McCarthy was raising the specter of communism under every toilet seat. I knew Joe a long time. We had campaigned together for (Republican Governor) Harold Stassen in Minnesota. There was something left out in him. He did whatever he could to push this “hard right.” He had his minions writing highly favorable books about him. He was riding high. He wanted these books to be placed by USIA in American libraries overseas. Streibert (director of USIA, Theodore Streibert) told him to go to hell. Streibert told him what he could do with his books.²¹

In spite of the rare acts of defiance by some courageous individuals both in and out of government, McCarthy and his supporters—including, notably, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, who provided the Senator with much fodder,

however spurious, for his crusade—were doing much damage to the picture of America overseas and to the fabric of U.S. society at home. The image of America internationally was what the Jackson people and their CIA counterparts were trying to improve, as they conceived their stratagems to sell our culture to the world. McCarthy underlings, David Schine and the unctuous Chief Counsel of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Roy Cohn, investigated “communist penetration of the Voice of America by examining the holdings of America’s overseas libraries.” In fact, “Some books were burned,” claimed Stephen Ambrose, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, “dismissed some 830 employees of the Voice.”²² Removing “objectionable” literature from America’s cultural institutions abroad qualifies as another Cold War irony. Book burning was totalitarian by any account, and thought to be reserved for the Kremlin and its client states.

C. D. Jackson was becoming increasingly disturbed about a situation that threatened his own mission and, more important, the Eisenhower Legacy. Early in 1953, Jackson received a report from a colleague who had “just returned from Europe, completely confirming and documenting (the) dangerous intensity of (the) McCarthy phenomenon abroad.”²³ Jackson’s assessment for the President outlined in a 1954 memo, highlighted a series of circumstances that threatened the prestige of the United States internationally. Most salient among his citations was: “The believed influence of Senator McCarthy over national policy.”²⁴

One of Jackson’s greatest disappointments—and perhaps Dwight Eisenhower’s major flaw as a Chief Executive—was the President’s inability to deal effectively with McCarthy and the opprobrium his anti-red campaign brought down upon the nation. In addition, the Senator from Wisconsin may have derailed, if only for a brief time, the direction that Ike sought to take the nation diplomatically. Marie McCrum painfully recalled that, “A major source of frustration (for CDJ) was the failure of the President to speak out strongly and come to grips with Senator McCarthy.”²⁵ The paranoia of the times and the strength of the right in American politics dictated that one tread lightly when confronting anti-communism run amok: “Look at the people who stood up to McCarthy. Poor Senator Flanders ... it was the beginning of everything, the John Birch Society, for example,” noted Tom Braden.²⁶

On the home front, the intelligence community itself enjoyed no special immunity from Joe McCarthy. He “never lost an opportunity to make a public statement attacking the CIA,” charged Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA Inspector General during this period.²⁷ Tom Braden himself had cause for concern

during the height of the McCarthy period. Being an enlightened spirit in the CIA made one an inviting target for the right. It was a time when “nearly every liberal in the federal government was viewed with suspicion,” stressed Kirkpatrick, who likened the atmosphere of the era to the French Revolution.²⁸ More threatening for Braden still, was that as head of the CIA’s International Organizations Division he was in charge of setting up phony international “front organizations,” and it was “those ‘internationalists’ ... who had most to lose.”²⁹ Braden characterized McCarthy as a “dreadful opponent ... but you had to put up with him.”³⁰ “By late 1952, ‘McCarthy’s suspicions had transferred to Braden’s outfit, after the Senator learned that it had ‘granted large subsidies to pro-communist organizations.’”³¹ This, of course, was McCarthy’s perception of what Braden was doing in Europe, as defined by Roy Cohn. Braden contended that this was merely a sophisticated covert operation, subsidizing the activities, so to speak, of Europe’s openly anti-communist Non-Communist Left (NCL). “Anybody who knew Europe after the war would have told you, don’t bother with the right, it was powerless. There was no right in Europe. There was only the left, and you had to dominate them despite congressional right-wingers, as the communists were already doing.”³²

McCarthyism was now becoming a critical problem for Braden and a threat to his European enterprises: “McCarthy’s unofficial anti-Communism was on the verge of disrupting, perhaps sinking the CIA’s most elaborate and effective network of Non-Communist Left Fronts.”³³ A lot of these covert operations “ironically were placed at risk because of McCarthy, who threatened at one point to blow their cover (redolent of the “Valerie Plame affair”) because, from his perspective, this was an American agency, the CIA, going into cahoots with lefties”³⁴ Additionally, there was fear “that the Senator’s attack on the U.S. propaganda apparatus in West Germany threatened to disrupt the subsidies given numerous West European publications and such CIA entities as Radio Liberation and Radio Free Europe.”³⁵ Braden’s Non Communist Left operation, so effective in attenuating Western Europe’s cultural drift toward the communist camp during this seminal period of the 1950s, survived McCarthyism relatively unscathed. But, he conceded, “we (CIA) receded as far as possible into the background. It was difficult to be brave at the height of McCarthyism. You had to be nice to him. He was a powerful guy.”³⁶

Joe McCarthy’s offensive against the CIA culminated in his attempt to oust its Deputy Director of Intelligence, William Bundy, for having contributed \$400 to the Alger Hiss Defense Fund. The lead investigator for

McCarthy's Committee and the Senator's top "thug," Roy Cohn, demanded that Bundy testify before McCarthy. Although he had openly defied the President almost since his inauguration, Joe McCarthy was now dealing on Allen Dulles's turf—and the Director of Central Intelligence was not going to allow a "jumped-up hack from Wisconsin," as he called him, to destroy the agency that he had helped to create. Tom Braden remembered that his friend "Allen (Dulles) answered to very few people up on the Hill. He admired and trusted Senator Dick Russell (Dem., Ga.), and needed him to approve his (CIA) budget, but Allen backed down to no one. When McCarthy wanted Bundy out, Dulles saved him. He stood up to McCarthy."³⁷ Braden was in Dulles's office one day with William Bundy, and the Director told Bundy, "get out of here and I'll deal with it." Dulles then went directly to Eisenhower and said, in Braden's words, he wasn't going to "fuck about with this mess from Wisconsin." Dulles bluntly told the President "he would resign unless McCarthy's attacks were stopped."³⁸

Senator McCarthy's public hearings on the CIA ceased, but not before Braden's Director of Trade Union Operations was removed because he had "briefly belonged to the Young Communist League in the 1930s." In addition, Braden, who along with his post as Chief of the IOD was then Assistant Deputy Director of CIA, had Cord Meyer Jr., his own deputy, come under the reckless assault of the junior Senator from Wisconsin. Meyer, a bona fide World War II battlefield hero, had once headed a liberal veterans group. Because of this innocent association—in spite of the fact that he "wasn't red ... he wasn't even pink," according to Braden—Meyer was suspended temporarily from his post and long remained under a cloud of suspicion, despite his full vindication and the support of his boss and that of DCI, Allen Dulles.³⁹

The full effect of Joe McCarthy on the diplomatic strategies and covert operations—including democratic propaganda—of the Eisenhower years may never be accurately measured. When hubris led him to a confrontation with an institution as formidable as the United States Army, the Senator's meltdown was assured. But while he was riding the crest of the "red-baiting" wave, millions of Americans supported his tawdry campaign. Journalist James Shepley, a friend of C.D. Jackson's when both were at *Time Magazine*, remembered that Jackson was greatly disillusioned with Eisenhower for his failure to speak out publicly against McCarthy for his shabby treatment of distinguished public servants—especially General Marshall, one of Eisenhower's "most profound personal influences." Shepley felt that, "the McCarthy thing was a great agony to him (Jackson)."⁴⁰ What dismayed

Jackson most was that he feared the nation might perceive a “lack of leadership” in the quality of Eisenhower’s character. He urged Ike to confront the issue at a press conference briefing, during which “Jackson wrote out a statement on McCarthy for the President to read to the reporters.” Ike’s political adviser warned him that “a vacuum existed in this country, and it was a political vacuum, and unless the President filled it somebody else would fill it.” Jackson then told the President that, “the people were waiting for a sign.” Later, Jackson recorded, “Eisenhower ‘twisted and squirmed.’” But Eisenhower refused to challenge McCarthy directly: “I will not get into the gutter with that guy,” he said.⁴¹

Few in the nation were bold during this shameful period, and the damage wrought by Joe McCarthy lingered until well after he had ceased plying his odious trade. The irrational fear of appeasement led the United States, inexorably, into the rice paddies of Vietnam—a disaster that C.D. Jackson, had he lived to see it, would have defined as a failure of policy. In retrospect, the ultimate irony of McCarthy’s war on the State Department was that, in John Foster Dulles you had the quintessential anti-communist, and a man who preferred McCarthy’s hawkish inclinations to the rather more tempered initiatives of C.D. Jackson. The notable exceptions to this were the American adventures in Guatemala and Iran, where Jackson agreed with Dulles and the hardliners that nationalism was to be deterred, if not altogether destroyed.

II

A 1993 biography of John Foster Dulles by diplomatic historian Frederick W. Marks III concluded that, “few secretaries of state have compiled a more handsome peace record. With all of his rumbling about ‘massive retaliation,’ Dulles did much to facilitate negotiated settlements in Korea and Vietnam.”⁴² While technically it may be true that the Eisenhower years were relatively peaceful—it is certainly beyond cavil that the nation appeared to be a picture of tranquility that was nowhere evident during the succeeding two decades—, the image of John Foster Dulles as a moderate and reassuring figure in the midst of superpower nuclear saber-rattling is hard to accept. To wit: the current historical consensus on Korea is that Eisenhower brokered his own deal with the North Koreans; and, in spite of Ike’s refusal—over the vehement exhortations of hard-liners like Dulles—to intervene militarily in the growing quagmire in Southeast Asia, it is now generally accepted that he left his successor, John Kennedy, an increasingly destabilized

situation in Vietnam due to an increasingly intransigent JFD-led State Department.

A look at Dulles's bloodlines suggests good lineage for the task at hand: Dulles's maternal grandfather, John W. Foster, had been Secretary of State under Benjamin Harrison; and his uncle, Robert Lansing, was Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson. Eisenhower, upon assuming the presidency, made JFD his first appointment: a man who was both skilled and apparently "replicated his own views."⁴³ Soon, however, it was clear to the President and others in the Cabinet, that Dulles's policies were "simplistic;" he was thought to be "rigid in his thinking;" and he had "endorsed a defense strategy based on massive nuclear retaliation for any Soviet act of aggression." Many on C.D. Jackson's side of the fence, including the highly respected John J. McCloy, known as the "Chairman of the Establishment," thought Dulles's stance "actually put the United States on the defensive in the propaganda war with the Soviets."⁴⁴ Eisenhower was not, initially, altogether unsympathetic to Dulles's idea of a "defense policy based on massive overkill capacity," but he came quickly to the realization that to go down this road without fully exploring every alternative meant possible nuclear annihilation, and the certainty of America's transformation into a garrison state. While the President agreed that Dulles's defense plan would provide the United States with a capability that "would be a deterrent," he warned that "if the contest to maintain this relative position should have to continue indefinitely, the cost would either drive us to war—or into some form of dictatorial government."⁴⁵

To characterize John Foster Dulles as a statesman who simply saw the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union as some grand Manichean passion play, probably misses the mark. Dulles, who was known for his "extreme vanity," also possessed a "single-minded dedication to the proposition that the United States was the principal defender of the ideas of free society." Like others of his station, including colleagues such as C.D. Jackson, JFD bought fully into the concept of "Manifest Destiny." But many of his fellow anti-communists tended to be much more ecumenical in their concept of geopolitics, while the Secretary of State was so insular in his thinking that he often alienated even our allies. Whereas Jackson wanted to quietly capture the loyalties of the non-aligned nations and make inroads into the Eastern Bloc, as well as strengthen our position with England and France — both of whom recognized the inherent emptiness of communist dialectics and the military threat posed by Russia, but accepted coexistence and especially trade with the Soviet States—Dulles opted for outright coercion and applied bullying tactics, even when dealing with our friends. He also had,

in James Shepley's view, an irritating "tendency to moralize ... whether or not his moralization was close to the point, it tended to annoy our allies and sometimes fell into the hands of our opponents." In short, he was heavy-handed and inclined to counsel the President to act unilaterally, added Shepley, from the vantage point of a Washington journalist and "beltway insider".⁴⁶

The wellspring of Dulles's strong moral conviction was "his Presbyterianism," frequently cited by the British as "something they felt they could do without." While Jackson advocated policies that were designed to sway public opinion in the United States and around the world, a concept that Eisenhower was comfortable with, Dulles tended to "lecture reluctant nations who sometimes didn't think that (his) solutions were the total answer." He was pompous; even with his colleagues he "assumed a superior moral position, and talked down to anyone who disagreed with him." Shepley was not of the opinion that Eisenhower was so "absolute or black and white or open and shut, in the matter of carrying out ... policy as Dulles was." When a crisis emerged, Jackson urged restraint where Dulles was purposefully confrontational. When war between Mainland China and Chiang Kai-shek—led Formosa over the future of the tiny islands of Quemoy and Matsu seemed imminent, Eisenhower felt that "Chiang Kai-shek should withdraw his troops from the islands." But Dulles advised him that this was an important "psychological matter," and shaped "what eventually became American policy." Shepley charged that Dulles, as it were, was "holding Eisenhower's feet to the fire in Quemoy and Matsu." Eisenhower, he said, viewed those two islands as "a piece of quite unimportant real estate, militarily and otherwise ... but again, he went along with Dulles."⁴⁷ As a result of that dangerous confrontation—which Dulles clearly had a hand in provoking—the United States, in early 1955, "came closer to using atomic weapons than at any other time in the Eisenhower Administration,"⁴⁸ concluded Stephen Ambrose.

Dulles ran the State Department in a clearly imperious manner. While Eisenhower frequently sought C.D. Jackson's counsel on important international issues, and gave great currency to his diplomatic vision (even as Jackson abandoned his role as presidential adviser to return to Time-Life), Dulles resisted "any efforts (by other than himself)... to intervene in the formulation of foreign policy, regardless of whether it was anyone he liked or not." It should be said that Jackson and Dulles were friends as well as colleagues and the Secretary had a great deal of respect for CDJ's intellect, but Dulles would not abide what he perceived as "any attempt by any White House staff to come into his bailiwick,"⁴⁹ and, as Mr. Shepley noted, in many

ways he displayed a “siege” mentality. After a flurry of criticism in the print media in 1957 took him to task for his combative style (C.L. Sulzberger of the *New York Times* suggested that Dulles was “too inclined to see the world in terms of black and white”), and Democrats charged that he was the obstacle to a Russian-American détente, the Secretary of State offered his resignation in February 1958.⁵⁰ Even friends claimed that he operated the State Department “rather like a wagon train going into hostile Indian territory, and every night they’d group their wagons around the fire,”⁵¹ noted former Russian Ambassador, Charles Bohlen.

Publicly, Eisenhower expressed great confidence in his Secretary of State and shared the opinion of many that Dulles “has got greater knowledge in his field than any other man that I know.” Privately, however, the President worried about Dulles’s “excesses,” his penchant for “brinksmanship,” and his implacable attitude regarding American—Soviet relations. Because Ike remained firmly committed to easing global tensions during his two terms in office, he was often reduced to “practically pleading for some ‘new ideas’” to his Secretary of State in order to create comity between the two superpowers.⁵² Former Ambassador to Italy, Clare Booth Luce, wife of Time-Life Inc Chairman, Henry Luce, saw Dulles as “a ‘Great Bull of Basham.’ He was very powerful ... (and) could make any policy of which he approved seem so moral that Ike couldn’t possibly combat it you know? And he left these matters very largely to Foster.”⁵³ While Ambassador Luce’s opinion must be carefully considered, it is more likely that as a diplomatic juggler of great skill—an ability he was forced to learn in World War II—Eisenhower only appeared to defer to his Secretary of State to appease his quite powerful political right flank.

On 13 March 1957, newspapers across the nation startled their readers with headlines that seemed to indicate that the recently settled and potentially disastrous Middle East Crisis, had, in fact, been manufactured by an overreaching and far too zealous Department of State. The “Suez Crisis was deliberate U.S. plan,” cried one headline, while the *New York Post* reported “Ike’s ex-aide says Dulles provoked Mideast Crisis for Red showdown.” The ex-aide was C.D. Jackson, and as if to further highlight the obvious differences in style between the two men, Jackson told the *Post* that it was his feeling, based on discussions he had had with the Secretary of State, that “Dulles deliberately brought on the Middle East Crisis to force a showdown with Russia.” Jackson adduced that, Dulles was troubled by the Soviet shift in its Cold War policy to an economic offensive which the United States found difficult to counter. In his explanation for the crisis, Dulles admitted to

Jackson that “The U.S. had been looking for a favorable position for a showdown with Russia ... and three special conditions were deemed necessary:

- a) the area must not be within the communist orbit.
- b) a large amount of money must be involved.
- c) the area must be one that would ‘get mad’ at the U.S. and be left to rely on Russian promises of aid.”⁵⁴

The Aswan Dam situation fit all three criteria, and caused some observers to fear the crisis might take the country into war with the Soviets. Jackson, then the editorial vice president of Time Inc and publisher of *Life Magazine*, had previously run an interview with Dulles in which the Secretary told his interlocutor that the United States had “walked to the ‘brink of war’ three times in Asia, but had averted an outbreak by threats to use atomic power.”⁵⁵

In the short time that CDJ was Eisenhower’s special assistant, he had sedulously worked to create a careful diplomatic symmetry—one that balanced a highly-structured propaganda offensive with a realistic economic plan that would benefit American business and markets in Europe, and bolster the emerging post-colonial nations. It was Jackson’s belief that the United States must, perforce, appear to be the moral and economic leader of the Free World if it were to prevail in the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union. Militarily, he assumed, the Soviets would always match our might, and so a standoff would be the best we could achieve. As part of the White House “think tank,” Jackson had cautioned Eisenhower early in his Presidency that the United States must not let the Soviets capture the world’s sympathies by pleading their case that Dulles “plotted war;” or, as Soviet historian E.E. Tarle had charged, that when Dulles was an adviser to Harry Truman he was “trying to frighten the rest of the world with ‘the ghost of non-existent Soviet expansion.’”⁵⁶ Inadvertently, Jackson reasoned, Dulles played right into the hands of Soviet propaganda when, at the onset of the Cold War, he issued statements like: the United States “had entered a second phase in which action, rather than diplomacy, would be decisive.”⁵⁷

Having built his international reputation on his aggressive deportment while serving the Truman Administration, Dulles made our European allies more than a bit uneasy once he took the helm of Ike’s State Department in 1953. His pugnacious attitude before the start of the Geneva Conference to end Indo-Chinese hostilities in 1954, incurred resentment and angst with both

the British and French who felt that he had “put undue public pressure on them to choose between a policy they (did) not like or repudiating the U.S. which they (did) not want to do.” Even amongst his supporters in the State Department there was a high level of anxiety that he was “gambling an awful lot on his own instinct,” because they never knew whether he was “bluffing the reds or getting the United States ready for military action in Indo-China ... after all the talk about ‘massive retaliation.’”⁵⁸ Dulles’s warlike public statements placed an excessive burden on propaganda specialists like Jackson and those at CIA who were trying, in the face of great Soviet pressure in those early years of the Cold War, to reflect a sophisticated and positive image with Europe’s wary “non-communist left”.

When Eisenhower first appointed his Secretary of State, he was well aware that our European allies—mainly the British and French—would find it “difficult to get along with Mr. Dulles.” The President acknowledged that “he’s a little abrupt and some people think he’s rather intellectually arrogant and that sort of thing.”⁵⁹ What compounded the problem was that, many among Eisenhower’s most trusted advisers also saw Dulles’s unyielding political conservatism as an impediment to their hopes that the new Administration would give birth to a more thoughtful foreign policy. At first glance, Jackson thought John Foster Dulles “did not appear competent enough to handle the job of secretary of state, although later he came to temper this initial presumption.”⁶⁰ Jackson shared this early skepticism of Dulles with other members of the Administration like the conservative General, Walter Bedell (“Beetle”) Smith, who, over a “highly personal lunch,” confessed to Jackson that he had “finally cracked under JFD’s penchant for two-timing maladministration.” And, though he admitted he “still respects Dulles’s intelligence,” Smith “wonder(ed) how long that will last.”⁶¹

What disturbed Jackson most about Dulles’s leadership was that, it seemed the Secretary’s lack of regard for the impact of his outbursts was allowing the Soviet Union to win the all-important “war of words.” This, C.D. Jackson lamented, was contributing to America’s warlike image abroad. The propaganda master liked to remind the Secretary that at the Berlin Conference, “Molotov never referred to the East German regime, or the Chinese communist regime, or the puppet regimes of any of the satellites, without the adjectival prefix ‘democratic and peace-loving.’ Theirs is Picasso’s ‘peace’ dove. They are the sponsors of an endless variety of ‘peace’ petitions and campaigns.” Respectful of his adversaries, CDJ acknowledged that communist legerdemain was highly productive, though “millions of people throughout the world know that these are Soviet absurdities—Soviet

lies. And yet very subtly, through the endless repetition of these words and slogans, some part of what the communists want to convey does rub off onto the sub consciousness of these same millions of people.” But who was at fault for this misperception that the United States was the aggressor if not we ourselves since the threat of Soviet military expansion had caused us “to make an unwilling contribution to this Soviet propaganda.”⁶² His spirit undaunted, Jackson was never at a loss to suggest measures to match Soviet psychological warfare with an American propaganda “counter-offensive.”

In December 1953, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill joined the French and the Russians in calling for a four-power foreign ministers’ conference;⁶³ a Big Four Summit Meeting to discuss how best to move forward on peace talks, or at least to attain some kind of *modus vivendi* with respect to current hostilities. C.D. Jackson importuned the President to agree to such a meeting to coincide with a presidential address giving “to the world some promise of hope.”⁶⁴ While Eisenhower clearly favored a Big Four Conference, “Dulles did not ... he doubted that ‘anything constructive’ could come out of such a meeting ...” Eisenhower disagreed, and was “ready to try, if only ‘to convince public opinion of our good faith.’”⁶⁵ Walt Rostow claimed that Dulles expressed profound reservations and a good deal of “skepticism about negotiations with the Soviet Union and anxiety about major presidential pronouncements on foreign policy—an anxiety that was to emerge on several occasions over his tenure in office.” Rostow discerned major “differences between Jackson and the State Department on what U.S. course of action was most likely to hold the alliance” between the United States and Western Europe together. Although the summit failed to materialize at this time, Eisenhower finally decided to proceed with the speech despite “Dulles’s lack of enthusiasm for it.”⁶⁶ The “Chance for Peace Address” bolstered progress toward the European Defense Community, an important factor in enlisting Dulles’s eventual support of the Presidential speech. But Dulles remained an intractable foe of a superpower summit claiming—quite mistakenly—that “such a meeting would have quite disastrous effects on our ties with our allies”⁶⁷

The long-deferred Summit Conference was finally convened at Geneva in July, 1955. The United States was impelled to join the other Heads of State at the table, lest it be accused of ignoring the pressures for peace in the midst of an ever-escalating atomic arms race. By not attending the Conference—something that Secretary Dulles clearly would have preferred—the U.S. also risked alienating our allies, especially Churchill’s British Conservatives who were locked in a tight election contest in which they stressed that their Party

was “the most effective instrument of peace.”⁶⁸ A staunch defender of American objectives around the world, Churchill was the “first among Western leaders to see that the Cold War had reached an impasse and must be called off.”⁶⁹ Eisenhower needed Churchill’s support, and the Prime Minister needed Ike’s presence at Geneva to win an election for his Party.

The crisis in the Formosa Straits also remained in the balance and left the world teetering on the brink of nuclear war. The President’s instincts were for productive negotiations with the Russians after being hamstrung “for two years by a right wing Republican Congress headed by Senators Taft, Knowland, Bridges, and McCarthy,” noted Cold War historian, D.F. Fleming.⁷⁰ In fact, McCarthy, although not in full flower at this juncture, tried unsuccessfully to block the Conference, or at least render Ike ineffectual by passing a resolution beforehand that would tie the Chief Executive’s hands. More ominously, many in the military establishment—especially “Strangelovian” Joint Chief, Admiral Arthur Radford—still longed for a preventive strike on the Soviet Union; and Secretary Dulles continued to advocate winning the Cold War as opposed to “containment.”⁷¹

Ike, nonetheless, shared a mind with C.D. Jackson, and embraced “the hopeful ‘Spirit of Geneva,’” as Blanche Wiesen Cook described it. He rejected outright the notion that the Cold War could be won militarily, and had the courage to repeat, “over and over again that international war had become—simply—unacceptable,” says Cook.⁷² Ike’s star shone brightly at Geneva and he was hailed as its outstanding leader. He escaped, for the moment, the grip of cold warriors like John Foster Dulles and convinced the Russians “that there would be no war while he was President.” This nation’s columnists cheered Ike as the man “who called off the Cold War, temporarily at least.” In the Soviet Union, *Izvestia* ran headlines proclaiming: “A New Era In International Relations Has Begun.”⁷³ Notwithstanding the opposition of Dulles and those supporters who swore fealty to him, it did indeed look like President Eisenhower had ushered in a new day in the postwar period, with the encouragement and guidance of C.D. Jackson.

III

A major component of the great divide between Ike’s psychological warriors and their adversaries in the Administration lay primarily in the usage of words and the overall promotion or “sale” of America’s image abroad. While RFE was beaming messages into Eastern Europe proclaiming, loudly,

that communism was a menace to world peace, Dulles was busy calling the nation to arms, inveighing against the Russians, and warning “the Chinese that the United States was no ‘paper tiger’ and threatening to use against them ‘new and powerful weapons of precision, which can utterly destroy military targets ...’ that is, tactical atomic bombs.”⁷⁴ Dulles was clearly working at cross-purposes with Jackson, and his minatory rhetoric continued apace. While Jackson’s formula called for shoring up our alliances with Western Europe and making inroads among the satellite nations by selling democratic capitalism, the Machiavellian Secretary of State appeared to be keeping the world on the precipice of nuclear holocaust.

In addition to losing the global “war of words,” in his perceptions, Jackson despaired that the Eisenhower Administration was needlessly alarming the people of this nation whose support was vital for the success of democratic propaganda. At the same time that Jackson and his image-makers were casting many of the President’s speeches and foreign policy initiatives in the language of peace (e.g. “Chance for Peace,” “Atoms for Peace”), Dulles’s words and actions bowed to the will of the right wing, which depicted to the world a nation that was in the grip of warmongers. The Secretary’s explosive *Life Magazine* article, which revealed how the United States had been brought to the brink of nuclear war, had “atomic effects,” said Arthur Krock of the *New York Times*, long considered the dean of American Foreign Policy writers. After the furor caused by his imprudent remarks, Dulles felt compelled to explain himself: “You have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in war. Some say that we were brought to the verge of war. Of course we were brought to the verge of war. The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art.”⁷⁵ The article just reinforced the Secretary’s warlike image and was hardly reassuring to the American public. Jackson thought Dulles’s behavior made Eisenhower look inconsistent in terms of the message he was trying to convey to the nation—and just as important, to the world. The problem, Jackson observed, stemmed from the fact that Ike “suffered from an ‘exaggerated desire to have everybody happy,’ which prevented him from making ‘clean-cut decisions.’”⁷⁶

C.D. Jackson spoke for many when he said that the United States had “become the prisoner of its Cold War slogans.”⁷⁷ No one could gainsay Secretary Dulles’s responsibility for this predicament. To many in the foreign policy establishment, among important members of the press, and within the United States Congress itself, Dulles’s foreign policy seemed impulsive and doctrinaire.⁷⁸ Some of his more vigorous opponents on Capitol Hill, like

Senator W. Scott Kerr (Democrat of N. C.), even called for his resignation.⁷⁹ Where Jackson and his propaganda specialists had prepared well thought-out responses to Soviet provocations, JFD countered with “cold legalisms” and armed might. While Eisenhower was receptive to the urgings of CDJ to adopt propaganda as the “primary instrument” of American diplomacy, Dulles’s diplomacy “typically was negative.”⁸⁰ Dulles never accepted the proposition that propaganda could be strategically employed as a weapon in the war for global hegemony; and he spoke for many hard-liners at the State Department, in Congress, in the Eisenhower Cabinet, in the U.S. Intelligence Community, and in the nation itself. But Dulles did not, despite much of what has been previously written of the Eisenhower years, speak for the President.

IV

On 1 August 1953, the United States Information Agency (USIA), which would incorporate all existing government information programs and assume responsibility for all “overt” overseas information initiatives, came into being. Abbott Washburn became Deputy Director of USIA under Theodore Streibert whom Eisenhower named to direct the Agency. The President, explained Washburn, had decided based on his wartime experiences with the Office of War Information, and his association with C.D. Jackson during World War II and after, to place a greater reliance on propaganda and “manipulating world opinion,” to come out ahead in the current East-West struggle. He thought “wartime propaganda” was “very effective” and “took a great deal of interest in it,” as it could be used to support our psychological warfare effort. Washburn and Director Streibert would see Ike once a month, and “we’d have a good long talk with him about all the things that were going on in our overseas propaganda,—‘propaganda’ in the good sense ...”, said Washburn.⁸¹ Eisenhower understood propaganda, especially as it related to war, and he understood the value of delivering information in order to affect a culture and to win people’s minds. C.D. Jackson knew before 1952, that if Eisenhower were elected President he would have a strong ally in the White House. Unfortunately, the choice of Dulles to run the State Department created an obstacle to his “new” strategy to win the Cold War.

Although Dulles expressed his approval for a separate information agency, the State Department marginalized its importance, and, in essence, would never accept propaganda itself as equal in stature “with economic, political, and military affairs in the nation’s overall foreign policy,” observed

historian Walter Hixson.⁸² The Jackson Committee had delineated the gross inadequacies in America's effort to confront the Kremlin's propaganda and agitation machine. What obtained, they noted, was that the Soviet Union allocated far greater resources in this area than did the vastly richer United States, indicating that they deemed the effort vital to their Cold War interests. A large portion of the Soviet expenditures went toward radio and print media, the core of their overall propaganda program. It was in this domain primarily, that the USIA would function; but the State Department remained steadfast in its opposition to a major role for the Agency. Deputy Director Washburn alleged that:

One of the most troublesome foes was State. These people came out of the woodwork to get rid of USIA. We wanted to keep it independent. We did the best we could to integrate it into all the rest of the government structure for information. And when Eisenhower set up USIA he said, 'the director is going to coordinate all of these activities, aid, special operations, the military, and everything else.' But it wasn't in the psyche of these people to think in terms of this as an important element that has to be integrated. There seemed to be a crusade with some at State to reintegrate USIA within the State Department. This, of course, would have taken it off the footing that C.D. Jackson had intended.⁸³

V

Most, but not all of the opposition to "psyops," or "soft-line" diplomacy, came under the rubric of reactionary politics. Many on the left—though liberals were often used, wittingly and otherwise, in propaganda operations—thought the American Government ought not to be in the "dirty" business of promoting propaganda at home or abroad. To many intellectuals, the creation of governmental bodies designed specifically to spew out what they saw as the "party line," was a disquieting notion for a liberal democracy. Moreover, they saw the likelihood that these agencies, once established, would become permanent fixtures. It was a benighted effort in their eyes, better left to totalitarian societies, even in the midst of a Cold War. Much of the displeasure was voiced before Congressional Committees. Abbott Washburn described,

people up on the Hill ... some of them self-appointed experts on this like Senator Fulbright (Dem., Ark.), who never did buy it. There were a number of speeches he delivered where he labeled USIA guys as a bunch of propagandists who should not be mixed up with our wonderful cultural efforts—not just the Fulbright Program. I think there were quite a number of intellectuals who had that notion that C.D. Jackson-types were propagandists and that wasn't quite nice. They never offered realistic alternatives, however.⁸⁴

The right-wing, nonetheless, was unrelenting in its assault on propaganda

operations; especially ones that seemed to embrace leftist causes like unions, socialist publications, and the arts. This was true both domestically and in Europe. Tom Braden coordinated a plan to promote modern art such as expressionism, cubism, and abstractionism in this country, and send it abroad as a symbol of America's commitment to the freedom of cultural expression. But, he said, there was a "Congressman Dondero who opposed this," and "gave us a lot of trouble" because he "couldn't stand modern art, thought it was sinful."⁸⁵ Actually, Missouri Republican George Dondero thought modern art to be more than just sinful. He proclaimed on the floor of the House of Representatives, that modernism was part of a "worldwide conspiracy to weaken American resolve." Moreover, he charged that "all modern art is communistic" and therefore should never be accepted nor in any way promoted by the American Government. This assessment gained currency with many conservatives in the Congress, as well as the myriad reactionary groups they represented in the nation. The hard right went as far as labeling "ultramodern artists" unwitting "tools of the Kremlin," and modern art "a means of espionage."⁸⁶

It must be noted here, that the current assault by the U.S. political right on the civil liberties of artists and others who possess the courage to challenge the status quo, echoes this shamefully un-American period in the Cold War, and reflects the ultimate irony of an ideological movement that strives to export American values abroad while actively seeking to curtail them at home.

One of the most formidable congressional opponents of the plan to seduce Europe's Non-Communist Left was Republican Senate Majority Leader, William Knowland, of California.* Knowland was an outspoken supporter of Joe McCarthy, and had once advocated a total blockade of the Mainland Chinese coast. Even the usually amiable Eisenhower found the California conservative contemptible in both manner and political instinct. If McCarthy was the paladin of America's reactionary right-wing, certainly Knowland was equally totemic of this brand of knee-jerk, reactionary politics.⁸⁷ Tom Braden recalled a meeting he attended where,

Allen (DCI, Allen Dulles) was telling Knowland that he was going to bring over Henri Spaak, former Premier of Belgium and Chairman of the Assembly at the United Nations, to speak to U.S. groups. Knowland said, 'you are, the man is a socialist.' Dulles replied, 'Bill you haven't been to Europe lately, a socialist is roughly equivalent to a Republican.' Isn't it astonishing, these people we elect, laughed

Braden. William Knowland was an awfully dumb guy.⁸⁸

General Walter “Beetle” Smith, former wartime Chief of Staff under General Eisenhower, and CIA Director under Harry Truman from October 1950 until the newly-elected President Eisenhower named Allen Dulles his DCI in January 1953 making Smith his under-secretary of state, was well known for his ultra-conservative politics. Though personally he cared little for the pompous John Foster Dulles, Smith’s retrograde political thinking made him an appropriate choice to serve the new Secretary of State. When Eisenhower announced that the liberal Nelson Rockefeller would succeed C.D. Jackson as Special Assistant to the President for psychological warfare, the preferment did not amuse General Smith. Tom Braden remembered that,

I had worked at the Museum of Modern Art after the war for Rockefeller, and we remained close friends and colleagues. I remember walking into Allen Dulles’s office one day soon after I joined CIA, and I could hear “Beetle” Smith, whose office doors adjoined the Director’s, roaring out from beyond his front door: ‘They got that goddamned communist Nelson Rockefeller running psychological warfare.’ I went into Allen’s office and said ‘I don’t want to work here anymore. I don’t want anything to do with this.’ I was just a young kid. My knees were shaking.⁸⁹

VI

Although C.D. Jackson frequently encountered fierce opposition—both bureaucratic and otherwise—during his time in Washington, he overcame what might have been for others insuperable obstacles to establish propaganda as an adjunct to American diplomacy. His methods ultimately garnered the support of many in the field of communications who recognized the value of favorable public opinion. The loss of Jackson’s service was apparent in the latter stages of Eisenhower’s Presidency, and was duly noted in the pages of leading newspapers: “The Free World has lost the initiative in its propaganda contest with the Soviet Bloc,” commented the *New York Times*.⁹⁰ Further reflecting this perceived “loss of initiative,” a major supporter of expanding the USIA’s budget and a leading exponent of propaganda, Edward L. Bernays, pleaded for what he considered “a miniscule amount considering the high stakes and the sums appropriated by the communists in the battle for men’s minds.”⁹¹

When Jackson left his Washington offices in 1954 to assume his former duties at Time-Life Inc, his influence on the policies of the Eisenhower Administration— both foreign and domestic—could still be greatly felt. Before his departure, Ike’s assistant “with a special portfolio in what is known as the ‘Cold War,’” as he liked to call himself, summed up his ideas as to our “assets and liabilities in this field, our successes and failures, and our unfilled needs,” in a missive to Secretary of State Dulles. He lamented the fact that the “Soviets have monopolized, and in a very subtle way made their own, most of the benign words.” As always, CDJ offered his own vision to Dulles: a carefully conceived protocol for “the development of foreign policy,” so that we may successfully counter “Soviet expansion” and “roll back communism by peaceful means.” What he offered was a “bold imaginative plan” that embraced “not just one, but all, of the possible elements involved.”⁹² Jackson suggested that U.S. economic initiatives, as they affected Marshall Plan trade subsidies and import-export incentives, were short term, while our military planning, especially in relation to the recently developed hydrogen bomb, had caused “a real intellectual and emotional crisis throughout the world, and including our own country.” “This crisis,” he observed, “had long-term ramifications for the nation’s foreign policy.”⁹³

In private life, Jackson contemplated with great interest the diplomatic direction of the Eisenhower Administration. It was with a profound sense of disappointment that he wrote Foster Dulles in 1959 to express his concerns that the State Department had shown “a lack of interest, lack of understanding, or even positive dislike, of the practice of political warfare.” In measured prose, Jackson entreated the Secretary not to confuse “political warfare” with the “department’s activities in diplomacy,” although he recommended, they should certainly be “working” in “close coordination.” His message was firm in urging JFD to review American diplomatic conduct and, “If you have indeed decided that it would be preferable for the United States not to conduct political warfare, particularly with respect to the East-European satellite countries, then the Free Europe Committee and Radio Free Europe should go out of business forthwith ... ” However, Jackson implored the Secretary of State to first consider the “role of political warfare as distinct from the role of diplomacy,” and therefore an integral part of foreign policy. He reminded Dulles that “it was the job of the Free Europe Committee and Radio Free Europe, ‘non-governmental voices,’” to “inform and arouse the minds of the people of Eastern Europe.” In summation, he maintained that his methods could “carry forward the foreign policy of the U.S” and deliver, in his words, the “1-2 punch technique so skillfully and constantly used by the

communists.”⁹⁴ C.D. Jackson’s Washington sojourn was memorable for both his unprecedented advocacy of propaganda, and for the vital role he played in American diplomacy during the all-important Eisenhower period of the Cold War.

On 6 May 1965, eight months after Jackson’s untimely death, the dedicated men and women that staffed the broadcasting organization which made up “the fighting arm of The National Committee for a Free Europe,” gathered together to memorialize the man they considered most responsible for the creation and success of Radio Free Europe.⁹⁵ Jackson’s most enduring legacy, according to most of his colleagues, was RFE. The dedication of a conference and reading room, named the C. D. Jackson Room, was a tribute by his associates to their fellow soldier in the war of ideas against Soviet communism. Jackson had “developed a common bond with the exiles of the five radio stations,” that were committed to the liberation of the satellite nations. His creative leadership and guiding spirit galvanized much of the energy of the exile population; and his ingenuity gave direction to many of his supporters inside both the Eisenhower Administration and the Intelligence Community.⁹⁶

Truth, in Jackson’s mind, was the weapon that American propaganda should employ to combat the deceit he felt the communists had been utilizing to gain ground in those post-war years. And, because CDJ understood full well that the dissemination of this truth was as important as the idea itself, he constructed a number of ways to transmit that truth to the world. The radio, for RFE, became a symbol of liberation behind the Iron Curtain. Because the Iron Curtain could not be easily penetrated by newspapers or magazines, radio broadcasts would be “employed tactically as well as strategically” to propagate the truth. This was the mandate of Radio Free Europe, as well as its *raison d’etre*.⁹⁷ And C. D. Jackson was its creator.

Footnotes

*The tail-gunner sobriquet ascribed to McCarthy was for heroics on the battlefields of World War II, which apparently never took place. This, nevertheless, did not stop him from perpetuating the myth.

*Senator Knowland had replaced the ailing former presidential candidate, Robert Taft of Ohio, as Senate majority leader, and was his equal as far as his standing among conservative politicians.

ENDNOTES

1. Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, p. 75.
2. Ibid. p.60.
3. Ibid. p.74.
4. Dwight Eisenhower to Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, 24 October 1953, (top secret memorandum, declassified 18 November 1975) C.D. Jackson Papers, box 50 file 1.
5. Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, p.177.
6. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington, D.C., August 2001.
7. See note 4.
8. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.
9. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, p. 191.
10. See C.D. Jackson daily log, 27 November 1953, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 68, file:1953 log, 5.
11. Rostow, *Europe After Stalin*, p.6.
12. Ibid., p. 69.
13. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 84.
14. Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, p. 161.
15. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 83.
16. Ibid., p. 65.
17. *New York Times*, 4 December 1953.
18. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, pp. 196, 197.
19. Ibid., pp. 195 & 196.
20. Abbott Washburn, oral history.
21. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington, D.C., August 2001.
22. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 81.
23. See C.D. Jackson daily log, 26 May 1953, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 68, file: 1953, log.
24. See Jackson position paper, “*Crisis of 1954*,” C.D. Jackson Papers, undated, box 83.
25. Marie McCrum, oral history.
26. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.
27. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, *The Real CIA* (New York, Macmillan, 1968), p. 139.
28. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, p. 197.
29. Ibid.
30. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.

31. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, p. 197.
32. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.
33. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, p. 197.
34. Ibid., pp. 197, 198.
35. Bird, *The Chairman*, p. 413.
36. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.
37. Ibid.
38. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, p. 209.
39. Ibid., p. 210; also Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.
40. James R. Shepley, oral history. Shepley was Washington Bureau Chief for *Time Magazine* at the time of Eisenhower's election in 1952, and remained in the position throughout most of the Eisenhower Presidency.
41. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 141.
42. Frederick W. Marks III, *Power and Peace, The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles* (Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 1993), p. 3.
43. Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, p. 150.
44. Bird, *The Chairman*, p. 433.
45. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 123.
46. Shepley, oral history.
47. Ibid.
48. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 231.
49. See note 46.
50. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 443.
51. Charles Bohlen, oral history.
52. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, pp. 444, 445.
53. Clare Both Luce, oral history.
54. See C.D. Jackson interview, *New York Post*, 13 March 1957.
55. Ibid.
56. Fleming, *The Cold War*, p. 434.
57. *New York Herald Tribune*, 4 January 1948.
58. *New York Times*, 11 April 1954.
59. Dwight David Eisenhower, oral history.
60. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington, D.C., August 2001.
61. See C.D. Jackson file log, 8 July 1953, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 68, file:1953 log, 3.
62. See C.D. Jackson memorandum to Secretary of State Dulles, 9 April 1954, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 49, file 4.

63. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 145.
64. Rostow, *Europe After Stalin*, p. 7.
65. See Note 63.
66. Rostow, *Europe After Stalin*, pp. 8, 9.
67. FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, p. 1121.
68. Fleming, *The Cold War*, p. 738.
69. *Ibid.*, 737.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 741.
71. *Ibid.*, *passim*.
72. Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, p. 154
73. Fleming, *The Cold War*, pp. 750-752.
74. *New York Times*, 9 March 1955.
75. Fleming, *The Cold War*, pp. 771, 772.
76. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 77.
77. Fleming, *The Cold War*, p. 779.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 846, and *passim*.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 900.
80. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 445.
81. Abbott Washburn, oral history.
82. Hixson, *Parting The Curtain*, pp. 26, 27.
83. Abbott Washburn, interview, Washington, D.C., August 2001.
84. *Ibid.*
85. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.
86. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, p. 253.
87. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, *passim*.
88. Tom Braden, interview, Virginia, August 2001.
89. *Ibid.*
90. See C. L. Sulzberger, *New York Times*, 15 January 1958.
91. See Edward L. Bernays, *New York Times*, 21 February 1958.
92. See C.D. Jackson, personal and confidential memorandum to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 9 April 1954, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 83, miscellaneous correspondence, file 2.
93. *Ibid.*
94. See C.D. Jackson to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 9 February 1959, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 69, file: log 1.
95. See Radio Free Europe policy paper, “*Radio Free Europe, Nature, Purpose, and Goals*,”

C.D. Jackson Papers, box 90, file: RFE.

96. See "*Report on Radio Free Europe*," 15 December 1952, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 54; see also C.D. Jackson Room dedication ceremony, 6 May 1965, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 52.

97. See "Draft of an Overall Directive for Radio Free Europe," C.D. Jackson Papers, box 90, file 2.

EPILOGUE

In the wake of the 11 September 2001 attack on America by Islamic terrorists at New York's World Trade Center, the United States was once again faced with winning the public relations war internationally as it pursued economic interests that might cause others to wish us ill. Even before the American military response to the tragic events of that day began, the Pentagon, according to the *New York Times*, had established a "small but well-financed" Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) for fear that the United States was "losing public support for its war on terrorism, particularly in Islamic countries." A 19 February 2002 *Times* front page story, detailed Pentagon plans to "provide news items, possibly even false ones, to foreign media organizations as part of a new effort to influence public sentiment and policy makers in both friendly and unfriendly countries."¹

The plan would continue an intelligence tradition of both military and civilian sectors which sought, said Pentagon officials, to use "disinformation and other covert activities to 'white' public affairs that rely on truthful news releases." These "black campaigns," as they were so characterized in the *Times* account, would seek to "influence foreign audiences" through propaganda that purported to be the truth, but was only truthful in that which served American interests. The question of what best served American interests arose anew, as critics pointed to the paradox of having domestic news outlets picking up as factual foreign news reports that were inventions of the United States Intelligence Community. The *New York Times* story also revealed that during the 1990s, "army 'psyop' units" tried to build "public support" for American peace-keeping missions in the Balkans. The Army's Psychological Operations Command, a relic of the Cold War, had performed similar "psyops" in the 1980s for the Reagan Administration in its efforts to undermine the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua. The Command has presently been active in dropping upon Afghanistan, millions of leaflets that encourage Taliban and Al Qaeda soldiers to surrender. This undertaking was a throwback to OWI operations in Europe during World War II.²

The United States was once more turning to psychological warfare to mold public opinion abroad, and build support for its policies here at home. But had we ever really abandoned it? More important, how does one distinguish "democratic propaganda" from government-sponsored

“information policy”? And is the distinction meaningful? As a member of the Kennedy Administration, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. observed how JFK showed great concern for world opinion. But, he said, he never recalled “hearing the term ‘psychological warfare’ uttered during the Kennedy years.”³ Recently, however, the State Department released its Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, in which the Kennedy White House appears to be engaging the Kremlin in a propaganda “war of words” over a Soviet offer of “peaceful coexistence”—a proposal that the Administration felt compelled to answer in kind. President Kennedy conferred with key aides including Schlesinger, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and United States Information Agency Director Edward R. Murrow, to devise a proper “response to the Soviet propaganda theme.” After giving it great thought, a counter-theme was composed, and Kennedy requested that “immediate steps be taken to give this formulation the widespread currency and usage” that would make it effective. JFK apparently was as sensitive as Eisenhower, or C.D. Jackson, as to how other nations saw America. He, too, seemed to recoil at the thought that the Soviet Union would be looked upon as the world’s peacemaker. And, like Jackson, Kennedy sought to change world opinion “by actions” while confronting Soviet propaganda at every opportunity.⁴

Today the U.S. faces many of the same challenges that it did after World War II, when the nation’s leaders deemed it appropriate to resort to propaganda as a “primary tool” with which to attack our enemies; only the names of the enemies have changed. Because threats to American hegemony remain C.D. Jackson’s legacy is permanent, maintains Blanche Wiesen Cook. There are “thousands of CIA agents operating around the world,” and “covert activities everywhere,” noted Professor Cook more than two decades ago.⁵ At present, the combined personnel of American intelligence institutions number over one hundred thousand, and the resources expended to support their activities is likely tens of billions of dollars.* The mission of these agencies is essentially what it was more than fifty years ago when, staring at the specter of communism, C.D. Jackson used the word “orchestration” to try to describe the way we should “conduct our psychological or political warfare.” In a 1957 memo to Henry Luce, Jackson spoke of the implications of the recent Soviet launching of the Sputnik satellite, and how this achievement would have a “jolting impact” worldwide where it would be “exploited to the hilt by the Communists.” The Soviet Union, he averred, used the “orchestration” of their psywar events “as skillfully ... as I have ever seen.”⁶ What America’s psywarriors understood then, and what seemingly has now been forgotten

since Russia ceases to be a threat in the foreseeable future, was perhaps best described in a letter from Abbott Washburn to presidential candidate Dwight Eisenhower: “Political warfare embraces diplomacy, intelligence, propaganda, economic negotiations ... and to be effective requires the integration of these functions according to an overall plan ...”⁷

The contradiction of propaganda in a free society looms larger today than at any point in the last five decades. The “proposed” OSI advocated the use of “private companies” to “develop information programs,” in an operation that one senior military official called “scary.”⁸ Adolph Hitler once defined the “ends of propaganda” as a “means to obtain power.” All the institutions of the state, Hitler said, “have somehow to serve the propaganda of ideas.”⁹ Where then does propaganda lead a society, even a free society that purports to employ only “democratic propaganda?” The former Soviet Union used propaganda to engender unity through a sense of nationalism: “We became unified,” claims Professor Dmitry Urnov. “With a large portion of our population imprisoned either physically or culturally, we were of one frame of mind.”¹⁰ Will the present American “crusade” for unity and conformity—veiled in the doctrinal calls for “national security”—march us down a similar path to totalitarianism?

Dwight Eisenhower, to his lasting credit, came to understand—albeit probably too late in his presidency—the inherent danger that existed in tying his nation’s future to a boundless struggle between “us” and “them.” His “Farewell Address,” which warned his fellow countrymen of the malevolent nature of the “military-industrial complex,”¹¹ certainly evinced recognition and a prescience of where the hollow, endless cries for national security would bring us. And shrouding the quest for a “garrison state” (a phrase Eisenhower liked to use to deflect the militaristic dogmas of the jingoes) in the stirring propaganda slogans of national defense and impending doom, would be violating the “trust” Ike saw as the last protection for Americans from the “undue influence” of a military-business establishment. C. D. Jackson, on the other hand, may never have recognized the folly of his stratagems: That the tools of his trade in the hands of the wrong people, could just as easily be employed to undermine American values as they could be used to destroy our enemies.

Postscript

Perhaps no Cold War history would be complete if it did not in some way

intersect with the enduring mystery that continues to surround the assassination of Eisenhower's successor, John Fitzgerald Kennedy. C.D. Jackson's saga does not disappoint in that respect. On the evening of the day JFK was murdered, 11/22/63, Richard B. Stolley of *Life Magazine* contacted businessman Abraham Zapruder, an amateur photographer, who, with his newly purchased motion picture camera, filmed the entire shooting sequence that took the President's life. The film, among many to be shot that day, stands as the preeminent record of the event, and therefore invaluable to researchers and investigators alike who seek to uncover the source, timing, and number of gunshots.¹²

Zapruder agreed to meet Stolley the following morning, Saturday November 23, at 9:00 am. They met instead at 8:00 am, in the company of Secret Service agents. Stolley then purchased the rights to the film, which Zapruder claimed was the original copy. The purchase price was \$50,000. When next a copy of the purported original film was shown to Time-Life executives, C.D. Jackson proposed that all rights to it be purchased from Zapruder and "withheld from public viewing."¹³ On 29 November 1963, *Life* published a special issue on the assassination highlighting selected frames from what was now "their Zapruder film."* The deleted frames made it impossible to determine accurately from which direction the shot or shots that hit the President's head, came. One year later, 2 October 1964, after the publication of the Warren Commission Report that concluded the President had been the victim of a lone gunman, once again *Life* published an issue which deleted the crucial head shot frames.¹⁴

Former University of California at Berkeley Professor and long-time investigative journalist, Peter Dale Scott, notes in his book on the assassination, *Deep Politics*, that C.D. Jackson may have had *Life Magazine* purchase the Zapruder film, and the rights to Marina Oswald's story, at the behest of his close friend and former colleague, Allen Dulles, an important member of the Warren Commission and former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Scott noted Jackson's expertise at "influencing public opinion," and his years inside government where his service was "psychological warfare." Jackson also arranged, "at the urging of Dulles, to have Marina's story ghost-written for *Life* by Isaac Don Levine, a veteran CIA publicist." Levine had worked with CDJ and Allen Dulles prior to this, and in 1953, had collaborated with them to coordinate a "U.S.-CIA psychological warfare response to the death of Stalin."¹⁵

Carl Bernstein of Watergate fame revealed in a disturbing October 1977

Rolling Stone Magazine confessionary article, the sometimes incestuous relationships that exist between American journalists and governmental agencies. Bernstein went on to claim that Jackson was the CIA's "inside" man at *Life*, and that he had personally arranged for CIA employees to travel with Time-Life credentials as cover.¹⁶ Moreover, Bernstein maintained that some of Jackson's "cover" arrangements for Central Intelligence "were made with the knowledge of (Henry) Luce's wife, Clare Booth."¹⁷

What may have in fact compelled Time-Life CEO Henry Luce, along with wife Clare Booth and his factotum CDJ, into collaborating in a possible CIA-inspired, conspiracy cover-up cover story, is the fact that *Life Magazine* was allowing its reporters to accompany CIA-led hit teams to attack Castro's Cuba, and had even financed some of the raids at the direction of Luce and his rabidly anti-communist spouse. It then becomes plausible, that Jackson indeed may have been acting in what he thought was Time-Life's best interest in coordinating what Scott describes as a "p.r. manipulation of the dialectical cover-up" of a conspiracy to kill the President.¹⁸

In his public musings about the assassination, Jackson, in the short time he had to live after the crime, clung to the theory that was then being postulated to the world by the Warren Commission: a lone assassin, with no known accomplices.¹⁹ But his involvement in a conspiracy cover-up, though probably benign in intent and unwitting as to its purpose, remains evident in the great dispatch Jackson employed in having his relative-in-law, *Life* journalist Richard Billings, coordinate a "*Life* team in Dallas that swiftly bought up the Zapruder film and the rights to Marina's story."²⁰ Except for some skullduggery by researchers, who purloined the film from the Time-Life vault in 1973 and showed it on Geraldo Rivera's "Good Night America" national television program, Zapruder's visual record of the crime may well have been hidden from the American public's view for many more years.

Time-Life Inc has played a key role in the years since the JFK assassination in attempting to shape the public's perception of the crime. Time published former President and Warren Commission member, Gerald Ford's account of the investigation—which, of course, posited the lone gunman theory—in October, 1964. Curiously, thirty years later, Time-Life Inc helped finance the film *JFK*, in which controversial director Oliver Stone purports to shatter the myths that were the foundation of the government's version of the crime. And Jackson in-law, Richard Billings co-authored with G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel of the House Select Committee's 1976-1978 investigation of the crime, a report that also called into question the Warren

Commission's finding of no conspiracy.²¹

At this juncture, the evidence suggests only that the Time-Life team, headed by its master propagandist, C.D. Jackson, may have been manipulated into covering up out of self-interest—and with the powerful means at its disposal—any hint of conspiracy that would have implicated, however tangentially, some of its own. Those responsible in the wake of the assassination for putting Jackson and his colleagues—most importantly, Henry and Clare Booth Luce—into an untenable position where cooperation in a “cover-up” was their sole recourse, were probably the culprits who pulled off the “crime of the century.”²²

Footnotes

*The secrecy attached to entities like the National Security Agency (NSA), the CIA, and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), make their numbers as well as their budget impossible to assess with complete accuracy. However, investigative journalist James Bamford placed the number of employees of the NSA alone at over 68,000 in 1978.

*There has been substantial controversy and disagreement over the years amongst assassination investigators—both official and otherwise—over the authenticity of the Zapruder film that was first shown to the public, frame-by-frame, in Life's 29 November 1963 issue, and then locked up in the Time-Life vaults until it was spirited away in 1973 by a researcher intent on airing it to the general public. Whether the film is indeed a pristine copy, or a forgery intended to fit a predetermined analysis of the crime, has until now remained a mystery, like so much else in the case.

ENDNOTES

1. See *New York Times* article, "Pentagon readies efforts to sway sentiment abroad," 19 February 2002.
2. Ibid.
3. Letter to author from Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 27 December 2001.
4. FRUS, 1961-1963, XXV, p. 239; also, letter to author from Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 27 December 2001.
5. Cook, "First Comes The Lie," p. 66.
6. See C.D. Jackson memorandum to Henry Luce, 8 October 1957, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 69, file: 1957 log, 4.
7. See Abbott Washburn memorandum to General Eisenhower regarding, "Development of an Integrated U.S. Psychological Warfare Program," undated, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 83, file: Princeton Meeting, 1.
8. See note 1.
9. Kershaw, *Hitler*, p. 404.
10. Dmitry Urnov, interview, New York, 15 August 2001.
11. See President Dwight D. Eisenhower "Farewell Address," 17 January 1960.
12. Noel Twyman, *Bloody Treason* (Rancho Santa Fe, Calif.: Laurel Publishing, 1997), pp. 134, 135.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Peter Dale Scott, *Deep Politics and the Death of JFK* (Berkeley, Calif. university of California Press, 1993) p. 55.
16. Carl Bernstein, *Rolling Stone Magazine*, 20 October 1977.
17. Ibid.
18. Scott, *Deep Politics*, pp. 55, 56, 113.
19. Jackson discussed the assassination with his foreign bureaus on several occasions, frequently fending off their skepticism of the "official" version of the events in Dallas. See C.D. Jackson to Mr. Alfred Korn, 23 March 1964, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 63.
20. Scott, *Deep Politics*, p. 117.
21. Ibid., p. 56.
22. Ibid.

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